

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*.

A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—*Edmund Burke*.

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ARCHBISHOP TEMPLE'S PRONOUNCEMENT

BY THE EDITOR.

ALL deliberate and authoritative declarations of Dr. Temple, Archbishop of York, demand to be treated by churchmen at the present time with the most serious attention, since his gifts and graces cause him to be regarded by many as the intellectual leader of the Church of England.

The *York Quarterly* for January 1935 publishes under the title 'Belief and Life,' the Archbishop's summing up of the issues involved in the recent Liverpool controversy. The article contains the substance of his address on this point delivered to the York Diocesan Conference in November last.

As all are aware, under the leadership of the Archbishop, the Upper House of the Northern Convocation decided to exclude from all cathedrals and parish churches at non-statutory services, preachers who are not 'prepared to recite the Nicene Creed.'

In his defence of this decision Dr. Temple makes a number of statements which will seem to many as hard to accept as they are hard to confute.

I.

At the outset His Grace stresses the obvious advantages of taking the Nicene Creed as the 'standard of reference.' These advantages are, that the Nicene Creed is very widely accepted, and imposes no novel test of orthodoxy.

Dr. Temple then very properly enquires :

- (1) Has the Church through all these ages been right to take a doctrinal formula as its basis of membership?
- (2) Can it be right to employ as the test for admission or exclusion this formula of the fourth century?

Dr. Temple admits that 'we are sometimes ridiculed for confessing our faith in terms of an obsolete philosophy,' but points out that 'substance' is the only technical philosophical term in our Œcumenical Creed, and 'that is not used in any specialized philosophical sense.' This is true, but if we are to be just to those who criticize the use of the Œcumenical Creed as the standard of modern orthodoxy, we must admit that there are many other things in that Creed to which they object besides the term 'substance.' For instance, they object to its pre-Copernican or 'three-storeyed' conception of the Universe : its localization of heaven : the notion of going up and down as a proper description of the activity of the Logos : the unhistorical character of certain of its statements, for example, the Virgin Birth : the expression of belief in the Apocalyptic return of Christ, as Judge.

Dr. Temple then asks whether the doctrinal affirmation or 'some expression of moral aspiration' should 'be the basis of church membership,' and replies :

'For my own part I have no doubt about the answer to that question. The doctrinal basis is the right basis for two reasons, either of which would be sufficient. (a) Belief concerning God implies a corresponding mode of life. If God is righteous, His worshippers must seek righteousness : if God is love, to be in fellowship with Him is to be filled with love. But a mode of life does not with anything resembling the same cogency involve a belief about God. (b) The second reason for preferring the doctrinal basis is that to put the Church on the basis of ethical aspiration would be to turn it into a society of prigs in three generations.'

We would venture to comment on (a) : 'If God is righteous, His worshippers must seek righteousness : if God is love, to be in

fellowship with Him is to be filled with love.' The Œcumenical Creed does not explicitly affirm that God is righteous nor does it explicitly affirm that God is love. If it did there are many who would feel much happier about its use than they do at present.

Our comment on (b) is that ethical aspiration is not the only alternative to a doctrinal basis: There is a *tertium quid*, the religious basis. This does not consist of the affirmation of the belief in a number of propositions either theological or historical, but in the personal affirmation of a religious attitude towards God. In so far as the Œcumenical Creed does this, and it does so in its formulæ—

‘I believe in one God the Father . . . and in one Lord Jesus Christ . . . and in the Holy Ghost the Lord, and Giver of Life’—

no exception can properly be taken to the Œcumenical Creed by modern orthodox Christians.

Dr. Temple of course is right in his objection to the inadequacy of ethical aspiration as the basis for the faith of the Christian Church. The Christian Church is first and foremost a religious body and its creed must be first and foremost a religious creed—that is, a creed stressing the bond between God and man. That bond, so Jesus Christ affirmed, is a bond of love.

‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind and with all thy strength and thy neighbour as thyself.’

Can it be said that for the ordinary user of the Œcumenical Creed this is stressed with sufficient clearness and force?

And in this connection it is most important to emphasize, for it is an essential and predominant feature of the Christian Religion, that the religious and the ethical are inseparable. The Christian religious affirmation—I believe in the God of Love, is conjoined to, and involves, the ethical affirmation: It is my duty to love. Cardinal Newman once complained that the loveless Dives had no more difficulty about affirming our Œcumenical Creed than had his opposite. Priggishness or no priggishness, ethical aspiration must constitute a basis for the faith of the Christian Church and therefore can and ought to find a place, though not the first place, in any full affirmation of Christian faith and duty.

When Dr. Temple criticizes the futile half-truth, ‘what a

man believes is unimportant : what matters is his life,' we are of course in agreement with him. The half-truth criticized illustrates F. D. Maurice's dictum, 'men are usually wrong in what they deny but right in what they affirm.'

II.

In dealing further with the suitability of the Œcumenical Creed for modern use Dr. Temple writes :

'Our faith is in Christ, not in any formula concerning Him. That is why for the standard expression of this faith an ancient form of words is greatly to be preferred to a form elaborated to-day. For such a form, now constructed, would put a far more stringent fetter upon freedom of thought than any ancient form can do. Everyone knows that our minds do not and cannot work exactly like those of the ancient Fathers: nor did they themselves desire complete uniformity of thought. They provided the Church with a form which essentially expresses what needs to be expressed: so long as the Church takes that view of it, as I have no doubt that it always will, this "form of sound words" provides the standard required more wholesomely than a modern form could.'

We are as convinced as is Dr. Temple that the Œcumenical Creed must be retained in the Church of England. What we desire, however, as His Grace knows, is that the Church should also authorize the use of other Confessions of Christian faith and duty of a more simple and practical character and free from those objections which are urged against the modern use of the prescribed creeds.

When Dr. Temple writes : If our faith be in Christ, not in any formula concerning Him, we cannot but ask : why then trouble so much about the formula and place such stress upon it so that men who have a most profound and reverent faith in Christ are excluded from the ministry and in some cases even from the membership of the Christian Church because they are unable conscientiously to affirm their faith in Christ in the words of the prescribed formula. Is it not possible for the Church, should it not be a duty of the Church, to provide a formula of faith in Christ which such men can use conscientiously?

If an ancient form of words be desired, there are a number of more ancient creeds which would be more acceptable to the modern mind than this fourth century formula and some of these are found in the New Testament itself.

Dr. Temple's plea that the Œcumenical Creed, because of its antiquity, permits more freedom in its interpretation by modern men than could a modern creed, can be used with greater cogency of simpler and more ancient creeds. If we are to go back, let us go right back. On the other hand, if we are to go forward, let us come right forward and trust the Inspiration of the Holy Spirit in this age to enable us as Christians to unite in professing the essentials of our faith.

We venture to think that the Archbishop takes too benign a view of the Conciliar period. It was marked by an appalling fall in the moral and spiritual life of the Church. In their fanatical fury even bishops beat each other to death, and one of the most distinguished bishops of the period wrote that the more he had to do with episcopal assemblies the less he liked them. Perhaps one of the few bright aspects of Church life in that period was the conversion of the Goths and Vandals to the Christian Faith by the exiled Arians and the extension of Christianity Eastward, even to the heart of China by the heretical Nestorians. The conciliar period closed with a thunderclap of judgment when the anti-Christian monotheistic religion of Islam deprived the Christian Church of something like one-third of its adherents.

When the Archbishop asks: 'Has the Church through all these ages been right?' we would dare to enquire what are 'all these ages' in the light of a modern view of human history, past and to come? That most learned prelate Bishop John Wordsworth pointed out the danger in our studies of Church history of regarding the past as longer than the future. If the Church be a Divine Society, as we hold it to be, it is still in its infancy and has many, many thousands of years ahead of it. The prevailing ecclesiastical temptation to fetter Christian thought by the formularies of the past seems to go dangerously near to denying Christian faith in the presence, power and protection of the Holy Spirit to-day—that spirit of Whom the Christ of the Fourth Gospel declares:

'I have many things to say unto you but ye cannot bear them now, but when He the Spirit of Truth is come He shall guide you into all Truth.'

Must we not believe that it was under the guidance of this Divine Spirit of Truth that the Reformed Church of England deliber-

ately refused to regard the General Councils of the Church as infallible.

General Councils . . . (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God) . . . may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God.—*Article xxi.*

III.

The difficulties which beset the Church which erects acceptance of dogmatic formularies as its standard for exclusion or admission to the Church is frankly recognized by the Archbishop. He writes :

‘No doubt this use of the Creed exposes the Church to a certain charge of legalism. For there will be some who are ready to express their faith in the traditional form, who are yet further from the intention of the Nicene Fathers than some who feel bound to refuse to express their faith in that way; correspondingly there are some who refuse, yet are nearer than some who consent. None the less, that consent or refusal puts him who makes it on one side or the other of a watershed . . . One man who refuses to confess in words the Deity of Christ may be nearer to perfect discipleship than another who confesses it; yet the latter stands on the side of the watershed whence flows the stream of Catholic tradition, while the other stands on the side whence the waters flow down to lose themselves in the arid wastes of Pantheism and pure Immanentism.’

The comment we would offer on this statement is (*a*) that a man may be eager to confess in words the Deity of Christ — by which we understand the essential oneness of the Divine Nature in Jesus with the essential oneness of the Divine Nature of the Creative Father — and yet have conscientious objections to making that declaration in the words of the Œcumenical formula because that Œcumenical formula makes a large number of other declarations which he cannot regard as true.

(*b*) We doubt if the either-or of the watershed comparison does actually represent the facts of history. Does not the stream of Catholic tradition too often lose itself in the deleterious marshes of a superstitious and materialistic polytheism unless that Catholic tradition be continuously reinforced by the life-giving streams of the ever-present spirit of truth, freedom and love?

The *impasse* in which a rigidly traditionalist dogmatic Church lands itself finally appears in the Archbishop's concluding reflections :

‘Let there be no confusion between the Church's exclusion of any

man from its teaching ministry and censure on his character. At an earlier time the orthodox were liable to identify heresy and wickedness, and this is the source of a great part of our trouble: for it is now assumed that for the Church to say some man is not an orthodox Christian is a moral judgment upon him. No doubt true orthodoxy and perfect goodness must go together because truth is a part of perfection. But so far as belief and morals fall apart, while sin is more deadly to the isolated individual, heresy is more deadly to the Church, and thus in the long run to individuals also. A man may be at the same time a heretic and a devoutly loyal follower of Christ. But a most sanctified body of Christians who refused or were unable to accept the Catholic faith, would be unable to transmit to the next and following generations the power to which their own sanctity was due.'

What are we to say to these things? If Christian faith be identified with the acceptance of a dogmatic formula and if the Christian moral life be dependent upon the possession of Christian faith, are not Church people justified in assuming that the refusal to accept and profess a dogmatic formula is a reflection on a man's moral character?

A man who does not accept the Nicene Creed must, if we are logical, be regarded as capable of anything morally, or rather immorally, yet much of our experience in our English life indicates that this conclusion is false. Hence we have our English poets who voice the profounder convictions of their countrymen expressing themselves in the following verses:

'For forms of faith let faithless bigots fight,
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right.'

POPE.

'Perplex in faith, but pure in deeds
At last he beat his music out.
There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds.'

TENNYSON.

Charles Kingsley, in writing to an English artisan on the subject of atheism, is careful to distinguish between speculative atheism and practical atheism and dares to affirm that many men who are speculative atheists are not practical atheists and many men who are practical atheists are not speculative atheists. He maintains that what is condemned in the Psalm *Dixit insipiens*, 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God,' is practical, not speculative atheism, and so in the case of Christians. There are speculative Christians and there are practical Christians, and the two, as experience shows, are by no means identical. The Archbishop recognizes this fact.

But the pressing issue is certainly this : Ought not the Christian Church to consist of practical Christians and ought it not to shape its policy so as to strive to include within its membership all practical Christians even though they be not all speculative Christians. Christ seems to have given only one test of orthodoxy and that not a speculative, but a practical test :

‘ By their fruits ye shall know them.’

‘ Not everyone that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven.’

Those who take Christ’s test of orthodoxy as the true test and discount as subordinate and ineffective all others cannot be rightly blamed at the bar of the Christian conscience. If the Church had made this its test of membership, what its history would have been in the way of achievement and victory, in comparison with its present weakness and ineffectiveness, who can say?

We do not, and we wish this to be made quite clear, charge the Archbishop with any lack of charity towards his fellow-Christians, orthodox or unorthodox. We believe him to be warm-hearted and great-hearted, but we cannot fail to recognize the extreme danger and detriment which beset a Church which stands for a policy of rigid traditionalist dogmatic orthodoxy. Such a Church is bound to lose, especially in this age and in this country, from her membership and ministry those for whom the Christian religion is pre-eminently the possession and propagation of the spirit of freedom, truth and love as revealed in the personality and principles of Jesus.

Any body of Christians which possesses this spirit and strenuously and courageously strives to put into practice these principles, though like the Society of Friends, it possessed no dogmatic formulary, is capable of propagating itself to the end of time. The study of the history of dogmatic discipline in the Church and the fanaticism and cruelty, obscurantism and intolerance which have accompanied that dogmatic discipline and have done so much to promote secularism, materialism and separatism should serve as a warning to those, who however well-intentioned and noble-minded, are tempted to promote that dogmatic discipline and temper to-day.

We once said to Dr. Rashdall : ' Surely the supremely important question for religion is whether there be a God ? ' He replied : ' No, the supremely important question is : What is He like ? ' The man who answers that the Divine Nature is that seen in Jesus Christ is orthodox. That answer can be given in two forms :

(1) In words.

(2) In conduct and character.

And here's the rub for the ecclesiastical statesman. There are many who give the answer in the first form who do not give it in the second, and many who give it in the second form who cannot give it in the first.

The reason for this inability of the second class is that they regard their Christian faith as an aspiration, a working hypothesis, not something which is so assured that they can express it in words as an absolute conviction. Their axiom is that of the late Dr. Illingworth :

' The Christian Religion refuses to be proved first and practised afterwards : its practice and its proof go hand in hand.'

In consequence the test of being ' prepared to recite the Nicene Creed ' becomes extraordinarily artificial and inadequate as a means of dealing with the existing religious situation. That is why, although ourselves able to recite the crucial clause in the Nicene Creed, we deplore the action of the Upper House of the Convocation of York in taking the line they took. By their action they have stimulated and hardened the dogmatic spirit within the Church, and have reduced the Church's sympathetic contact with that large and growing body of diffused and practical Christianity outside the Church by contact with which both Church and Nation are profoundly benefited.

Those who realize the implications of faith in the universal Divine Fatherhood, in the Divine Word ' which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,' in the Holy Spirit of Freedom, Truth and Love, who cannot be circumscribed in his operations by the limits of ecclesiastical institutions and regulations, must be compelled to this conclusion.

M. LOISY AND THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL

THE following statement by M. Loisy appeared in a recent number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. It is reproduced here as an admirable summary of the attitude of the Modernist, who is aware of the antiquated and unsatisfactory nature of much traditional Christianity, both in theory and in organization, but feels that the idea underlying both the theory and the organization is the highest to which man has attained, which may be amended and improved, but should not be dropped.

The Editor of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* wrote :

'We had read the work of M. Alfred Loisy on the *Birth of Christianity*: how erudite, how detailed, how negative also, did it appear to us in its conclusions. We took up then the new edition of the *Religion of Israel*, and we saw the author, in his Preface, repudiate all solidarity with those according to whom we are to see in the coming of Christianity "a lamentable aberration which was to make the Mediterranean world deviate from the royal road opened before it by Greek philosophy and science." "This philosophy," went on M. Loisy, "lacked a moral result, which Christianity has known how to give, a result which an exaggerated interpretation of the rôle of intellect in human development tends to compromise nowadays." Finding ourselves in correspondence with the author, we asked him if it would not be possible for him to tell us, to tell perhaps the readers of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, more clearly than he could in a strictly historical work, in what this "moral result" consisted. He answered that he was too much of an invalid to have strength to carry out what we desired. But three days afterwards, "having had some hours of respite and not knowing if he would ever be able to write more on the subject in which we were interested," he wished, in default of a reasoned study which he did not dare undertake, to send us the following pages, in which his considered opinion is expressed.'

So far the Editor of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. M. Loisy then says :

'In my recent publications I allowed myself to say that Christianity had deserved to conquer both Greek science, of which some present-day science considers itself as the legitimate heir, and those religions of salvation, the Mystery-cults, which had undertaken at the same time as Christianity the conquest of the Roman Empire. I am asked if I put the Christian ideal in the "Sermon on the Mount," or in the Pauline theory of grace, or again in the conception of the Church, as if I was obliged to define this ideal in a concrete form, which should be regarded as adequately representing it. Now I do not conceive the Christian ideal, or any ideal, as a thing definable in a concrete form, which should be supposed to delimit it absolutely. An ideal is a living force, which is only provisionally defined in its manifestations.

Thus the Christian ideal expresses itself at the same time both in the notion of a reign of justice realized or realizable with the law of love—although the Gospel expresses this idea utopically (if one may say so) and therefore very imperfectly, by reason of the eschatological form in which it is cast; and in the inward peace of a man that comes from the confidence that faith gives in the profound value of this regeneration of the soul in the reign of justice and love, although the regeneration in question, in the form given by the childish mythological system in which it is expressed in the Epistles, presents it as a Gnosis for as arbitrary and inconsistent as the kinds of Gnosis we call heretical; and in the universal society of believers, the Catholic Church, the common fatherland of souls united in the practice of justice by the law of love and in the confidence which the sentiment of its regeneration assures to the soul by this sublime law—although traditional Catholicism, with its prescribed orthodoxy, its dominating hierarchy, its blindly imperialist papacy, is in many respects like a caricature of this ideal Catholicity which it makes believe to represent.

Thus the Christian ideal might be considered as the essence of Christianity, imperfectly realized in historic Christianity, and might be also considered the essence of human religion, infinitely and more and more realizable in the future.

This Christian ideal, wholly religious and moral, the scientists—those who regret the triumph of Christianity as having been realized at the expense of Greek science and philosophy,

at the expense also of human progress — the scientists, I say, do not perceive that it (the Christian ideal) has produced the success of Christianity by reason of the higher degree of humanity which was implied in the Gospel and the Church. They do not perceive that the principal nerve, the true spring of human society is not science but love and self-devotion, and that Christianity, which has laid down this principle in applying it to all humanity, was thus proclaiming a law of humanity far superior to all the religions of antiquity, as it was to all the speculations and science of Hellenism. Moreover, as regards this philosophy and this science which could not prevail against Christianity, has one not the right to say that Christianity has saved them from complete ruin by transmitting them to the new peoples whose education it has made? There is therefore no justification for bringing a prosecution against Christianity on the grounds of Hellenic science and philosophy. The attitude of Christian Churches and theologies towards the scientific movement in these last days is another question, into which we need not enter; it is intimately connected with the decadence of the existing forms of Christianity.

As for the Socialists of various shades, they too profess an ideal of humanity, of which most of them consider that Christianity is the enemy. An ideal more truly called inhuman in its rigour and its systematic definitions! An almost automatic distribution of the good of this earth for the profit of all; an economic exploitation of this planet for the advantage of the masses, without any privilege of individual or class! In this intention there is a real sentiment of humanity; in the execution a veritable devotion to the common work, and an enthusiasm more religious and mystic at bottom than it is believed to be. But in this there is a terrible lack of soul. One would say that this "humanity" ignores the highest delights of the spirit. That there is much, almost everything, to be done in the sphere of economic justice no being truly human will deny; but that is not the whole man, it is not all humanity. And this attitude threatens to ruin that spiritual possession which the Christian ideal has attained. Let us have economic justice as much as you will; but also, but first, the complete love of entire humanity, the law of love and self-sacrifice, the grace and joy of souls in

the consciousness of the high, free, beneficent and friendly service, which should characterize the new humanity, the true Church, in which hate, violence, and narrow fanaticism, are unknown.—A. LOISY.'

F. C. BURKITT.

PARLIAMENT AND CHURCH REFORM

By the Rev. GAMALIEL MILNER, M.A., author of *The Problem of Decadence* and *The Threshold of the Victorian Age*.

OUR former article dealt with the great burst of reforming energy which followed the opening of the Victorian Age in 1830, and with the valuable measures passed by Parliament for the better administration of the Church. To-day we stand at the beginning of a new period. The fifteen years that followed the Treaty of Versailles, like the fifteen years that followed the Treaty of Vienna, were hectic years, a post-War interlude. Civilization reeled under the shock of the great catastrophe, and it has taken it half a generation to recover stability. On both sides of the Atlantic the great slump has had a sobering effect, and the phase of recklessness and irresponsibility is over. The younger generation, resembling in this if in nothing else the early Victorians, are portentously in earnest. The Victorian age ended on a note of gentle scepticism; it was bad form to show strong feeling about anything. Jowett shuddered when the repentant undergraduate told him that he had 'found Jesus,' and begged him not to talk about it. Of course the new-born seriousness does not always take a religious form; it is sometimes anti-religious or unmoral. The Oxford Union, for example, decides that it has no use for conventional morality. Sometimes it is politics that supplies the motive power for the new life; young men and maidens are converted to Fascism or Communism; there are few respectable Conservatives or Liberals among the younger generation; even Socialism is voted somewhat old-fashioned. Others seek salvation in modernistic poetry or in sun-bathing. To many the Church of England seems a bit Victorian lumber which calls aloud for drastic treatment. Its institutions are not likely to be so tenderly handled as they were by the Whig aristocrats of the reign of William IV.

The Victorian Age, once its stormy beginnings were past, proved a time of peace and prosperity for the Anglican Church. It was also, judged by every statistical test, a time of progress. Never had so many new churches been built, and old ones restored. New parishes were formed, new sees created, agencies for good, parochial machinery of all kinds, were multiplied to an almost embarrassing extent. Services became more frequent and ritual more elaborate, and if the number of worshippers did not keep pace with increased opportunities for the enjoyment of the means of grace, the compilers of the Official Year Books (when the growing taste for statistics led to the production of such works) were able to tabulate reassuring figures as to number of communicants, Confirmations and the like.

Writers of Church History are apt to devote a disproportionate amount of space to disputes about doctrine and ritual, and the wrangles of controversialists. In their pages the ecclesiastical history of the nineteenth century appears as a succession of crises. Froude calls the secession of Newman 'a blow under which the Church of England still reels.' But the average church-goer of the period thought Newman a sophistical hair-splitter who tried to explain away the plain common-sense of the Thirty-nine Articles, of whom the Protestant Church of England was well rid. Egypt was glad at his departing. Again, we are told of the shattering effect of the great discoveries of science and archaeology at the beginning of the sixties. But the earthquake did not shake very appreciably the solid fabric of the Victorian Church. Most people thought of Darwin as an odd-looking man who wrote a book to prove that men were descended from monkeys; Colenso, it was generally felt, would have been better employed in writing arithmetic books or in converting the Zulus than in picking holes in the Holy Scriptures. The antics of the Ritualists attracted more attention and excited more annoyance, but most sensible people felt that this sort of mummary would never go down with self-respecting, level-headed Englishmen.

Of course the average man was wrong; he usually is in the long run, but it takes some time to prove him so, and he is generally dead first. The year 1850 or thereabouts marked a turn in the tide. The waves of scepticism which had to all ap-

appearance receded during the first half of the century began to gain ground once more as position after position of the old orthodoxy was rendered intellectually untenable. Even Ritualism, it turned out, meant something deeper than a liking for outlandish garments and weird ceremonies. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a quite perceptible change in the atmosphere, an ominous feeling that, in spite of the Church's manifold activities, all was not well with the spiritual state of the nation. How far things had moved may be seen from a comparison between, say, *David Copperfield* and *Jude the Obscure*.

Social changes meanwhile were affecting the life of the national Church, which, for good or evil, had always been closely identified with the traditional order of society. The England of the parson and the squire was disappearing; at the country houses there dwelt either the impoverished inheritors of a great name or representatives of the new wealthy class. And the fall in the price of corn, which had caused the agricultural depression, affected the clergy directly by drastic reduction in the amount of tithe. Fathers began to dislike the idea of their sons going into the Church, and the more thoughtful of the younger generation were often disinclined for reasons other than financial to take Holy Orders. The supply of ordinands was well kept up as far as numbers were concerned, but an increasing proportion of them came from the theological colleges of which Cuddesdon, founded by Samuel Wilberforce, was the prototype. These colleges were mostly under High Church influence.

For the once-despised Ritualist (he had begun to be called by this time an Anglo-Catholic) had now become a power in the Church. In 1874 a campaign initiated with much sound and fury had been begun to put down Ritualism. The Public Worship Regulation Act which was to effect this object was the work of a powerful triumvirate, Archbishop Tait, the first of the three catchmen who were to occupy the throne of St. Augustine, Mr. Disraeli, and, behind the scenes, Queen Victoria. In spite of the opposition of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Salisbury it passed both Houses by large majorities. *Punch* had satirized Lord John Russell as the boy who scrawled up 'No Popery' and then ran away. Disraeli and Tait did not exactly run away; they died,

one in 1881 and the other in 1882; for twenty years, with the short interval of Lord Rosebery's Premiership, Gladstone and Lord Salisbury appointed the Bishops. The Public Worship Act was clumsily drawn and seemed designed to produce the minimum of effect with the maximum of irritation. Nine incumbents, whose names figure as martyrs in Anglo-Catholic hagiology, suffered imprisonment for refusing to obey the orders of what they regarded as an illegal court. Public opinion gradually turned in their favour. The Bishops gladly availed themselves of a proviso in the Act which permitted them to veto proceedings. The perfectly well-grounded grievances of the laity against a system which left them without any effective redress were exploited by a class of agitators who by their violence and vituperation contrived to make the term 'Protestant' generally odious.

Yet the lawlessness of the Anglo-Catholics had an appreciable influence in reviving the agitation for disestablishment which had slumbered since the thirties; the disestablishment of the Church of England was one of the planks in the unauthorized programme put forward by the Radicals in 1885; the disestablishment of the Church in Wales was an accomplished fact before the War.

Nowhere, perhaps, was the earthquake shock of the War so vividly felt as in England. England, indeed, did not see its territories invaded as did France, or occupied as did Germany; but for these countries war on a great scale was a living memory; even in America there were old people who remembered the Secession struggle. But the Englishman of 1914 knew of war only as a far-off echo from a distant continent, Africa or Asia. The natural result of the fearful impact on men's minds was to produce what we may call the apocalyptic temper, a mental state by turns extravagantly pessimistic and unreasonably hopeful. Alternately we grovelled in contrition over our corporate failure and exulted in the wonderful revival that was to follow, when by means of the now almost forgotten National Mission the nation had been got upon its knees. (In actual physical fact a large part of the nation was up to its knees in Flanders mud and perfectly oblivious of the Mission.) Perhaps we shall best recall the spirit of the time by quoting one or two sentences from the

Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Report of the Committee on the Administrative Reform of the Church. The writer, be it remembered, was Archbishop Davidson, the sagacious Scot whose moderation was known unto all men. His Grace says : ' Two years ago, in this grave crisis of our nation's history, after much thought and prayer, we called the people of England to a National Mission of Repentance and Hope . . . In every diocese and parish we sought fresh guidance of the Holy Spirit to reveal to us our own failures, both as individuals and as members of the Church and nation. Then followed in every corner of the land the Mission-call to corporate repentance and to hope in Christ as the living answer to our needs. The call told : not, of course, universally, but very widely. We found that people were ready to face familiar facts afresh : that a new spirit was breathing upon dry bones : that we must, and could, be up and doing.' This, of course, is a very mild specimen of the sort of rhetoric with which ecclesiastics from bishops down to the humblest curate improved the occasion and relieved their feelings.

It was in this hectic state of the public mind that an organization called the Life and Liberty Fellowship sprang into existence. Its alliterative and vaguely inspiring title caught on. It suggested that one cause of the Church's failure was its servitude to the State. The Church must be free, free to reform itself, free to welcome to its bosom the separate sects, free to lead the nation along the path of social reconstruction.

Five Commissions were appointed by the Archbishops, the progenitors of a countless host of commissions whose reports the Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly issues thick as leaves in Vallombrosa, so as to give fresh point to Sydney Smith's jest that the world had been delivered from the Deluge only to be overwhelmed by a flood of commissions. But the commissions which Sydney lamented were Parliamentary commissions ; these were Archiepiscopal ones. The change was significant ; the Church was now to set its own house in order. Sydney Smith, when speaking of the horde of commissions appointed by the Whigs, said, ' The *onus probandi* now lies upon any man who says that he is not a commissioner,' but in the commissions appointed by the Archbishops the same names recur

with the irritating pertinacity of circulating decimals, and not a few of these commissioners have since attained to episcopal rank.

The one class that was not adequately represented on these commissions was the class that had most to do with working the institutions of the Church, the parochial clergy. The end of the War was marked by a wave of anti-clericalism. There had been endless talk about the failure of the Church, and the Church, whatever anyone may say to the contrary, means for the average man the parson. The exemption of the clergy from military service did not enhance their prestige; during the War they were denounced as not sufficiently patriotic, and when it was over they were reproached with having turned their churches into recruiting offices. The tendency therefore of the Reports of the Commissions was to depress the inferior clergy and to exalt the episcopate. (We may compare Ezekiel's vision of the renovated Temple in which the unfortunate Levites are to be reduced to the rank of servitors and the sons of Zadok are to stand before the Lord.)

The rather apathetic and war-weary Parliament which was elected in 1918 was induced to pass the Enabling Act which gave powers to the Church Assembly, a body which consisted of the two Houses of Convocation, the House of Clergy consisting as to one-third of its members of dignitaries, with a House of Laymen tacked on to it, this latter chosen by a complicated system of indirect election which makes it in fact very imperfectly representative of the laity; it is based in theory on electoral rolls which contain scarcely a tithe of the population, and probably not one per cent. of the parochial electors knows the name of his representative. The most efficient part of the machinery which has since been set up was the Parochial Church Councils, which in many parishes have done good work and are of real assistance to the incumbent.

Church reform stands for two ideas, first such a change in the doctrine and practice of the Church as may bring it into harmony with the best ideals of the age, and secondly the removal of those anomalies and abuses which clog the efficient working of the Church as a machine. At the beginning of the sixteenth century there was a well-nigh universal feeling among all men

of intelligence and goodwill that the Church needed a reformation. Luther, Erasmus and Pius V were all Reformers, but they differed widely as to the kind of reformation that was necessary. The party which triumphed at the Council of Trent abolished many age-long abuses and raised the tone of clerical morality, but they left the doctrinal standards unchanged, or rather, by exact definition they made many things rigid which were formerly fluid and uncertain. Modernists would not be satisfied with such a reform of the Church of England any more than were the Protestants and Humanists in the sixteenth century; while they are in nowise blind to the need for greater efficiency, their chief desire is the removal of those stumbling blocks which are preventing an increasing number of modern men from finding a spiritual home in the Church of their fathers.

The chief contribution which the Church Assembly has offered towards liturgical reform has been the New Prayer Book, which was rejected by Parliament in 1927, and the revised edition of the same, which suffered the same fate in 1928. We say liturgical reform, not doctrinal, for we were solemnly assured on the highest authority that the New Book involved no change in the doctrine of the Church of England. The Composite Book which was presented to Parliament was the result of a long process of revisal going back to 1906, when Convocation received letters of business empowering it to revise the Prayer Book. It was a conflation of various books and earlier documents, and its Higher Criticism would be a task compared with which the labours of Wellhausen and his forerunners would be mere child's play. We have no desire to revive extinct controversies; Modernists, like other sections of Churchmen, were divided on the merits of the new liturgy; some of us thought that it was worth accepting as a step in the right direction, others felt that its concessions to the Anglo-Catholics nullified any possible gain that we might derive from its use. It certainly excited no enthusiasm amongst any Church Party, and if its premature demise at the hand of Parliament evoked a sigh, it was one of general relief — except among the Bishops.

To the humbler but necessary work of practical reform the Church Assembly at its first inception addressed itself with a good deal of vigour. The clergy complained that burdens griev-

ous to be borne were laid upon their shoulders, and that their independence was being undermined by the increasing pressure of officialdom. The feeling of the laity for the Quota resembled that of the French peasants for the *gabelle* or the Indian ryots for the salt tax. There was one class of reformers, never perhaps very numerous, who suffered a grievous disappointment, that section of the laity who thought that under the new democratic constitution of the Church parishioners would be given a real voice in the selection of their incumbent. The second Report of the Patronage Committee, after laying down certain principles which need not detain us, sums up as follows :

‘ After long and careful consideration they have come to the conclusion that the most satisfactory way of giving effect to these principles is by an enlargement of the powers of the Bishop.’

We are reminded of the least creditable episode in the career of the great Clive, as described by Macaulay :

‘ Clive then turned to Mr. Srafton, one of the servants of the Company, and said in English, “ It is now time to undeceive Omichund.” “ Omichund,” said Mr. Srafton in Hindustani, “ the red treaty is a trick. You are to have nothing.” Omichund fell back insensible into the arms of his attendants . . . From the moment of that sudden shock, the unhappy man sank gradually into idiocy.’

We do not suppose that any of the laity who supported the Life and Liberty Movement have been affected to such a painful extent, yet we think that they have fair ground for complaint. This applies particularly to those who think, we believe rightly, that the way to restrain the excesses of the Anglo-Catholics is not by legal processes, which only lead to friction and create martyrs, but by a real enlargement of the powers of the laity.

One alarming feature of the present situation is a revival of the cry for disestablishment. Mr. Garvin, in his monumental *Life of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain*, pointed out that disestablishment, which was a live issue in 1885, had receded into the background. Labour showed no particular desire to take over this part of the inheritance of their Radical precursors. No candidate of any party, we believe, mentioned it at the last election. That the spectre which was believed to be laid now once more stalks abroad is the result of the activities of the Bishop of Durham and the organizers of the anti-tithe war. The Bishop wants the Church to be disestablished because Parliament would

not swallow the New Prayer Book, and Mr. Kedward and his associates are taking practical steps towards its disendowment without waiting for the consent of Parliament.

We are all of us inclined from time to time to weary of the schemes of Church reformers and to echo the complaint of the Conservative Butler that the Puritans wanted the Reformation to be always going on,

‘As if religion was intended
For nothing else but to be mended.’

But in truth the need for reform in an institution is as continuous and insistent as the need for contrition and amendment in an individual; it cannot be done once and for all and be got over. It is essentially a spiritual process and not to be accomplished by tinkering with machinery. We must remember this when we are asked for practical proposals. Modernists as such are not committed to any theory about the relations of Church and State. We understand that in a changing world, and in a world changing so rapidly as that in which we live, the traditional form of their relationship may come to be modified. If a separation like that which exists in the United States and our own Colonies comes about, Liberal Christianity will survive the change and adapt itself to the new conditions. But the recent trend of events on the Continent of Europe hardly justifies the expectation that secular rulers will treat religion and its manifestations as outside the sphere of their control. Religion is too vital a matter to be ignored by the modern Totalitarian State as we see it in Russia, Germany and Italy. There is a difference, no doubt, between the savage repression of Stalin, the bullying of Herr Hitler, and the kindly but rather overwhelming patronage of Signor Mussolini, but all would agree that religion cannot be ignored.

It is inevitable that for the present our attitude towards practical questions should be one of opportunism. There is nothing, for example, sacrosanct about the system by which the King by the advice of his Prime Minister, who may not be even nominally a member of any Christian Church, nominates Bishops; all that we say is that we think that on the whole such a mode of selection is preferable to leaving the appointment in the hands of an ecclesiastical clique, which would be the probable result of the

acceptance of the proposals of Lord Wolmer and his friends. So again with the parson's freehold, the principle of the Common Law that a clergyman cannot be deprived of his benefice without a legal process. It is not an ideal arrangement and it leads to some bad results. The Committee on the Administrative Reform of the Church recommended that appointments should be made for ten years only and should require renewal. Against this proposal the late Dean of Carlisle, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, who was one of the Commissioners, entered a strong protest. His words are worth quoting :

‘I should strongly object to bestowing upon a Bishop, or any diocesan Committee, the power of getting rid at the end of ten years of a clergyman who had created enemies whether on account of the independence of his conduct or the unorthodoxy of his social, political, or religious opinions without cause assigned by the easy method of allowing his appointment to lapse.’

We may conclude by laying down two principles on which Modernists ought to insist :

(1) No reform of the Church will be acceptable to us which does not ensure that Liberal Christianity shall at least be tolerated. We are aware that those who call themselves Modernists are at present a minority in the Church of England. Unhappily during the nineteenth century many persons of devout minds were alienated from the Church because they could not accept outworn dogmatic standards. Things doubtless have changed for the better, but it will be long before the harm done can be repaired. The result of this ban on liberal opinions is that the Modernist Party is weaker than it would naturally be if a more tolerant policy had been pursued. We claim that we are speaking for the Church that is to be. How far our claim is justified time will show. We cannot accept a constitution of the Church under which a majority, or even a well-organized minority, would be able to control the Church.

That is why we feel that all proposals for the self-government of the Church should be carefully scrutinized. Parliament and the law courts have in the past afforded protection to minorities, and not to liberal minorities only. Probably if the Church had enjoyed (or suffered) self-government about 1850 the Puseyites would have been expelled. At an earlier period Evangelicals were regarded as scarcely disguised traitors,

Methodists in disguise. As late as 1850 Bishop Philpotts refused to institute Mr. Gorham into the living of Bampton Speke because he taught the ordinary Evangelical doctrine about Infant Baptism, and it was only the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which asserted the comprehensiveness of the Church of England.

(2) We desire a reform of the Church which shall make reunion with the Free Churches easier and not more difficult. One reason for the undue influence exercised at present by the Anglo-Catholic Party is that a large section of the English people which is Protestant is now outside the Church of England. The Anglo-Catholic attitude towards reunion must be, even if unconsciously, influenced by this fact. They cannot help desiring the continuance of a state of things which makes it easier to make the Church of England what they call 'Catholic.' Morally the ancient endowments of the Church belong to the whole English people; to divert them to secular purposes would be a triumph for materialism, to divide them among the sects would only help to perpetuate schism. We are not in favour of handing them unreservedly over to a Church assembly which even in theory represents only one denomination.

THE CENTENARY OF EDWARD IRVING*

By the Rev. A. J. CARLYLE, M.A., D.Litt., D.D.

YOU have done me the honour of asking me to speak to-day in memory of a man to whom I am bound by that tie of kinship, which happily is still great and strong among us in Scotland; and in this place where my father, who was himself a minister of the Church of Scotland, now happily re-united, was for many years brought up among the family of his mother, the sister of Irving. And though I cannot myself, of course, speak of any memories, my father, though he was but a boy of thirteen when Irving died, had a living memory of his moving and impressive personality, as when he read to them one day at family worship that great and moving poem of human life and Divine compassion: 'Bless the Lord, oh! my soul, and all that is within me . . . and forget not all his benefits—Who forgiveth all thy iniquities. Who healeth all thy diseases.'

It is not for me to measure all the various aspects of his life and actions, but it is possible to see and understand something of the man, something also of his relation to the conditions and circumstances of the life of that time. In his letters, and in those moving recollections of our own great kinsman, Thomas Carlyle, we have a living and speaking impression of a great and lovable human being. And in some of his speeches and sermons we can still see the traces of his relation to that great movement of the human spirit which we call 'Romantic.' For that great movement was not, as some people think, only a movement in Literature and Philosophy, rather is it true that the Literature and Philosophy were the expression of a new and revolutionary sense of life which showed itself in many ways, and under many terms, and not least under the terms of religion.

The truth is that Edward Irving came into a world of revolutionary movement, but that which is, for our present purpose, the most significant aspect of it, was the revolt against the merely rational spirit, the spirit which thought that men were governed

* An Address delivered in Annan Old Church on December 7th, 1934.

and controlled by mere logical reasoning, or by prudent calculation of that which makes for the useful or profitable. Men were once more aware that the truth of life and of religion lay in the passionate apprehension of realities which lie behind the superficial appearance of things.

Those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings,
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realised,
High instincts before which our mortal nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised :
But for those first affections,
Those shadowy recollections,
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing ;
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal silence.

They saw themselves once more, not as the mere creatures of a day, but as 'pilgrims of eternity.' They saw once more the majesty and magnificence of human life, not as humble and mean, but as bearing upon it continually the image and likeness of God. It is no wonder that sometimes they were carried away with what may seem to us impossible and even fantastic dreams. But 'once to have hoped is no matter for scorning,' and it is to this great revival of the spiritual that we owe the greater part of what is most real and profound in modern life.

I think that it is thus that we must understand the effect of those first years of Irving's ministry in London, the crowds of men of all sorts and kinds. For certainly his preaching was not what we should call, in the ordinary sense, popular. I doubt if any of us would nowadays have the courage to impose upon our people either the length or the weight of his discourses. He went back, and no doubt deliberately, like some of the great writers of that period, not only in England but on the Continent, to the fiction and manner of the divines and other writers of the Elizabethan and Jacobean times, to Hooker and Milton's prose, to that great periodic style which we may admire but cannot imitate. There is a sonorous magnificence about some of his sermons or

addresses which is not only beyond our power, and I daresay uncongenial to our habit of mind, but intelligible, as belonging to those years when men were awakening once again to the mystery and wonder which lie behind the apparently simplest things, and were dissatisfied with the apparent but often misleading lucidity of common-sense.

You will not misunderstand me, for I am well aware of the great services which what is called, in a rather cant phrase, the 'Age of Reason,' had rendered to the advance of truth. In this world, men being what they are, it is not possible that we should be able to see all truth clear and complete and perfect; we must be content, being but 'half men,' as Robert Browning has said, to see in part and to understand in part.

I have found some words in Irving's addresses 'On the Word of God,' which seem to me very characteristic of the man and the time. Speaking of the preparation for consulting the Word of God, he says of the catechisms, 'They have the disadvantage of presenting the truth in a form altogether different from what it occupies in the Word itself. In the one, it is presented to the intellect chiefly (and in the catechism of our Church, to an intellect of a very subtle order); in the other, it is presented more frequently to the heart, to the affections, to the imitation, to the fancy, and to all the faculties of the soul. In early youth, which is applied to with these compilations, an association takes place between religion and intellect, and a divorcement of religion from the other powers of the inner man, which derangement, judging from observation and experience, it is exceedingly difficult to set to rights in after life.' And a little farther on he says, in notable words, 'Therefore, while the warm fancies of the Southerners have given their idolatry to the ideal forms of noble art, let us Northerners beware we give not our idolatry to the cold and coarse abstractions of the human intellect.'

It is the revolt against the common-place and conventional which gives its meaning to the 'Addresses on Missionaries after the Apostolical School,' which were published in 1825 and were expanded from the original sermon at the anniversary of the London Missionary Society; and which, as I should gather, from Mrs. Oliphant's *Life*, were received with some astonish-

ment and irritation by many among the religious public. Indeed, I am not wholly surprised at this, nor would I venture to say that there is not in these addresses a certain half-humorous wilfulness.

They serve, however, admirably to bring out that side of Irving's character and temperament with which I am now concerned, and there are some words in the Preface which seem to me very characteristic.

'This is,' he says, 'the age of expediency, both in the Church and out of the Church, and all institutions are modelled upon the principles of expediency, and carried into effect by the rules of prudence. I remember, in this metropolis, to have heard it uttered with great applause in a public meeting, where the heads and leaders of that religious world were present, 'If I were asked what was the first qualification for a Missionary, I would say Prudence: and what the second? Prudence; and what the third? still I would answer Prudence.' I trembled when I heard, not with indignation, but with horror and apprehension, what the end would be of a spirit which I have since found to be the presiding genius of our activity, the Ruler of the Ascendant. And now, if I read the eleventh chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, I find that . . . Faith is there defined 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,' while prudence or expediency is the substance of things present, the evidence of things seen.'

And a little further on: 'This evil beast of prudence to become the death of all ideal and invisible things, whether poetry, sentiment, honour, disinterestedness, or faith, it is the great prerogative of religious faith to withstand, because religious faith is the only form of the ideal which hath the assurance from heaven, of a present blessing and an everlasting reward.'

I think that it was by a singular felicity of insight that Irving dedicated these Addresses to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, as to one who had been 'more profitable . . . to my spiritual understanding of the Word of God, and to my right conception of the Christian Church, than any or all of the men with whom I have entertained friendship and conversation.'

If anyone should say that such words of Irving's as I have just read to you, contain some germs of what to most of us will

seem the extravagance of later years, I should not wholly deny it; but I should beg you to remember that it is better that men should embrace the great adventure of life than that they should stand aside in cold and calculating prudence. You will remember the great lines of Walter Scott :

One crowded hour of glorious life
Is worth an age without a name.

I think that you will agree with me that the whole bent of Irving's mind was towards the qualities of the Romantic Revolt against the Utilitarians, the narrow conceptions of the rational common-sense, and that the expression of this in style and language which is reminiscent of the great writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is very intelligible.

And this takes me to another quality of Irving's temper, and that is his high conception of the meaning of the common life of the Religious Society, that is the Church. It is indeed true that in Scotland, owing to the constitutional order of the Church, this had, happily, never been obscured as much as in England, where it required the great impulse of the Tractarian movement to bring it back to men's experience. It had been the great weakness of the Evangelical revival in England that while it justly laid such emphasis on the individual religion, it had on the whole little sense of the community. To Irving, as I understand, this was wholly repugnant. We may be compelled to feel that there is in his eloquent reconstruction of the history of the Church of Scotland in his *Historical View of the Church of Scotland before the Reformation* much which we cannot accept as historically valid; nor would we follow him in his indiscriminating censure of the great Roman Church; but it is significant of the tendency of his mind that he should be so greatly concerned with the continuity of the life of the Christian Church in Scotland.

Of those questions which finally brought about the critical attitude of the General Assembly, and his deposition from the ministry by the Presbytery of Annan, I do not think you will require me to say much. It is many years since my own work has led me into other aspects of history than the great monophysite and monothelite controversies, and I venture to think that we

should be well content to accept for those great questions the words of St. Leo, that our Lord was 'totus in suis, totus atque in nostris' — whole and complete in the divine nature, whole also and complete in the human nature. I think it is clear that Edward Irving was concerned not to change anything in those great conceptions, but to vindicate in terms which may or may not have been wholly well chosen, the complete reality of the human nature of the Lord, the complete fellowship of the divine and the human.

There is indeed something tragic in the spectacle of a man profoundly devoted to his great Church, of which he was a passionate lover, cast out of its ministry and service, and one can but venture to hope and believe that in these days, though we make no claim to be better than our fathers, we have at least earned a greater patience, a wiser tolerance, a fuller understanding.

You will allow me to pass to that other and more grateful aspect of our subject, to the character and quality of the man, for it is here that we find something wholly admirable, and, happily, we have an excellent picture of this, not only in the kindly and human *Life* of Mrs. Oliphant, but even more in the moving *Recollections* of a great friendship, by Thomas Carlyle. For, indeed, Irving was a great and lovable human being, warm-hearted, gracious, simple, kindly, and yet with a certain simple magnificence. I cannot speak to you with any personal knowledge of the conditions under which Irving lived as a boy here in Annan, for like so many Scotsmen I was born far away in India, and lived during my boyhood in various European countries. But I can happily understand something of his life when from Annan he went to the University of Edinburgh; for as he went out into that new world when he was thirteen, I went to the sister University of Glasgow when I was fifteen, and I can understand something of his experience; as to this day I can never forget the beginnings of the great adventure in the new world of knowledge and learning.

I owe an immense debt to that great University of Oxford, of which, as well as of Glasgow, I am still a member, and in which I work. I can never forget the gracious and kindly welcome which it gave to the young and inexperienced scholar; I

am still, and will always remain under the spell of that glamour which it casts over us, the kindly tolerance, the mellow wisdom, the free play of mind upon mind, of soul upon soul. But also I never can forget my first mother. Our November days are often dark and cloudy. I remember the dusk of the early mornings through which the insistent clamour of the bell summoned us to our places. But to what a new world it called us, to what a new light, a new sense of life, to what a new commonwealth!

Our Scottish Universities have been—I suppose for that matter they still are—poor in means, compared with the great and wealthy Universities of the South; but I think that in some ways they have played at least as great a part in the life of the Scottish nation. They have always been the universities of the Scottish people; they have drawn their students from the whole community, and they have consequently given back to the whole community something of their own intellectual and spiritual life. It is indeed no small thing that for many generations few households have not, through some member or another, had some touch with the intellectual world. How constantly do we find that some of the greatest servants of our country, in State as well as in Church, come from the humblest and poorest homes. Poor the Scottish student has been, and still I trust is. I well remember canvassing among the students for the Rectorial election of 1877, and finding many of them living in the garrets of the poorest parts of Glasgow, and some of them living mainly on the provisions which they had brought with them from their homes. But they were free and equal citizens of the great Republic of Letters, and not rarely the poorest were the most distinguished.

Edward Irving and the brother, with whom he went to Edinburgh, lived the life, if not of the poorest, still of the poor. But that was a little thing; it was a new life and a new world. Much has changed in the studies and methods of our Scottish Universities since that time, and even since my own; but whatever may have been the gain, the older course, with its combination of literature, of philosophy, and the mathematical sciences, gave to the students some sense of the meaning of the intellectual life.

The story of the seven years during which Irving was headmaster of the school of Kirkcaldy, as recorded by Thomas Carlyle, are vivid and interesting; but for that great calling, he felt

no vocation, and it was not till the happy insight of Chalmers brought him to Glasgow that his proper work began. It is apparent that his powers as a preacher were not recognized, probably indeed they were still unformed, but the manner of his life and work in those years among the poverty-stricken people of Glasgow reveal the man. The simple and sincere kindliness, the human sympathy, the unaffected and gracious brotherliness, and with this a certain grave and majestic dignity, as of one who knew that he was the minister of Christ, and who invoked the peace of God upon every house, and the blessing of God on every child—these are the very man himself. For it was the union of such qualities which made the man, and it was with these qualities that he went to London, to that chequered career, in which for a few years he was in men's estimation illustrious and singular, and finally, broken in all but his faith and his humanity. It is not an easy thing now to recover the sense of the qualities which gave Irving that force and power, which for a time commanded the attention of multitudes. The fashion of men's speech changes, and it is only rarely that the written record conveys more than a shadow of the effect of the spoken word. That is true, not only of great preachers, but of the great political and Parliamentary speakers. A few indeed survive like Burke and Abraham Lincoln, but it is only a few. And I think this lies in the nature of things, for the speaker, if he is a speaker, addresses a particular audience, under particular circumstances, under the terms and forms of the day and the moment.

I have read to you some sentences from his Addresses which illustrate the temper and something of the method of Irving's preaching. I am, however, inclined to think that it is easier to see the character of his speaking through the impressions of others, and especially of his friend, Thomas Carlyle. Here are some of the terms in which Carlyle speaks of him in the earliest days of his licentiate as a probationer of Kirkcaldy: 'Irving's preaching was always interesting to whoever had acquaintance with him, especially to us who were his intimates . . . We enjoyed the bold potency of his delineations, exhortations, and free flowing eloquence, which had all a moving and original tone. And then afterwards there was seen to be on the part of the public a great deal of criticism, which also had its interest for us.'

And again : ‘ On the whole, Irving’s style was sufficiently surprising to his hide-bound public, and this was but a slight circumstance to the novelty of the matter he set before them. Actual practice ! “ If this is true, why not do it ? You had better do it. There will be nothing but misery and ruin in not doing it.” That was the great and continual purport of all his discoursing to the astonishment and deep offence of hide-bound mankind.’

And again, in a passage where he compares the qualities of Irving’s mature preaching with that of Chalmers : ‘ Irving’s discourses were far more opulent in ingenious thought than Chalmers, which indeed were usually the triumphant onrush of one idea, with its satellites and supporters. But Irving’s wanted in a definite head and backbone, so that on arriving you might see clearly where and how ; that was mostly a defect one felt in traversing those grand forest avenues of his, with their multifarious outlook to right and left. He had many thoughts pregnantly expressed, but they did not tend all one way. The reason was, there were in him infinitely more thoughts than in Chalmers, and he took far less pains in setting them forth.’

I think that from such impressions one can gather something of the nature of the effect of Irving’s preaching, the imaginative range, the rounded eloquence, but above all, the force and sincerity of the man.

For again that is what we come to finally, the man himself, a certain magnificence of body and character, but with it an almost unexpected openness of mind, and a singular humility. Carlyle relates how Irving, after reading *Wilhelm Meister’s Wanderjahre*, said : ‘ In this German poet there are some pages about Christ and the Christian religion, which, as I study and re-study them, have more sense about that matter than all the theologians I have ever read.’

And it would be difficult to find a more moving picture of the humility of a great nature than in the account of the last visit which Irving paid to the Carlyles, when they, with the greatest sincerity and kindness, remonstrated with him on the way he was going, for this was the time of the prophesyings and tongues : ‘ During all this, which perhaps lasted about twenty minutes,

Irving sat opposite to me . . . silent and sad-looking, with head downcast, face indicating great pain, but without the slightest word or sound from him, till I had altogether ended. He then began with the mildest low tone, and face full of kindness and careful diction : " Dear friend," and endeavoured to make his apology and defence, which did not last long, or do anything to convince me, but was in a style of modesty and friendly magnanimity which no mortal could surpass, and which remains to me at this moment dear and memorable and worthy of all honour.'

It is time this tale should have an end. You have asked me to speak of a man, who was also my kinsman, and if I may have seemed to you to have failed in criticism or judgment, the fault does not lie with me, for there would be a certain impiety that I should do this. I have endeavoured to recall a great and gracious human being, a faithful servant, as he understood it, of God and man, a man of large and generous temper. And I have endeavoured to suggest to you that in order to understand him you must see him against the background of that great and turbulent and revolutionary time, when men's minds were possessed by a new sense of the greatness, the majesty, the beauty of human life, and of its nearness to the Divine. That some of the greatest men of that time should have fallen by the way, carried beyond themselves and the possibilities of life, is no wonder. But once again men saw the heavens opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the son of man.

While we, the brave, the mighty and the wise,
 We men, who in our morn of youth defied
 The elements, must vanish — be it so.
 Enough, if something from our hands have power
 To live and act, and serve the future hour;
 And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
 Through love, through hope, and faith's transcendent dower,
 We feel that we are greater than we know.

THE THEOLOGY OF ECLIPSE¹

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PROFESSOR Brunner's weighty book,² *The Mediator*, is, in the main, a rendering of the prophetic utterances of Professor Barth in the terms of a more lucid and 'popular' theology. In this exposition theological implications less obvious in the original become salient and freed from that glamour which genius inevitably casts upon its gnosis.

That this book pales in comparison with, for example, the fire of Professor Barth's commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, seems 'as moonlight unto sunlight, as water unto wine' in such a context, cannot fairly be laid to the charge of Professor Brunner. What prophetic fire does not dim when imprisoned in the earthen lamps of systematic theology? If that wild-fire is to be made serviceable to the majority, this diminishing process is unavoidable. It could hardly, in this case, have been undertaken by more pious, devoted and scholarly hands.

But the process is of peculiar interest and importance in this book, since it seems to have elucidated a certain life-denying trend in the 'theology of crisis' less obtrusive in the utterances of Professor Barth. That trend becomes here so marked that the theology expounded in *The Mediator* becomes rather a 'theology of eclipse' than of crisis.

For it becomes plain in Professor Brunner's book that, for this type of theology — and it is one which has a peculiar attraction for a dark age — every natural and mundane light is ruthlessly condemned and extinguished, and man is left in a darkness of eclipse lit only by the occasional and gratuitous flashes of the lightning-light of revelation. For this theology the spirit of man is far from being, in Cudworth's great phrase, 'the candle of the Lord'; it is the candle of the devil. It has short

¹ The references to the book under review and to Karl Barth's Commentary on 'The Epistle to the Romans' — marked 'R-B.' — are, in each case, to the English translations of these works.

² *The Mediator*. Emil Brunner. (Lutterworth Press.)

shrift at the hands of this Judge-Jeffreys judgment. It is brusquely blown out, and man is thereafter illuminated by divine revelation alone, and by what Professor Barth has called the 'wisdom of the night.'

There will be few who can appreciate the macabre grandeur and heroic realism of Professor Barth's vision, who will not readily agree with him that 'the Night, too, has its wisdom' and that this is a wisdom of which our night stands desperately in need. Whether there is not also a complementary but not therefore un-Christian wisdom of the day, of light as well as of darkness, of life as well as of death, is the crucial question which this book seems to pose. That the 'theology of crisis' contains a real re-vision of a real aspect of Christianity is hardly now in question. It is all the more urgent that a balanced criticism should consider its implications dispassionately and seek to separate the enduring flame of vision from its enveloping smoke. It is not easy to view the passion of Professor Barth dispassionately; for the opportunity of reviewing its possible and, as we think, dangerous, implications we have to thank Professor Brunner and this book.

The claim is made for this theology that it is based upon 'existential' thinking; it seems just and right therefore that a criticism guided by such 'existential' thinking should be applied to it. 'Existential' thinking, to quote from the Translator's Note to Professor Brunner's book, is 'a mode of thought which appeals not merely to the intellect but to the whole personality of the man who accepts it.' And faith, says Professor Brunner elsewhere, is 'the totality-act of personality.' In other words, in estimating the value of a 'word' we are to ask ourselves how far it seems to 'ring real' to our whole and undivided personality. It is a test which may well be applied to this book.

The crucial question of life-denial or life-acceptance is involved in its subject. Professor Brunner has called his book *The Mediator*. But many of the conclusions at which he arrives appear to contradict the conception of 'mediation' with which he begins. For to mediate is to form a link between two disparate realities. But what mediation is possible between that which is real and that which is unreal, between that which really exists and that which only seems to exist, or is doomed to im-

mediate extinction? The 'Mediation' which Professor Brunner contemplates is the most momentous of all mediations, the mediation between God and man. Yet it would appear that, for this type of theology, the life of man is wholly worthless, unreal and doomed, fit only for some cosmic incinerator; that only when the life of man is a 'void' or a 'vacuum' can this Mediation occur.

That this conception of the necessity of making of human life a 'void,' that is, it would seem, of utterly mortifying, annihilating and destroying it, is not alien to the sources of this theology a few quotations from Professor Barth will suffice to show. The community of the Church is, for him, 'the void in which the Gospel communicates itself' (R-B., p. 36). In the 'apostle' a 'void becomes visible' (R-B., p. 33). 'Genuine faith is a void' (R-B., p. 88). 'The new man seems no more than a void' (R-B., p. 149). The conception seems uncommonly like a religious attempt at making a desert and calling it peace.

This 'Mediation' of which Professor Brunner tells, therefore, is the establishment of a link between that which is and that which is not, or at least that which must be made 'void' before the link can be established. Then this would seem to be rather, as it were, a theological version of the miracle of the Indian rope trick than 'mediation' in the proper meaning of the term. The 'Mediation' of which Professor Brunner has so much to say appears to be, *au fond*, not mediation at all, but annihilation followed by recreation, and the Christ Whom he envisages not a 'Mediator' but primarily a Destroyer and secondarily a Creator of a 'wholly new and other life.' The real concept of mediation seems to slip through the meshes of this theology in spite of these 619 pages of patient pursuit.

Much play is made with the metaphor of bridging an abyss, and it is a metaphor which would seem all too aptly to fit the facts of our human state. But we are asked here to conceive of a bridge of which one pier is a 'void' and a re-linked chain of which one half is a 'vacuum.' This may be miracle, but it can hardly be called mediation. It seems clear that this theology has not yet attained to any valid concept of mediation and its inability to do so, in spite of the skill and immense labour of Professor Brunner, seems a very significant fact.

For, in that failure, the radical weakness of this doctrine is suggested. It involves life-denial. For it the life of man, of nature and of the world is, as it were, but a doomed and burning Troy, and Christ (if one may, without irreverence, employ such an analogy) a celestial Aeneas rescuing a remnant from the flames for immediate export elsewhere. The fitness of such an analogy, indeed, leaps to the mind on a reading of the Romans-Commentary.

*Tum vero omne mihi visum considerare in ignis
Ilium et ex imo verti Neptunia Troia.*

The city of Mansoul is in flames; Troy is burning. It is the burden of this prophecy. Therefore the Greeks, the Hellenists, the school of life and light in theology are for ever accursed.

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.

It is with such an abhorrent fear that Professor Brunner waves aside all 'modern' thought as the 'fatal endeavour to be modern and Christian at the same time' (p. 89), 'the unedifying story of an impossible compromise' (p. 56). The knot of reality is a Gordian knot; only some magic blade, some trenchant either . . . or' formula, can sever it.

That formula is everywhere in evidence. *Either* the 'fact of Christ' is 'unique and absolute, *or* it is only relative' (p. 86); *either* it 'transcends history' *or* it is 'something within the sphere of history' (p. 86); *either* 'we must admit that evil is natural and . . . not a moral fact at all, *or* . . . it is a moral factor and . . . inexplicable' (p. 124); *either* 'Autonomy, the principle of immanence,' *or* 'the real communication of the Logos' (p. 211). *Either*, to revert to Barth's succinct statement of the formula, the 'Word of God' *or* the 'word of man.'

The desperate reliance upon this clean-cleavage formula seems to lead inevitably to an unreal schism of life; the fact that it leads to a denial of the life of this world seems clear. We are told that the life of faith is 'not positive, in its essence it is negative' (p. 512), that 'the wood of this world is unfit for the building of what is new' (p. 512), that Christ 'stands in the world as the One Who endures and tolerates it' (p. 513). The only reality that matters is 'wholly other'; the only history of importance is 'super-history, eschatological history' (p. 583); the only knowledge of any real value is 'faith-knowledge.'

'History, in the human sense, is a matter of indifference for faith. It is flesh' (p. 309). 'Jesus,' we are told, 'did not take any interest in intermediate conditions' (p. 420).

Thus Reality, the Reality of God, is relegated to a 'fourth dimension' where 'super-history,' 'faith-knowledge,' the 'new man,' are, incidentally, immune from all mere three-dimensional attack. Here, in this dimension, is the new 'Rome' of these fugitive Trojans, in the 'dimension of revelation' (p. 561) whence the advent of Christ was 'a breaking-through out of another dimension into the sphere of history' (p. 246).

Except for this fleeting visitation of Christ into this mundane dimension which He can but 'endure and tolerate,' a visitation which, it seems to be suggested, was as abbreviated as the divine purpose would permit, there is no real contact between this 'other,' 'wholly other,' dimension and our own. There is thus a clean 'break in the world-order' (p. 485), an unbridgable abyss between the old life and the new, between knowledge and faith, between history and 'super-history,' between man and God. This fourth-dimensional Reality is not only other; it is 'wholly other' than our damned three-dimensional sphere. This conception, when denuded, as in this book, of the prophetic nimbus with which Professor Barth surrounded it, seems something very other than the full Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. This theology may affirm and fortify the 'new life,' this fourth-dimensional life beyond death; it seems clear that it denies the life we live.

Such a creed is not without its comfort. It is humiliating enough indeed; but most of us to-day would rather be humiliated than insecure, and this drastic formula carves out a comfortably neat and clean-cut ethic and theology. In effect it says, as has so often been said before—Deny this life and win the life of the Kingdom. Deny this world and migrate to a 'wholly other' world. Such a faith is no new version of the Christian gospel and it has never lacked fanatical followers. It is a four-square doctrine, upon which one knows well where one stands, and that, in so shifting a world as ours, is a comfortable, if a lowly stance. Such 'Romes' beyond our stormy seas of speculation have ever had their lure for the tired hearts of men, and this fourth-dimensional Barthian 'Rome' has much in common with the papal

Rome. Its lure is very similar and there are many who, weary of 'the wandering fields of barren foam,' will welcome such a Lotus-isle of surety, such an 'island-home,' 'far beyond the waves' of dubiety, and sighingly assent that—*Hic amor, haec patria est*.

Such logical lucidities are alluring enough to tired minds; their satisfaction of that 'whole personality' to which this theology makes its appeal is perhaps less sure. Certainly these 'root and branch' doctrines are always a little suspect to the English temperament, a temperament the reaction of which to life, for all the defects of its qualities, is yet a peculiarly 'whole' reaction, a composite 'practical' judgment in which feeling, experience, reason, instinct and intuition combine and no one faculty predominates unduly, in fact, very much that 'existential' judgment which this theology desiderates. It seems therefore not a little significant that in England this logic should have been generally taken 'with a pinch of salt.' When tested against such a composite, 'whole,' 'existential' judgment this *either . . . or* blade-edge seems to turn against the now tough, now yielding stuff of reality. The attractive simplicity of this *either* 'the word of God' *or* 'the word of man' formula seems an over-simplification which, like all over-simplifications in life, leads right on to impossibly complex conclusions.

That such a reaction of the 'whole' temperament to this doctrine is not without foundation, a calm consideration of its actual basis would seem to corroborate. For when one probes down to the quick of this life-denying faith, one arrives, as does all theological thought in the final issue, at the root problem of the 'point of contact,' the *imago dei*, the *analogia entis*. And just here it will be found that this theology grows confused and contradictory.

For assuming that this 'faith-knowledge,' this 'revelation-truth' is wholly 'given,' the question remains—what is it in man which is able to recognize and to receive it? Barth with no, and Brunner with little, compromise stoutly affirm that this very ability to recognize and receive is also God-given and not in any degree man-engendered. But how do they know that it is God-given? What is it which affirms this still more remote truth or 'word' when it hears or perceives it? For if one says that this

faculty of apprehension is itself not human at all but God-given, one is only driven a stage further back to ask what apprehension it is in us which knows that it is thus God-given, and so on *ad infinitum*. In the end there is always some faculty within man which can not only apprehend truth, but also judge it to be true, however slight and limited that apprehension and judgment may be.

Therefore, in spite of Professors Brunner and Barth, there seems always to remain some eye of the soul which can be 'constrained' by the truth, which can recognize, however dimly, God and His Truth when it encounters them, and when these theologians castigate such pronouncements as that of Dean Inge, that 'at the core of our personality is a spark lighted at the altar of God,' with such vehemence, they are, it would seem, at the same time castigating that very faculty of apprehension and judgment by the light of which they find such 'findings' false.

We cannot, in fact, get beyond that initial, basic human 'judgment' and 'apprehension.' He who asserts that there is no such thing, or that it is some divine meteorite fallen into a human 'void,' is, at that very moment, also tacitly asserting that there is in him a valid faculty which knows or judges that it is so.

But if, however remote, however infinitesimal, however distorted, the apprehension, there is something in man which can apprehend the divine and the true, there must be in him some faculty, some likeness to the divine which can make that apprehension and judge it to be true, a 'point of contact' which is also an *analogia entis*. For how could that apprehend the divine or the true which did not partake of the divine and the true? Can seed germinate in a soil which has not within it vitalizing powers not alien but akin to that of the seed which falls upon it?

But, for Professor Brunner, this divine truth 'enters the arena as an alien force' (p. 107), 'life depends wholly on grace' (p. 610), 'God must do everything' (p. 299), and, for Professor Barth, 'the truth . . . is not accessible to our perception' (R-B., p. 98), 'faith is, as it were, creative of divinity' (R-B., p. 143).

But it is to be noted that these trenchant pronouncements are not consistently maintained. On this ultimate and vital issue there is a significant confusion of tongues. 'The Will of God,'

says Professor Brunner elsewhere, 'is made known to the human will' (p. 589); 'this word is addressed to one who, although he no longer possesses the word, when the word is once more given to him is able to recognize it as the original word' (p. 151); 'reason is not without a knowledge of God' (p. 151); 'even outside the Christian revelation of the Bible man is not without God nor without truth' (p. 414); 'so long as there is a trace of humanity left in a man there also some ray of light from the Divine Image is still visible in him' (p. 493); man is 'one whose deepest self is at bottom identical with the divine' (p. 608). Similarly Professor Barth's other voice speaks of 'that thing of soul and sense which we call faith' (R-B., p. 63); 'as a tumbler sings when it is touched so we and our world are touched in faith by the Spirit of God,' he tells us (R-B., p. 157); 'religion is the ability of men to receive and to retain an impress of God's revelation' (R-B., p. 183); 'we become aware of the impetuous roaring of heaven' (R-B., p. 272).

Thus this void or vacuum which man is or should be, for which God is 'an alien force' and 'must do everything,' to whose perception truth is not accessible, yet is able to recognize the word and has memory of the 'original word'; is 'not without knowledge of God' 'nor without truth' nor without a 'ray of light,' in his 'deepest self' is 'identical with God,' can 'sing' in response to the divine touch; has ability to 'receive' and 'retain' and 'become aware.' In such a juxtaposition of conflicting statements the fundamental confusion of thought seems to become evident.

This theology buttresses what thus seems to be a radically unsound architecture with the Calvinistic conception of 'auto-pistis.' This 'revelation-truth,' they say, is 'autopistic,' that is, it conveys its own confirmation; it corroborates itself. At first hearing this seems to ring very real, for we know well enough how certain 'words' do seem in fact to prove themselves. They seem manifestly true and beyond argument, as though indeed they were 'autopistic.' But to stay at that point is to evade the real problem. For again we come to the question of what it is in us which accepts this self-testimony, which knows, beyond argument, that this or that is a true word. For that knowledge, however little reason may seem to enter into it, is none the less

still a judgment of the 'whole personality.' If the process of apprehension of truth were indeed wholly and solely autopistic, the 'word' could convey its 'pistis' no further than itself.

If this conception of 'autopistis' is carefully examined—and so much is balanced upon this slender point that it is imperative that it should be examined—it seems really to imply, not that man is wholly passive to such truth, but that the nature of his response to it, his acceptance, his judgment of it, is something other than mere intellectual assent. It is, in fact, an immediate, unhesitating, judgment of the whole man under the 'constraint of the word,' as distinct from the slow, tentative and dubious judgment of the intellect. It is judgment made for and evoked by life, rather than judgment made for and by thought alone. It is, in fact, 'existential' judgment. But it is still judgment and it is still man, or some element of the divine in him, which forms that judgment.

Here then, upon this problem variously posed as the 'point of contact,' the *imago dei*, the *analogia entis*, '*autopistis*,' we seem to come down to bed-rock, and here, it seems, that the majority of Christians must part company with this theology. For when the matter is thought and felt out, it seems impossible to maintain this drastic elimination of all human mediation from the initial act of apprehension of God. It is indeed quite possible to say—it is undoubtedly the Christian faith—that the 'Word' is the only Mediator between God and man, but this fact does not necessarily rule out a subordinate mediation between the human soul and that 'Word,' for the only possible or conceivable 'mediation' between the 'Word' and the human consciousness must in the end dwell in that consciousness. This 'point of contact' in the soul is not, therefore, merely a *tabula rasa*, a blank and dead surface for the writing of the Holy Ghost. That *tabula* must, no doubt, be made blank from sophistication and clean from all pride of possession before it can receive that Word. But there is that within its substance which can conceive and germinate that holy seed.

The analogy of the soil or of feminine conception would seem, indeed, to be a far more apposite and significant one—that which receives the seed of life with an utter passivity, which is yet not a lifeless but a very living passivity, able to germinate

what seed into a new organism of life. That analogy has never, perhaps, been as fully developed as it might be in this connection, but, without attempting to develop it further here, it seems at least clear that it fits the reality of this apprehension far more closely than the analogy of a lifeless substance, since it is an analogy from life to life.

But it is as a lifeless substance that this theology seems to conceive of the soul in the act of faith, containing no life to respond to the Life poured out upon it in this impact of the Divine Word, or, if it be living, to be deprived of all life of its own before that Life can deal with it. And here we seem to detect its fundamental flaw. For this, so our 'existential' thought affirms, is not the way of life, and, if it were, then the manifestation of the Life and Love of God recorded in the New Testament is in absolute opposition to it.

We arrive, then, at what seems to be the only possible Christian conclusion upon this matter, that, in this act of apprehension, there is, contrary to at least some of the conflicting findings of this theology, life and a germinating life at that. God does not, according to the Christian revelation of Him, first kill the soul in order to remake the soul. He beats down, with the terrible and tender force of His searching passion, all that resistance which prevents His Word from reaching that 'ground of the soul' where it can take root and live; He slays the unreal in us in order to make alive that which is real. There is in man, then, not only a 'soil' able to receive the seed but properties in that soil able to germinate the seed when it has been given.

The initial act of apprehension is not, therefore, also the final act, and therefore the idea of 'continuity' and development cannot be condemned as completely as this theology demands. If it were the final act, that seed of the Word could never come to birth or to fruition. It is indubitably true, for any real Christianity, that, save for the continuing grace and fostering love of God, that faith, that 'Word,' that seed, must die, that it is utterly dependent upon that grace, just as the seed in the soil or the embryo in the womb must die if unprotected and un nourished. But it seems no more true to say that the soul has no further part in that birth, has but to present a dead passivity,

than it is to say that the earth has no more to do than submit when the seed is sown or the mother no pains or care to give after conception. Again, this seems most evidently neither the way of life nor the way of that God Whom Jesus revealed.

This conception of the primary and fundamental apprehension of God and truth by man and of the nature of 'autopistis,' which we have found fallacious and un-Christian, is of the utmost moment since, upon that axiom, rests the whole 'root and branch' offensive of this theology against all that it condemns as 'humanism.' When that axiom is moderated it would seem that the indiscriminate fury of this attack must also be moderated. For, in the light of what seems to be the more truly Christian and apostolic conception of 'autopistis,' the essential difference between Christian and non-Christian knowledge becomes, not, as the theologians of crisis seem to suggest, that between judgment and what is not judgment but passive receptivity, but, in the first place, between two different species of judgment, and, in the second, between two different reactions in life to that judgment.

The first point, that both species of judgment, 'autopistic' or otherwise, are still judgment and human judgment at that, seems unavoidable, and with that conclusion the dictum of Professor Brunner that 'God must do everything' falls to the ground. The second point seems to mark the real difference between Christianity and the un-Christian humanism which this theology so stoutly and justifiably assails. For, in the intellectual judgments of the latter type of humanism, the intellect does not make the judgment and then abdicate the judgment-seat to a truth seen to be greater than itself. On the contrary, it continues to judge; the truth thus received does not thereafter assume the sovereignty of the soul which apprehends it; it remains still subordinate and subject to the further findings of the human reason. This is, it would seem, that pagan humanism which Barth and Brunner condemn rightly, it must be believed by Christians, although, as we have tried to demonstrate, upon wrong grounds.

For, in the apprehensions or judgments of 'faith,' in the Christian sense, the reaction to such primary apprehensions is very different. Here the 'word' or truth which has been appre-

ended, being apprehended and judged true, assumes the sovereignty of the soul, and reason and all other faculties of the soul thereafter own themselves subject to that 'word' which they have apprehended. In the former type of judgment man finds his own truth; in the latter he finds Truth (or Truth finds him — since he is able to be found the difference seems immaterial to the issue of the moment) and owns that Truth as the Lord of his life. The Christian recognizes that which is initially apprehended or judged by himself, or which confronts him, as divine, and, as such, he submits himself wholly to its direction; the humanist regards such findings as the 'treasure trove' of his omnipotent mind and remains the lord and owner of them. The Christian bows to a Reality greater than himself; the humanist will not recognize that superiority and therefore will not bow to anything or anyone but himself.

But such a conclusion, although the whirlwind attack upon modernism and humanism of this arrogant type remains justified, seems to draw the fangs from that sweeping and immoderate condemnation which this type of theology metes out to every kind of 'modernism' or 'humanism' which, in any degree, professes the 'idea of continuity.' For the idea of continuity, although subject to revelation, is thereby re-admitted. For, if that totality of man's faculties which is the human soul is able to know and receive God when it encounters Him, by what logic is the complete denial and rejection of all those faculties held to be the right sequel to that apprehension? Why should an arbitrary 'clean break' be made at this point? It can only be made good if the doctrine of the complete passivity of the soul in the initial apprehension of God can be made good, and it would seem that it is for this reason, owing to a well-justified but unbalanced fear of a prevalent pagan type of humanism, that the attempt, confused because unconvinced and unconvincing, is made by this theology to posit this dead passivity of the soul as an axiom.

In point of fact, as has been seen, no such 'break' can really be made; to extirpate 'the idea of continuity' is to extirpate life from religion. The soul which can vitally receive God can continue to a continually fuller and more vital conception of Him, a process which all history and experience of religion

corroborates. Therefore the wholesale excommunication of the 'idea of continuity' which this book proposes cannot be maintained. There is a continuity of human and religious development, as there is a human culture, not at variance, so long as it is subject to the sovereignty of God, with the Christianity of Christ.

The real choice, therefore, would seem to be, not between Christianity and all humanism of every complexion, as Professor Brunner proposes, but between a true Christian, God-centred and God-ruled humanism, and a false, pagan and man-ruled humanism. That post-Renaissance humanism has become increasingly of the latter kind may still justify the bulk of the invective which this theology launches against it; it does not justify an indiscriminate condemnation of all humanism. Here too this book raises an issue of the most vital importance for our time.

It follows, further, from the same conclusion, that the wholesale life-denial doctrine which this book seems to reveal, is equally untenable. That our human life, that the life of the world and our age, is damnable enough, no Christian dare deny. But if, all too conscious of that radical and all-pervasive evil, we pass to the conclusion that all natural and human life is wholly and inherently evil, it seems that we go very far beyond any fundamental premise valid for Christian or any 'existential' thought. A humanity which can conceive God is not 'wholly' evil. The life of man is not in itself damnable; it is damnable because and in so far as it is sundered from that Life of life which is God and is at variance with that Life. Such has always been the Christian faith. Barthian, Calvinist, Augustinian attempts to improve upon this onus of damnation, to go one better in an acknowledgment of evil already sufficiently horrifying, seems to savour of a masochism born of fear. If we do not declare that there is no good thing at all in man, so this trend of thought seems to run away with bit in teeth, we run the impossible risk of declaring, with the 'delicate-minded disciples of Rousseau,' that man is naturally good. And that must not be. From that fear springs the terrible and debasing logic of the more extreme forms of this type of theology. It is a perennial fear and it issues, ever afresh, in a perennial theology of this

mind. It is always particularly epidemic in an age such as our own, ridden by the fear-complex.

But when it is closely scrutinized, this 'fearful faith' seems consonant neither with Christianity nor with the mind of Christ, nor, as we have tried to demonstrate anew, to be based ultimately on any 'existentially' tenable logic of life. For Christ, or Christianity, the natural life is not in itself damnable. To pronounce it so is to blaspheme the God who created it. It is damnable in so far—and it is very far—as it is at odds with that primal, ultimate deep life of God, and it is at odds so radically that it needs God Himself to link up the broken chain with a real mediation. But it is glorious in so far as, by the grace of God through the mediation of Christ, it can return to that greater life and recover that greater original rhythm of its being. Man is not a *massa perditionis*; his heart is abominably evil, but there is within his being a golden grain of glory.

It follows, then, if this life-denial axiom be abandoned, that it is for man to 'deny' his corrupted, ego-centric life, but to affirm that fundamental, deep-buried soul-life which he has from God and which, at the touch of God's finger, may spring to life again within him, and the release from this dismal doctrine seems to lead to a Christianity for which there is a 'wisdom of the Day' of God's Light and Love as well as that 'wisdom of the Night' of His Wrath.

The conclusion is a vital one for Christian ethics, as well as for Christian theology, for if the initial perception of God proceeded through, was mediated (in spite of Professor Brunner) by man's latent but not wholly lost *imago dei* re-kindled by the name of God in man's inmost soul, the growth and development of that perception will continue to be so mediated. Such a conclusion must issue in a strenuous, heroic and humble rather than supine, craven and self-satisfied Christian living. Faith will continue to be something received only through a labour and agony of soul which is itself a mortification, an agony relative to the being and conditions of the believer. The knowledge, the insight, the fire of faith does indeed, we must believe—and all religious realism affirms it—fall like manna from God; the term of faith, the expression of faith in life, is for our human fashioning and subject ever to our human fallibility.

Such is the faith which seems to ensue from the alternative and, we believe, true conception of the *analogia entis* which we have opposed to that of this theology—a theology of light and life for a theology of eclipse and death. It is a faith, moreover, which would seem to be that of the majority of Christians throughout the ages, its antitype more often that of a masochistic minority.

The criticism which has here been outlined may seem to lack the quality of appreciation and even of a balanced justice towards a theology which has done and is doing so much to galvanize modern Christianity. The omission is due, not to lack of appreciation, but of space. Appreciation has not been lacking: a cogent criticism seems overdue. The qualities of this theology are so conspicuous that it is all the more urgent that its defects should not be overlooked. The value of Professor Brunner's book, whether or not it be held to offer an acceptable doctrine of Mediation, may be gauged by the challenge which it conveys and the protest which it provokes.

‘HAPPY DIVISIONS’

‘WE thank Thee, O Lord, for the many ways by which Thou dost reach the hearts of men, especially for our happy divisions.’

The old voice swelled with gratitude, then ceased. ‘Amen’ someone murmured, uncertainly. As they rose from their knees, one and another glanced round furtively, as if to sense his neighbour's views on this unusual cause for thanksgiving. Was it merely a slip of the tongue? Had the old man meant to say ‘in spite of our unhappy divisions’?

Before the prayer, voices had been growing louder, faces more flushed, tones cold, didactic, even angry. The Archdeacon had maintained that there could be no unity outside the Established Church. The pale young priest had demanded an explanation; there was but one true Church, and her headquarters were in Rome. A Free Church minister had brought his fist down upon the table with a bang, and had muttered something that sounded suspiciously like ‘Rats!’

A nervous little Plymouth Sister, quivering in her seat,

had darted a swift look towards the door, as though seeking a chance of escape. She had had qualms about entering so mixed an assembly, and now felt certain that her forebodings were justified. Never again would she leave the shelter of her own fold with its fast-dwindling little flock.

The Chairman rose. He had a rugged, heavily-lined face, that would have been hard, but for the sensitive mouth that told of suffering sternly repressed. His tone was a trifle acid, though he strove to keep it even and free from the disappointment he was feeling.

He explained briefly how, in convening this meeting, he had been actuated solely by two motives—love to God and to Man. The question at issue was wide as these two themes. The time called for concerted action, for Unity of Purpose, Unity of Faith. In the childhood of Christianity ‘the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul; but,’ he added bitterly, ‘those days were gone, never to return. And now, faced by evils greater than any that had confronted them for a generation, they had met together, only to find that they were helpless, unable to take action, crippled by their unhappy divisions.’

He paused as though short of breath, his eyes swept the rows of faces that seemed to hem him in—an eager, wistful look. Who could supply the right word? Who could be trusted to dismiss them on a note of ‘unity, peace, and concord’? Each member had expressed his own view-point with such assurance, that to fall upon any one seemed to invite trouble.

His eyes rested on the grey head of the old man by the door. He had no right to be there. He did not ‘belong’ to any denomination. He would ‘turn up’ unexpectedly at widely differing places, Quaker Meeting, High Mass, Second Advent Conference or Socialist Demonstration . . . but wherever he appeared he seemed to bring an atmosphere of peace and worship.

Sometimes his Sundays were spent wandering on the downs with his terrier. Again, he would be found in a remote cottage, tending to a sick man, or cooking for his wife. He was a good nurse, a skilled herbalist, a wide reader, and had more than a touch of Poet and Mystic. Yet, of all that company, Michael Denton alone had not raised his voice during the evening.

The eyes of the harassed chairman turned to him now, and caught an answering gleam—almost a disconcerting twinkle. Then he said, ‘I will ask Mr. Fenton to close the meeting with prayer.’

‘We thank Thee, O Lord, for the many ways by which thou dost reach the hearts of men, especially for our happy divisions.’

He rose. The rest shuffled back to their seats. They did not attempt to leave the hall. Something had happened. A change had come over the gathering. They were suddenly united, in their discomfiture and perplexity.

The old man moved softly from his place by the door and stood against the Chairman’s table, facing them. His brown eyes shone with loving amusement as he smiled into their puzzled faces. They felt like foolish children in his peaceful presence—he, so much older than any of them, so much nearer the ‘Land of far distances.’

Then he spoke. ‘Yes, my friends, I meant what I said. No, I am not yet in my dotage. When our Chairman spoke of “unhappy divisions” he was confusing “division” with “disunion.” Look up the word in your dictionary. You will find that only in its last—and least—sense, is it so used. Primarily the word stands for “section” or “partition.” You do not worry because there are different “sections” in your schools, that all the children are not in the same class, learning the same lesson at the same moment and in the same way, regardless of temperament, taste, age or capacity.

‘The Great Master has many “divisions” in His school. Thank Him for His priceless gift of Personality. Each of you has an angle of vision shared by no one else. Each can add his own note of music to the Great Orchestra. Be thankful it is so, and use it—use it for His Glory and for the good of Mankind.

‘What did you say? “When shall we see eye to eye?” When? Never, I hope, in this life! “Why not?” Because we should see so little. Our sight is limited enough in all conscience—why wish to limit it further? Make the most of your differing visions! Pool them, and from the sum of them gather some faint gleam of the Whole—the Glory Inconceivable.

‘No, my friends, do not wish to see “eye to eye” until the clouds are parted, and you see—HIM—“face to face.”’

M. A. SEYMOUR.

EVANGELISING A SCIENTIFICALLY-MINDED WORLD

By the Rev. T. C. LAXTON, M.A., Vicar of Cobo, Guernsey.

EVANGELISATION, to be effective, to be of real power in this generation and of lasting influence in generations to come, must include the preaching of the Gospel to the 'scientifically-minded': a somewhat awkward expression intended to embrace not only the professional physicist, biologist, psychologist, etc., but also the ordinarily educated man or woman who reads the works of the professors with interest and shares their point of view.

The work of Evangelisation must be carried to the world's thinkers. In the past the Church has denounced them as enemies. They are not enemies of the Christ Who seeks to guide men into all Truth. They are themselves ardent seekers after Truth. If the Church ignores them, if the Church is afraid of them, if the Church makes no attempt to state the Christian Gospel in terms which do not contradict the truths established by science, makes no attempt to discover a Christian interpretation of the universe known to the scientist, then the Church fails in her mission and has no future in a scientifically-minded world.

The message of Christ is not only or mainly for the illiterate in a literate world. A Christianity which depends for its power on the credulity of ignorant people is not worthy of its Founder.

Within the Church of to-day there are many simple believers whose religion is precariously dependent on the miraculous element in the Christian tradition. Such people demand the blind acceptance of tradition and disapprove of critical enquiry. They prefer authority to adventure. They have a profound respect for dogmatic assertion. They are particularly impressionable, easily swayed by an eloquent appeal to emotion. (Where the intellectual, critical faculties are inactive, life comes increasingly under the influence of emotion. The rise and rapid spread of Buchmanism is sufficient evidence of such influence over such lives.)

Professor Whitehead in his small, difficult book, *Religion in the Making*, says that 'intense religious emotion is evidence of *some* vivid experience, but it is a very poor guarantee for the correct interpretation of that experience.' In other words, we may recognize, we must recognize as an obvious, unquestionable fact, that a man has enjoyed and does enjoy a real religious experience; that his life is 'changed,' that his religion is moulding his character for good and is profoundly influencing his whole life. Yet we need not assume that his statement of his creed is beyond criticism, or that the source of the undoubted power that has come into his life is precisely what he says it is.

The followers of revivalist movements live on dogma. Theirs is the child-mind which demands definite teaching. They have neither the desire nor the capacity for independent thought. They ask for a simple statement of the Christian tradition, a simple meaning for religious terms. Heaven, Hell, Creation, Eternal Life. The fact that the simple statement provided by the Church is built into the cosmology of the Hebrews of 2,000 years ago raises no difficulty in their minds.

For the scientist, however, the difficulty thus raised is final. Any statement which depends on the idea of a flat earth supporting a material heaven on its outer edges and built over a material hell is for him unmeaning. He would welcome a religious interpretation of the universe, but it must be of *his* universe, that in which he knows himself to be living. He is invited instead, first, to accept a fantastic picture of the world, and secondly to invest the fantasy with religious value. This he declines to do. He cannot do it without violating that reverence for Truth which he holds supreme.

For him the miraculous element in the Christian tradition is not a help but a hindrance to the acceptance of that tradition. He knows that physical substances 1,900 years ago were subject to the same physical laws which constitute the basis of all scientific knowledge. The world 1,900 years ago was this world; a world in which virgin birth, physical resurrection, and physical ascension were not more possible than they are to-day. He knows that the conditions necessary to successful psychotherapy were the same then as now. (The study of those conditions and the

practise of that kind of healing are not the peculiar property of religion but form legitimate material for scientific enquiry.)

One of the greatest and most fundamental difficulties in presenting Christian doctrine to-day is that the traditional teaching of the Church is built into a view of the universe which can no longer be accepted.

Dr. Kirk, in his Bampton Lectures of two years ago, spoke of the 'doctrine of the unnatural God'—

'that great and tragic accident of Christian thought, the doctrine of the unnatural God, a God so radically unlike the world of nature that He will least be found in any process that can be called natural.'

Our Church is not yet freed from the fascination of this doctrine.

Shorn of all irrationalities, the core of the Gospel of Christ, that which Christ by His teaching and through His life set before mankind, that which St. John especially emphasizes, is surely that 'God is Love'; that the Spiritual Power behind the universe is most simply expressed in human language and most effectively operative in human life as Love; that ultimately all things are bound together in a common life and informed by a common purpose, and that Man, the highest known form of life, to achieve the fullness of manhood, must lose himself in that divine, all-embracing Spirit. And further, that the suffering which Love involves is not a sad mistake but a true revelation of the very nature of God.

There are, however, comparatively few Church people who would be willing, while treasuring the kernel of the truth, to let fall all the husks, willing to admit as unhistorical any of the traditional origins of the Christian Faith. The majority apparently prefer to regard scientific knowledge as being something which cannot be reconciled with religious experience, but which belongs to an entirely separate department of life. How long this view will continue to dominate Church thought is unpredictable, but what is certain is that this view is keeping many thoughtful people outside the Church. It would also seem safe to predict that the future influence of the Church must depend on a restatement of her doctrine.

Christianity claims the supreme place among the religions of the world, embracing more than a third of the world's inhabitants,

its members numbering nearly twice as many as those of any other one religion. If the Church is to justify this claim, if the Church is to maintain her influence, to preserve her life, to be worthy of the Divine Purpose she is commissioned to promote, the Church must be willing, without prejudice, to be guided into all Truth, and this for her can be no passive process. It demands her active co-operation with the Spirit of Truth.

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON TEACHING DIVINITY

By Rev. W. H. OLDAKER, M.A., a Chaplain of Clifton College.

MOST discussions on teaching Divinity in schools begin by drawing up a syllabus. There are many syllabuses available to one who has the responsibility of deciding what shall be taught. In spite of the labour that must have been put into drawing them up, the differences between them are generally small, and they are mostly of equally good value.

But the fundamental problem does not seem to be what shall be taught, but rather, shall the subject be taught at all? If the answer to that is, Yes, then follows, how shall it be taught and by whom? It is on these problems that I offer a few thoughts based on personal experience.

It is perhaps not unfair to say that the lay mind (that perilous generalization) is by no means convinced that we ought to teach Divinity in school. A school time-table is in these days so overcrowded. One section of opinion will cry, 'Science, and still more Science': or in greater detail, 'You must find a place for Biology: it is the branch of Science which is going to save the world.' The internationalist and the business man unite in advocating the study of modern languages. In the midst of the tumult a still small voice is heard (perhaps from the Classical Side) reminding us of the claims of the Humanities. One or even two periods a week would be made available for other subjects if Divinity were dropped. Form Lower VB might be given an extra hour of Latin (poor things) which might make all the difference between a credit and a failure in the School Certificate examination next July . . . How about that letter from an

angry parent complaining that a form master was teaching his son to disbelieve in the truth of the Scriptures, because he suggested that the story of Adam and Eve need not be literally true? Or the other letter which followed closely upon the first, from another parent, saying that he did not want his son taught to believe in the story of Adam and Eve and all that sort of thing . . . There are so many experts on education nowadays, and it is scarcely to be wondered at that those responsible for arranging a time-table are tempted to give Divinity a wide berth.

And yet, full of difficulties though it will undoubtedly be, the subject must stay. Its loss would be a disaster. It may perhaps have been already thought strange that reference has so far only been made to the teaching of Divinity. Is this not the same thing, it may well be asked, as the problem of religious instruction in schools, which has formed such a bone of contention since the introduction of compulsory education? I am suggesting that it is not the same thing, though the two are related. Teaching religion is a very difficult thing. It is not accomplished by sermons or moralizing, whether in pulpit or classroom. Whoever was responsible for the aphorism that religion can be caught, but not taught,¹ was expressing a profound truth in few words. The teaching of religion is not confined to the Divinity period; it is a matter of the whole atmosphere of the school and of the life of the teachers. Needless to say, it is of fundamental importance that this attitude should be the right one, and it is possible that the loss of this right attitude is responsible for the difficulties of the Divinity hours in some schools.

To teach Divinity, then, is not to teach Religion. But those who suggest that they can teach a religious attitude to life, the fullness of life which Jesus Christ came into the world to give to mankind, without instruction in the Scriptures, or without instruction in part of them (the Old Testament), should pause to think very seriously. There must be an intellectual background to faith. If nothing else, the high intellectual level of modern materialist systems demands that the reasonableness of Christianity should be known and advocated. Christianity will not be proved by its reasonableness, but a Christian should be able to convince an opponent that he has chosen, in Christianity,

¹ Dean Inge seems to be the most favoured of several candidates.

the most reasonable way of life. A faith founded upon sand is liable to be washed away when the rains descend and the floods come. Boys and girls who pass on to our universities from the secondary schools not seldom fall away from the Church. They have not been taught to think about religious problems: they have faced no difficulties: they have been provided with no intellectual equipment to face them when difficulties come. The only equipment which the school can give them, and the only armour necessary, is an adequate knowledge of the Scriptures rationally expounded. No one else, certainly not their homes, will give it to them in these days.

But if Divinity is to remain as a subject of school instruction, it is by no means so certain how it is to be taught. Without attempting to offer a dogmatic answer to that question (and indeed the answer is bound to vary enormously in different schools) it may be of value to state how it is in fact taught.

In the great majority of boys' public schools of the older foundations Divinity is a form subject, *i.e.* taught by the same man who teaches the form Latin and English, and perhaps also History and Greek. Specialists on the staff are responsible for the Mathematics, Science and Modern Languages. It is scarcely to be expected that a form-master will be chosen for his fitness to teach Divinity only. If there is a school chaplain, it may be his duty to supervise this one subject: or it may not be considered to be his special business at all. The defenders of this system say that Divinity is not a specialist subject, except possibly in the Sixth Form: that any well-educated man can teach it even to-day, when the study of the subject certainly calls for some technical approach; that if it is put into the hands of specialists, Divinity will become as remote from everyday life as (with all due respect to individual Science-masters) Science has in fact become. Put in terms of the boy's outlook, Smith minor will see his own form-master handing over his form to his Chaplain for a period of Divinity; and, since the form-master certainly knows nothing about Science and not seldom says so, the boy will assume that he knows nothing about Divinity too. And Smith minor may have no particular respect for a clerical collar, and think a good deal more of his form-master than he does of his chaplain.

On the other hand we are told that Divinity, if taught on reasonable modern lines, is a specialist subject : no layman (that is to say, no one who has not made a specialist study of the subject : of course he need not be in holy orders) can rightly regard the subject as he does his Latin or Greek, in which he has been trained from youth up, or his English, which he probably teaches by light of nature. Examiners of public bodies are fond of putting their case so. They say that the large percentage of failures in public examinations in Divinity, as compared with other subjects, is simply because it has not been properly taught : that the boys show by their answers to questions that no foundation has been laid and that their instruction has not even begun on the right lines. If this is true, it is only a criticism on the general level of Biblical knowledge in the country ; which we all know to be very low. For an examination, however, of School Certificate standards, taken by boys of 14½ to 17, it may reasonably be suggested that only a fair knowledge of fact with the minimum of necessary exposition should be required ; and this should not be beyond the competence of any educated person to teach.

In girls' schools the tendency is rather to entrust the teaching to mistresses who have had some sort of training. There are several diplomas in Theology which can be taken by a school-mistress, and the training colleges for the most part include Divinity in their scheme of training. Examination results suggest that it is usually better taught to girls than to boys : they certainly secure more 'credits' than their brothers. On the other hand, they generally have more periods a week for the subject. There is no evidence that its religious value is much greater for being treated more as an examination subject, and, in fact, freely rammed.'

Examinations in Divinity are a much-discussed subject, and those whose lot is to teach it are probably divided fairly equally for and against them. Whether examinations in any subject are a fair test or the best test is outside the scope of this article. But under our present examination system, in which the Fifth forms are working for a School Certificate, the Sixth for a Higher Certificate, and the lower forms for school examinations directed within the school, and all of them, external or internal,

taken fairly seriously by master and boy alike, if Divinity is not an examination subject, it generally falls behind in the race. Preparation for it is left till last by the boy: for the master it is a useful period to make up work left undone in other hours. Human nature being what it is, Divinity becomes a 'soft' subject. Some who teach it prefer quite definitely to treat it as such, to set no preparation and to let the boys sit back and listen to a lecture. This may be good in the right hands. But even so, it would seem to be even better to recognize that the text of the Bible needs study and learning, and as much of an active interest as a chemical experiment; and that a mere reception of the ideas of another is not enough. As a matter of practical experience, boys do seem anxious to question and even to think things out for themselves, and certainly have no wish to accept all that is given to them dogmatically by authority: but this interest does not carry them far enough to make them work solidly at the subject, without the stimulus of the examination: rather all the talk remains talk, and because it lacks foundation, vanishes away like a wisp of smoke without effect upon the life of the individual.

What has so far been written will apply to most of the larger public schools, whether for boys or girls. The smaller schools will often find it a good deal more difficult to have Divinity adequately taught by form-masters: and, in these days, there may in fact be no competent person on the staff to teach it. One or two of such schools have made the experiment of bringing in the local expert (*i.e.* he who has the cure of souls) for this purpose, and with the right man, this should work well.

And lastly, what is to be taught? There will be no disagreement that all teaching must be designed to show the gradual self-revelation of God to the world which culminated in the Incarnation:² this will emphasize the inadequacy of the Old Testament unless it is interpreted in the light of the New, and at the same time the necessary place of the Old Testament and of the Apocrypha as the *praeparatio evangelica*.

One further tendency in modern teaching of the subject may be noted. It is wholly good. With the realization that the dif-

² See articles by Mr. W. E. J. Lindfield, and the present writer, in the *Modern Churchman* for June, 1932.

different books of the Bible are not separable entities, but very closely connected with each other, most syllabuses prescribe for reading, not set books, but definite subjects or definite periods and ideas. The value of studying, *e.g.* the Book of Judges, by itself is questionable. When read in the light of the development of prophetic ideas from Moses to Elijah and Elisha, its value is very great. The best guide to one of St. Paul's Epistles is the Acts: St. Luke's gospel is incomplete without the Acts. With this in view it may be called a reform of the greatest possible value, that the Oxford and Cambridge Joint Board should have added to their syllabus for the School Certificate within the last few years, periods of Old Testament history designed to illustrate the growth of the Christian idea of God: so the 'Story of the Southern Kingdom from the death of Hezekiah to the fall of Jerusalem,' with special attention to the teaching of the prophets as illustrated by select passages of Jeremiah and Habakkuk (the subject for July 1932), was followed in July 1933 by the period of the Exile and Return, with select passages from Ezekiel and Haggai and practically the whole of Deuteronomy. This, in turn, will be followed in 1934 by a return to the earliest period, including Amos.

These considerations bring us to a very serious practical problem. Faced with a class each member of which has probably been brought up to look at Christianity from a different point of view, will it ever be possible for a teacher to go down to the root essentials of Christianity, to edify all and to offend none? The answer, one must admit, is in all probability in the negative. But the way in which the teaching is approached will be of great importance. Leaving examinations out of the question for the moment, here is no matter in which we can look for quick returns in the life of the pupils: but the right attitude of the teacher is going to sow a seed which in the end will bear good fruit. If anyone were to sit down and attempt to work out the greatest common measure between the different varieties of Christianity, his position would be not unlike that of the mathematician who attempted the same thing for a series of prime numbers. Even the essential facts will bear different meanings for different people. But might we take as a starting-point the summary of the Law: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with

all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind and with all thy strength, and thy neighbour as thyself? So we can insist that teaching of Divinity is subservient to training in a religious outlook on life. It is possible that, once we go beyond this law of life, we must wait for wiser guidance than our own for those whom we teach. The teacher, being a human being, will inevitably present his facts with a certain colouring. It is scarcely humanly possible to avoid a bias derived from a whole life's training and a whole personality. But the teacher may (when his pupils have reached an age for it to be profitable) stress the importance of modern critical methods in extracting every scrap of fact which is to be obtained from New or Old Testaments. He may then go on to say, 'Now here is my interpretation of these facts, and my reasons for this interpretation.' What is quite inexcusable, and must only increase rancour and ill-feeling, is to give his own interpretation and say, 'Here are the facts.'

We have now reached the stage when, bearing the proviso of the earlier part of this article in mind, we are dealing with specifically religious teaching rather than with the teaching of divinity. While this really lies outside the scope of this article, we may well conclude with a reminder that Christianity is not the possession of certain facts nor belief in certain doctrines, but a way of life: and not merely a way of life, but the whole of life lived with a personal experience of God. God reveals Himself in sundry ways and in divers manners: and a due humility will prevent one who is in authority from assuming that what is best for himself is of necessity best for all. We are therefore asking the teacher, while teaching upon certain definite lines, to discriminate between what is essential and what is non-essential in his teaching: and we are giving him but a vague criterion with which to do so. We are clearly setting him a very difficult task. If he is prepared to put Christianity before self it is not an impossible one.

This, however, is to touch upon wider issues than those with which we began. It is partly the fault of wrong methods of teaching that the Bible is so neglected by the average layman to-day. The problem is probably most acute in the secondary Schools, and the present state of Divinity teaching in them is far from satisfactory. In most cases it should be making a much

greater contribution to the religious life of the country. Evidence of the lack of knowledge of the main facts of Christianity as presented by its best exponents is not far to seek. The trouble is that Christianity is attacked, not because of the beliefs of its best exponents, but of its worst. Over and over again, scientists, and those whom Fr. Ronald Knox calls 'symposiaists,' demonstrate that they are judging Christianity as it was presented by the smallest brains of the eighteenth century. Mr. Bernard Shaw in his latest fable, *The Adventures of the Black Girl in her Search for God*, has joined this number. That little book owes much of its interest and brilliance to the fact that the God of so many Christians is the God of Genesis or the prophet Micah. While it is clear that the only god who will ultimately satisfy Mr. Bernard Shaw is Mr. Bernard Shaw himself, he ought not to be able to make these charges against Christianity, and if the average Christian were better informed, he would be unable to make them: they would be laughed out of court as absurdities. Nor is it unfair to ask whether Mr. Bernard Shaw, if he had been better informed about Christianity, would have committed the gross elementary blunder of confusing ἀγάπη and ἔρως when writing of the Christian doctrine of Love.

This is a questioning age, and every tendency of the young against accepting the recognized beliefs of their elders and of previous ages. They must examine for themselves, form their own conclusions, and live their own lives in accordance with their conclusions. The Bible as a body of revealed truth makes little appeal to them; and we must meet them on their own ground. The Bible as the supreme classical and timeless account of the spiritual experience of mankind does make a very direct appeal. We cannot now present to the young a body of doctrine simply to be accepted on authority. We can say to them, 'Here is the evidence: in these books I see the direct revelation of God's mind guiding the world: this is the evidence of my beliefs.' But the Bible by itself will not give this message to its students. It can only live through exposition, and its exposition is the voice of the Divine Society. The voice of the Church must turn a dead record of fact into a living and authoritative summons to a new life.

THE GOSPEL PORTRAIT*

For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye put to silence the ignorance of foolish men.—I PET. ii, 15.

We preach a crucified Messiah, to the Jews a stumbling-block and unto Greeks foolishness.—I COR. i, 23.

I WANT to draw your attention this morning to a curious feature of all religions, and of Christianity and its predecessor Judaism in particular; namely, when religion begins to express itself primarily in creeds and formulae, and ceases primarily to express itself in lives, it sounds its own death knell.

We have only to turn to the sacred scriptures of the Hebrews for an illustration of this. Throughout the Old Testament there is apparent the bitter antagonism which always existed between the prophets and the priestly classes. The one a group of men who lived religion, the other a group of men who attempted to legislate and regulate it. No greater calamity ever happened to Judaism than that which took place when the 'spirit laden' words of the prophets were codified and legalized in the Deuteronomic and subsequent Priestly legislation. Legislation in religion empties it of its spiritual content. If you want to prove this for yourselves, open your Old Testament at one of the great prophets and read there. You will find yourselves not only among the greatest literature of the world, but you will find too that almost every word pulsates with life, and you breathe an atmosphere refined, real and spiritual. Then turn to the Book of Leviticus or even to Deuteronomy: there you will find the deadly dullness of a code of laws, the kind of atmosphere which comes over one when one attempts to understand the regulations relating to the payment of income tax. The one inspires, the other enslaves or repulses.

Turn then to the New Testament, and read the simple, dignified story of Jesus in St. Mark's gospel, watching as you read the alluring figure of Jesus passing through the daily life of Palestine as it was nearly two thousand years ago. He is not

* A sermon preached by the Rev. L. B. CROSS, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall.

rayed in royal apparel, he does not wear the priestly vestments, no sword clangs at his side. He is a simple figure from a village, a carpenter, possessing a sympathy, an understanding and a care for others with which His contemporaries were not familiar. A kind word here, a glance which meant so much there, helping and a healing hand everywhere; a new type of person. Cannot you see Him, now with the lepers, then with a sick woman, with a paralytic, the centre figure as Jairus and his wife lean over the bed of their little daughter. Jesus with the children on His knees, talking to the rich young man, discussing with the professional scribes and Pharisees—equally at ease with one and all. It takes a lot to show to a crowd of self-righteous religious leaders that the only righteous person in their midst is the prostitute they had themselves taken in adultery. Yet Jesus did so, and with the words, 'He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone.' Jesus who loved the flowers, the birds, the ragged clothes with patches on them. Jesus who had watched the raven working in the bread, who knew that kind of poverty which makes it necessary to find the small lost coin. Jesus who in the bitterest moments of His agony reigned majestically from the Cross. Did those words, 'Truly this was a son of God,' slip from the mouth of the centurion for no reason at all? It is a majestic figure which passes before our eyes, One who knew life and had weighed it in the balance.

And with this majestic figure compare 'our Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father,' etc., or 'For the right faith is that we believe and confess: that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man, God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds, and man of the substance of his Mother born in the world. Perfect God and perfect man of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.' It is the latter picture of Christ which St Bernard Shaws and the Bertram Russells criticize—they do not criticize the former. Such a figure is beyond criticism.

The one is the Jesus of history, the other is the Jesus of legends. They are not very much like each other, are they? And

yet the latter is the Jesus most of us have been brought up on, and we have sometimes found Him hard to reconcile with Him who moves through the Gospels.

In the lifetime of most of us a reaction from the Jesus of Creeds has taken place, a search has been made for the Jesus of History. Scholars have looked down their respective wells of learning, and seeing their own faces reflected in the water, have found their respective Jesuses. To one He is a deluded fanatic, to another a great prophet, to a third He is the Son of God, to a fourth a myth. On the whole the results of Historical Criticism have been disappointing; when we have dug down ever so deep, we can find only traces of Jesus, never Jesus Himself labelled undeniably, God or Man—analysed as having a nature human or divine.

But Historical Criticism has nevertheless done great things for us. It has put us on His tracks and has bidden us follow them.

And where have these tracks brought us now? They have brought us to others who have known Him. We cannot account for Christianity without its Founder, and we cannot account for its Founder without Christianity. We have ceased to bother so much who Jesus was, and we are looking more at what He did and the impression He created. No single figure in history has had such an effect upon the lives of individuals. Need I remind you of the words of the Jewish leaders, 'Now when they beheld the boldness of Peter and John and had perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men, they marvelled: and they took knowledge of them that they had been with Jesus.' Have we been with Jesus? Think of the difference that Jesus made to Paul. We may not agree with his theological speculations on the person of Jesus, or with his interpretation of the doctrine of the Atonement, or with his views on eschatology, but we cannot dispute the greatness of the change. Think of the martyrs and the saints, men and women who hazarded their lives unto death because of Him. Was all this mere foolishness and fantasy? No: it was the effect of Jesus on their lives. Here in the lives of the saints and martyrs, as well as in those of the simple trusting souls, we are thrown back to the Gospels to catch the hushed

rumor of the words, 'Surely this is that prophet,' 'never man make with such authority.' The Person of Jesus was an enigma to His own generation, but His personality was irresistible. He electrified or electrocuted.

As we turn over the pages of the New Testament and read the Pauline Epistles or the Gospel according to St. John, or that magnificent outpouring of the soul of one who had been led on through Christ to see God face to face as Love, a glimpse of those experiences have been left us in *I John*, we begin to understand what Jesus meant to His immediate followers and their successors. These records of these first Christians are the finest commentary on His life.

They all tell us the same thing. Something had happened to them. Something new had come into their lives. What was it? Over and over again we get the same answer. The Spirit. St. Peter connects it with the prophecy of Joel, 'It shall come to pass in the latter days I will pour out my spirit on all flesh.' St. John calls it the Spirit of Truth; St. Paul looked upon it as something which sanctified life and made it bear fruit, instead of being empty. It had brought him love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control. Christianity to these men was no conformity to creeds or doctrines—it was foolish to look for them in their writings—it was life and love abundantly. The Spirit embraced all the virtues, it encompassed every occupation.

But these men did not have everything their own way. There was opposition—for some, death. The Spirit in the Fourth Gospel is called the Comforter, but it is a great mistake to associate this word with feather beds and silken couches. The action of the Spirit as the Comforter was to make strong, to fortify, best expressed in Paul's metaphor of the fully-armed soldier. The early Christian was the fighter. Do you think they met opposition with philosophical or theological arguments? Do you think they won converts by showing men creeds or doctrinal statements? No, 'with well-doing they put to silence the ignorance of foolish men.' To the Jew the Crucified Messiah was no argument, He was a stumbling-block, to the Greek foolishness—but the new life of the Spirit manifested in a Paul, in an Ignatius,

meant and should still mean a very great deal. It was the most forceful of arguments, it was more than an argument, it was an overwhelming victory.

The author of the Fourth Gospel tells a story of certain Gentiles who came and said to Philip: 'Sir, we would see Jesus.' The narrative is particularly interesting, for their request is apparently never granted. Instead, Jesus breaks off into a discourse on a grain of wheat. 'Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone: but if it die, it beareth much fruit.' The Greeks were apparently looking for the wrong thing: they had asked the wrong question. It is just this wrong question which the world has been asking all along—it is the question, as we have seen, which historical criticism has been asking. It would perhaps have been a different story had they said, 'Sir, we would know Jesus.'

Know Jesus. Christianity since the days it became an institutional religion embodied in the Church has sought to exhibit Jesus in creeds and formularies, and it has met its opponents by shaking at them their heads, or—with persecution. Both opponents and Christianity have been barking up the wrong tree. Opponents have attacked something which is not Christianity, and the Church has attempted to defend that same something. 'True Christianity is best understood biographically'—in the lives of true Christians—they will silence all opponents. 'For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye put to silence the ignorance of foolish men.' Let our constant prayer and effort be that we may be as Christ to others and that they may see something of His love in our lives and learn to love Him in us.

We can have disarmament conferences, we can hold economic councils, we can legislate for everything under the sun, but all will be futile till man is enthused with the spirit which was in Christ. Peace, stability, order, these are from God, and they will never come to us till we can see our world through the eyes of God.

THE INTELLECTUALS IN RETREAT

By the Reverend J. C. HARDWICK, M.A., B.Sc.

I HAVE the intellectuals lost their nerve? It would appear so. With startling unanimity they are giving up Humanism with its belief in mankind, and embracing Original Sin. Tradition, orthodoxy, authority, discipline are passwords nowadays to intellectual respectability. Liberalism and humanism, just in human nature and science, are *demodés*. They belong to the optimistic nineteenth century.

Take that much-read Russian, Nicholas Berdyaev. He tells us, writing in a minor key, that 'contemporary history is being wound up.' Our time is 'one of spiritual decadence, not of decadence.' The paths of Humanism and the Renaissance 'have been fully explored, and there is no longer any possibility of advance along them.' We who stand at the apex of the Humanist find ourselves in the midst of 'a frightening emptiness.' European man 'is tired to death and ready to rest upon any kind of collectivism.' One has to make allowances for a professor misled by the Soviets, but if he is disillusioned with humanism and liberalism that is no reason why we in England should follow his example.

Then there is the very able Roman Catholic writer and propagandist Christopher Dawson, whose admirable historical surveys are deservedly popular and exercise a wide influence among thoughtful people. His popularity is due in part of course to his talents and ability, but largely also to the fact that he is uttering a message to which everybody is willing to listen. He preaches return to discipline and authority.

Then we have the Anglo-Catholicism of Mr. T. S. Eliot and the Roman Catholicism of Mr. Alfred Noyes. These two modern poets began life as agnostics.

The flight from liberalism is not, of course, confined to the religious sphere. In politics there is a definite reaction away from democracy and towards fascism. To what are we to attribute this phenomenon, so many-sided and pervasive? And is it going to be permanent or temporary?

We may note that something of the kind occurred after the Napoleonic wars. England became predominantly reactionary for twenty years after Waterloo. The Reform Bill was not passed until 1832, and it was a hard struggle to push it through. Eighteenth century England had been 'progressive' and free thinking (Voltaire got his inspiration from England), but by the time of Queen Victoria's accession, a change had taken place. Was the reaction due to war-weariness, or to alarm at the French Revolution? Or possibly to a combination of both causes?

And if our present case is parallel, are we to attribute our reaction towards authority to war-weariness or to disgust and shock at what has taken place in Russia?

It is worth noting that ancient history affords a parallel case of a flight from liberal ideas after an exhausting war.

After the disastrous ending of the Peloponnesian War,

'the first concern of the Athenian post-war philosophers was to repudiate everything that, for two centuries past, had made Athens economically and politically great. This comes out almost startlingly in a passage in Plato's *Laws*, in which the fictitious 'Athenian Stranger' makes his first observations upon an imaginary project for the establishment of a new city-state on a depopulated area in Crete.'¹

The 'Stranger' in making his recommendations, urges that the new city be not placed, as Athens had been, near the sea.

'For the sea is an insidious neighbour inasmuch as it fills the country with tradesmen's business and the souls of the country's inhabitants with tortuousness and deceit and the body politic itself with distrust and disaffection.'

In fact there is in this palinode a complete retraction of all the ideals expressed in the famous speech of Pericles over the Athenian dead at Plataea. There is an absolute repudiation of Athenian ideals in favour of those of Sparta, the former arch-enemy. The timid intellectual runs to take cover with the militarist, as a child to its mother's knee.

'In Plato's *Republic*, and a *fortiori* in Plato's *Laws* and in the last two books of Aristotle's *Politics*, the dry bones of "Lycurgeoan" Sparta stick out gauntly through the tender Athenian philosophic skin. In their condonation of caste, in their penchant towards specialization, and in their passion for establishing an invincible equilibrium at any price, the Athenian philosophers of the fourth century B.C. show themselves docile pupils of the Spartan statesmen of the sixth.'²

¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (1934), Vol. III, p. 91.

² Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

Plato, it will be remembered, places a ban on poets in his ideal Republic, and establishes a general censorship over 'dangerous thought.' The intellectual seeks an orthodoxy which he can impose upon others, and so make the world safe for dogmatic philosophers.

Yet the Utopian programme of the defeatist philosophers was a forlorn hope. For the "Lycurgeoan" system, in which they put their trust, was visibly crumbling at the very time when they were seeking to arrest the incipient decline of the Hellenic Civilization by "pegging" it to the Spartan rock.³

What is the psychological explanation of this failure of nerve on the part of the intellectuals, which was a phenomenon of the fourth century B.C. no less than of the twentieth century A.D.? It is not merely that they wish to run away themselves. They vie with one another in repudiating every ideal by which intellectuals in healthier times have lived. Not only that, they wish to enslave everybody, and to dragoon them into the kind of stagnation-salvation of which they themselves approve.

The last paragraph of Mr. T. S. Eliot's *Thoughts After Lambeth* breathe this very spirit of despair and retreat :

'The world is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality. The experiment will fail; but we must be very patient in awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time: so that the Faith may be preserved alive through the dark ages before us; to renew and rebuild civilization, and save the World from suicide.'

The motives behind this withdrawal of the intellectual from the world into a kind of monkish seclusion and isolation deserve to be examined, for the phenomenon is one of sinister omen. What is wrong with the intellectual that his nerve fails him thus suddenly at a critical moment when his help is most needed? One reason may be that the intellectual has never lived in close touch with reality, but in a world of lofty ideas which are remote from the concrete facts of life. In smooth and normal times this 'remoteness' of the intellectual does not trouble or embarrass him, since life flows on gently, and the actual course of the world does not contrast too strongly with the ideal world to which he himself is immuned. But when, as in times like the present, the steady course of events is disturbed, and when social and economic life display signs of a possible complete breakdown, then the intellectual finds himself faced with something

³ Toynbee, *loc. cit.*

which his super-normal intelligence enables him to see far more clearly than his neighbours, but which (owing to his settled habit of 'remoteness') he is quite unable to *face*. He sees the fence before him, but, like a nervous horse, he 'refuses.' He is aware of the situation in all its grimness, but he cannot accept its challenge. He cannot deny that the menacing situation exists, as can the ordinary 'natural' man with his providential obtuseness; so what he does is to wash his hands of all responsibility, and say of the world that 'we must be very patient in awaiting its collapse, meanwhile redeeming the time, so that the Faith may be preserved alive.' He takes up an attitude of moral superiority while evading the moral *tasks* which the situation really presents.

But 'the Faith' will not be preserved alive in that way. A faith can only be preserved alive by being put into practice. Those who imagine that any policy of mere conservatism can keep a faith alive deceive themselves. The phrase 'redeeming the time,' as St. Paul used it, did not mean sitting at home watching over spiritual riches as a miser watches over his gold. It means that the believer should seek out every opportunity of putting his faith into practice, and if the world would not allow it to be put into practice, to defy the world and die rather than live with ones ideals proscribed. But St. Paul's converts had a courage which our intellectuals lack. They saw, as Mr. Eliot sees to-day, that the world was on its way to perdition; but their policy was not to stand aside and see it go, but to throw themselves in its path and, if need be, perish in the attempt to stop it.

One has to conclude, too, that our recreant intellectuals are not only cowards, but (as often happens) prigs into the bargain. There is an air of moral superiority about Mr. Eliot's standing aside, of which only an intellectual would be capable. The intellectual all his life has been accustomed to despising his fellow-mortals, and now, after *il gran rifiuto*, subconsciously he is aware that he has sold his birthright (and the birthright of other people who trusted him), and hence his high moral attitude. When we feel morally superior it is always an indication that we have just done something rather despicable. This is the way in which we compensate ourselves.

Of course the intellectual, being an intellectual, is always

le to justify himself. He can devise new justifications of the doctrine of Original Sin, and attribute all our ills to the indelible defects of human nature. This is a gospel of despair and defeat. It is like attributing the collapse of a house which might have been shored up and repaired, and so saved as a useful habitation, to the forces of gravitation. Of course human nature is not perfect, but one makes one's plans on that understanding. One does not cease to make plans, sitting by with folded arms to watch the catastrophe, with an air of moral superiority as if to say how well-deserved it is. Before our troubles came upon us the intellectuals were optimistic enough about human nature, and turned out utopian schemes by the dozen. But when the facts about human nature became visible, they have done in the last twenty years, human ignorance and passion drive our idealistic intellectuals to despair, and like Jonah they sit under their gourd and wait anxiously for fire from heaven to descend upon the sinners, and like Jonah they feel pained if it fails to do so. This is neither a healthy nor a helpful attitude. It would be almost better to construct utopias on the atonic plan; to be dictators in imagination is always a compensation for the frustrated intellectual.

At the moment our intellectuals in retreat spend most of their leisure in labouring to show that the Renaissance, the Reformation and the French Revolution were ghastly mistakes, and that the humanist outlook, from which every liberal view, whether in religion or politics, takes its origin, is perverse and erroneous — heresy, in short, since our refugees are adepts at using theological terms. Probably no small amount of this theorizing among our modern English *intelligentsia* is derivable from T. E. Hulme, whose *Speculations* were published posthumously in 1924.⁴ Hulme was an eccentric genius who was killed while serving as an artillery officer in 1917. But though he repudiated humanism, Hulme was no reactionary. He aimed at making his attitude 'a possible one for the "emancipated" and "reasonable" man at the moment.' As a matter of fact the ingenious scientific basis which he devised for his theory has been made secure by researches in physics which have taken place since his death.

⁴ Kegan Paul, 10/6.

The defeatist attitude of the intellectuals, regrettable and harmful in itself, has also an unhealthy influence upon the cultural underworld, as it may be termed. Under the shadow of Mr. Eliot, and doubtless repudiated by him, Buchmanism grows up. What is wrong with Buchmanism? it may be asked. Does it not make our young people healthy and hearty, and help them to ease some of their complexes by unburdening their souls to one another? Doubtless this is so, but the point is that our young people do not need to have their emotions stirred so much as their minds shaking up. And in any case Buchmanism is an 'escape,' and its ultimate destiny is to be an ally of fascism. As the acutest of our younger critics, Mr. W. H. Auden, has pointed out, when Groupism expands beyond the limits of a small group, it must have a programme, and what other programme can a movement of that kind have than some form of reactionary politics? Groupism is an attempt to side-track the generous ardour of youth. But it is only because the intellectuals are in retreat that such follies are possible.

The temptations to go into retreat are, of course, strong, and to the timid must appear almost overwhelming; to say that we are at the end of an age sounds plausible, and enables one to evade the necessity for blazing new trails into the future. Nothing can be done, we must return — return to the faith, to authority, to discipline, to a sense of human depravity, to a belief in the Virgin Birth, to a repudiation of reason. Nothing in fact is more sinister and more cowardly and indolent than the present fashionable repudiation of reason, which saves the labour and danger of thought. It is significant that Hulme was a disciple of Bergson. And it is noteworthy that as Bergson praised the instincts of bees and ants, so it is the hive world into which we are slipping, into which we are being driven by our authoritarian shepherds with their pipes playing soothing songs of retreat. Back, back; always back — to the fold, to the mother's knee, nay, to the mother's womb. It was a mistake to emerge into the dangers of the world.

'Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be. Why then should we deceive ourselves?' There is a whole philosophy in those words. But the intellectuals, the idealists, will not, perhaps cannot, face facts. They

Imagine that they can prevent war, for example, by preaching pacifism. You might as well seek to cure phthisis by administering cough lozenges. It is the amiable and easy way, but it is useless. And meanwhile Mr. Eliot waits for the religious tide to turn and come in. If it did come in it would sweep him and his like away, just as it swept away the defeatist Stoics seven hundred years ago.

While the neo-catholics are on their knees in the splendid isolation of their cloister, the new barbarism, the uprush of the mass man from below, will flood in and swamp them. The culture for which they stand will be submerged, and deservedly. For even if their truths were true, no truth has a right to survive that will not fight for its life. Perhaps it is the case that Europe is in dissolution, that the Orient is right in saying we are done for. Our intellectuals have lost faith in our culture, they have lost heart, their nerve has failed, they are tired and in retreat.

WHY EXCLUDE ?

I HAVE waited long for someone more qualified than myself, more facile of pen, more authoritative in the councils of the Church, to write my plea. Yet since no other has voiced my contention in your pages, perhaps you will allow me—a plain layman with no claim to scholarship or literary experience—to ask the question which forms the title of this paper.

When Hobbes described the Church of England as the most tolerant and comprehensive religious institution known to the world he was probably justified in his assertion, for practically, and not theoretically, the Church did not demand uniformity of interpretation in his day from those who gathered within the fold. Similarly now it is a community of persons of widely differing views, bound together by their common sympathies, or by inherited instinct or merely by the conventional conformity that is typical of the respectable Toryism of England. This diversity of opinion within the ranks of Church people is indeed a guarantee of the health of the body—the prime justification for the amazing yet splendid conception of a Church controlled by the State.

It is the very apotheosis of democracy, unintentional but none the less precious, that the responsibility for any variation in the ordering of the Church should rest, not with those dangerous people the specialists, who are liable to be carried this way or that by the fashionable fervour of the moment, but with you and me—the man in the street through the men of reasonable intelligence and character whom we send to Parliament.

No doubt the comprehensive character of our English Church has been the product more of accident than deliberate policy—unless, indeed, we may see in it an example of Providence bringing good out of evil—for there seems little doubt that neither Henry VIII nor Elizabeth was actuated by worthy motives in the measures which they took during the Reformation period. When Henry overthrew the papal influence, and when Elizabeth, as Ransome tells us, left the religion of England ‘so ill-defined that few could not find an interpretation which should include their views within its pale,’ it was political interest rather than religious principle which dictated their action. It was left to the political struggles of the Puritans and the Revolution to rescue the Church from autocratic control, since by transferring power from King to People it necessarily democratized the Church and made the nation as a whole responsible for its own religious development.

There are to-day, both within and without the Church, many advocates for disestablishment; it is well that they should realize that establishment and comprehension must inevitably stand or fall together. Can it, for instance, be doubted that if disestablishment had come in the past we should now have separate Evangelical and Anglican and Modernist schools of thought? And who can say which section would remain the Church to which we are all to-day proud to belong?

Let it be admitted then that practically the Church is comprehensive in outlook, exceedingly tolerant of doctrinal aberrations, whether in the direction of Rome or agnosticism; is it not time to throw over, once for all, the theoretic exclusion which is implicit in our creeds and restrictive rubrics?

I am told that reciting a creed is an act of worship. Why so? We may with the most fervent enthusiasm applaud Daniel making his triumphant profession at his open window, and yet doubt

whether, in these days when religious persecution is unknown, our 'credo' is not better relegated to privacy; whether a public recital is not even a slightly bombastic militant gesture, out of place in a service of devotion.

What a boon too it would be to be spared those countless sermons preached to explain (for instance) that the 'resurrection of the body' does not mean what one cannot but think that it did mean when the creed was compiled, or those tedious explanations which try, not very convincingly, to render the anathemas of the *Quicumque Vult* less hurtful to tender consciences.

I am told that all societies have rules, must have them, ought to have them. Again why? I am not sure that the analogy between the Church of Christ and the societies or clubs that we know in social life is very helpful, but even in such societies the rules and regulations are usually as few and as simple as possible. The most essential rule is that members should pay a subscription, and surely anyone who feels that he can bring worship with him into the community of Christ's Church is paying that contribution. It may be that the earnest agnostic is giving widow's mite that out-values many a conventional Christian's gift. It is true of course that no door-keeper stands to ask the intending worshipper at the Church porch whether he or she can recite the creed, yet we do not allow any to be confirmed as fellow-members without that test, nor do we allow any who have not so conformed to join with us in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Why not? Is it that we fear contamination with an infidel? or is it (still more arrogant—nay blasphemous) that we doubt the capacity—the out-thrust—of the Everlasting Arms of Love? Each must come to the feast in his wedding garment, but many of us Churchmen know unconfirmed persons anxious to attend whose wedding garment of humble adoration would put our own to shame.

I am told that there is danger in the Church being too tolerant, that a faith undefined is necessarily lacking in security, vitality. Again why? Is not the precise opposite true? Is not the building erected on a confined foundation less secure, less capable of beautiful development than one that is more generously based? To teach a child to recite a creed and then leave

him to discover (or possibly fail to discover) the rock foundation upon which it rests, is surely an inversion of the natural order. A creed must be the fruit of experience, not the password to it. What right have we to tell a child what he or she believes before the words are understandable to youthful mentality? It is surely only because the basis of faith is broad, and in each experience ever-broadening, that we can each for ourselves dare tentatively and with reverent hesitation to formulate any creed that is worth the name. It is true for so many honest souls that to define your faith is to confine it. Just as an artist like Michael Angelo or Giovanni Bellini tries to express universal motherhood in a Madonna and achieves greatness in proportion to his success in transcending a particular portrait, so, as we grow older, surely we ought to strengthen our grip on the basic assurance of God's love omnipresent, and in doing so let the particular dogma sink into comparative insignificance—the part being absorbed in the whole.

As a schoolmaster I well remember being told by a thoughtful, if conventional, sixth form boy, 'If I found that such and such a dogma seemed to me false my whole faith would go'—a deplorable pronouncement but not illogical if he has been taught that the Church's dogmatic system is infallible and so to disprove one dogma is to discredit all.

Let it be admitted (with regret) that probably those whose dogmatic sense is most definite will be most likely to make converts, just as we are accustomed to finding men of strictly limited outlook more successful as politicians than the philosophers who weigh up conflicting points of view, but in the long process of history it is statesmen rather than politicians who mould the world.

We pray constantly that we may hold the faith in 'Unity of spirit,' and no other kind of unity is to be expected or even desired in a realm where the truth that we seek is so incomparably beyond any single human capacity to comprehend or to define. We claim as Churchmen to have a vision of the truth, however it may be blurred or inconstant, but how dare we claim a monopoly of vision? Moreover, why should we expect to see more than one tiny facet of the jewel Truth? One of the few things that we may confidently assert is that the nature of God

something infinitely more loving and generous than it has entered into the mind of man to imagine. We are led to believe that though now 'we know in part,' one day we shall know 'even as also we are known.' The promise of Truth is an infinite promise, and as such must surely, in God's time, reach its infinite fulfilment. As a member of the Modern Churchmen's Union, I believe that it is each one's concern to search earnestly and fearlessly for a fuller view of the Truth, but we have lessons to learn of others, just as they can learn from us.

But above and beyond all questions of logic or expediency the compelling reason against an exclusive Church policy is the example of the Master, Christ Himself. 'Come unto me all that travail' is a universal invitation—the qualification is man's need rather than his fealty. 'Suffer little children' is the charter of welcome for all humble seekers after truth. Like the over-zealous disciples the Church tries to put a cordon round illimitable love.

Our Master was revolutionary in much, but in nothing is His revolutionary zeal more evident than in sweeping away the musty formalism of his age. The point scarcely needs labouring, for it is in the whole trend of His example rather than in detached quotation that it is clear that here was no exclusionist. Is any so bold as to declare that Jesus' mission was to teach dogma? Dare any of those who are so zealous for the exclusive dogmatic position claim authority direct from Him? We are making verbal conformity the test of loyalty: the only tests which Christ applied were simpler and more searching, 'Lovest thou me?' and 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' When will some authoritative voice be raised within our well-loved Church, some powerful arm lifted to push open wide the half-closed doors, until we welcome within God's house neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Unitarian nor Trinitarian nor Agnostic, but only those who come to pay the homage they can command?

FELIX N. DOWSON.

THE LITTLE CHILD AND THE KINGDOM*

By SIR FRANCIS FREMANTLE, M.D., M.P.

WE are met here to celebrate the patron saint of the art and ministry of healing and to realize the part that such ministration must ever play—not merely in the material affairs of the world, but in the higher world of the Eternal Forces, which is the world of religion. We step aside this day from our daily round of service to the sick and suffering and to the community; we come together, as a fellowship, hand in hand, into the House of God to lay before Him our little offering of service, past and future, and to think out in His presence, in peace and silence from the noisy twentieth century world, where we stand in the sight of the Eternities.

Oh! That clash and noise and hurry and worry of the material world outside! How it jades us! How difficult it makes our life! How it interferes with the proper carrying out of our work! How it prevents our doing what we are trying to do as thoroughly as we want to do it! What would we not give to be left alone with our job till we have done it; to be told what to do; to be given everything necessary, to be fed and provided for, and to have an hour or two's absolute leisure every day and an hour or two's absolute quiet in which to read and think things out undisturbed! But that is not how the world is made; that is not the world into which we have been born. We have our part to play in an excessively bustling world, and here we escape from it for a brief hour to think out quietly how we stand in face of the greater world of eternity and from it to draw fresh strength and help for our work outside this church.

In gospel-days the little band of humble wage-earners, who had left all to follow the carpenter's son, no doubt had their own worries; to them the world seemed as difficult as to us to-day. They had seen and heard much from their Master in His ministry, and much that they had heard puzzled them. In *Mt.* xviii, 1, they asked Him, 'Who is the greatest in the Kingdom

*A sermon preached on St. Luke's Day, 1934, to Doctors and Nurses in Ware Parish Church.

Heaven?' Our Lord's reply was practical. He set a little child in the midst of them; there was the picture of him that should be greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven. Childhood has a naked mind; is natural, essentially truthful, in so far as it understands the facts to which it speaks; simple, and at the same time is helpless, like those to whom you give your service; and our Lord emphasizes the credit that will come to those who help the little child in its helplessness, and ensuing discredit that will reach to those who are cruel enough to injure the helpless in body or soul.

Let us imagine the Master with us here, applying His teaching of the little child to us in our lives and thoughts. We all want peace and security in our minds, as well as in the world around us; and with many to whom we minister we know that there is something from which they suffer deeper than the sores and wounds and infections to which we apply the physical remedies. 'You must rest,' we say to them; 'you must take a holiday, have a change of air.' Impossible, generally; but if possible, how often do they return, little the better and soon again to lose their health. It is the restlessness in their minds and souls, reflected from the restlessness of their surroundings, that needs a cure. And the cure needed is the simplicity of the little child.

Perhaps the root-cause of the outstanding troubles of the present-day world is the decay of moral authority; and authority in its essence must depend on the conviction of the individual and that he *must* do right and avoid wrong, and not wait for rewards to be dangled before his eyes before he does the right thing nor look round the corner for a policeman before he avoids doing wrong. Why is there a decay in such conviction? Surely, because of the decay in religious faith, in a belief in the realities of God and Devil, Heaven and Hell, on which the moral code of our forefathers was based and to which we were, perhaps unconsciously, trained. Let me suggest that here we of the medical and nursing services have a special part to play and that a new light is appearing out of the darkness to help us on our way.

We have a special part to play; for in our professional training we are taught to seek truth and follow it out without fear; and yet when we come to apply it to actual, suffering, human

beings we find they and their troubles never conform to the ideal subject of the text-books. We are the go-betweens, the interpreters of science to human life and of human life to science. To those interested in the supposed conflict between Science and Religion I would commend the only book of many I have read in which a theologian has given Science a square deal and by a deep understanding of the essentials has cleared away difficulties and shown the part each has to play in the harmony of the universe. The author, Canon Streeter, rightly calls his book *Reality: a new correlation of science and religion*.¹ For scores of years the science that we have been interpreting has implicitly or openly disputed the existence of God. The atomic theory and the nineteenth century conceptions of Energy suggested a neat physical basis for the whole universe; evolution by natural selection suggested a natural explanation of the development of all living things from the simplest. Edward Clodd wrote the *Story of Creation* as an automatic procession from the homogeneous nebula to the present diversity; and the agnostics, too gentlemanly to declare for atheism, saw no need or sign of a God.

It takes a generation or two for any big idea to percolate from the intellectual heights of the mighty to become incorporated in the common thought of the people; and this percolation of agnostic philosophy unfortunately coincided with the most revolutionary mechanical advances, which have so speeded up life, and opened up communications and opportunities, as to usurp the whole field of attention and imagination of the public mind, especially in the young. There is no time left for thought; material progress offers a 'sufficient prospect for practical purposes; science doesn't need a God — nor do we.' Is not that a true picture of the usual rude philosophy in the people at large — even if veiled by occasional attendance at a church-service and by mute support of religious institutions and conventions for a multitude of very good reasons?

But Science itself has now turned the tables on the agnostics. The atom, on which their universe was founded, has been split into protons, electrons and neutrons; and now these themselves are exploded into a system of waves, in which physicists at last

¹ Published by Macmillans.

realize that the human mind must be included. Sir James Jeans, in his Presidential Address to the British Association at Aberdeen last month, said that

‘the new physics . . . has reopened a door which the old physics had seemed to slam and bolt. It shows us a building in which we can mould events to our desire and live lives of emotion, intellect and endeavour.’

The President of the Royal Society, Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins, wrote to me last January that

‘Science is far more humble-minded to-day than it was at the end of the last century and its limitations are much better defined . . . The great rebellion just now is of course against a mechanical view of the universe,’ and that ‘for Jeans we only know in as far as our minds are in touch with the minds of the Creator.’

Science can only look on the act of creation as a fact beyond its understanding, and in that creation it now sees evidence of design.

And so Science realizes, as we have realized all along in our simple way, that we have, each of us, the power of will, of choice, governing small things around us; that life is something apart from the physical matter and energy of the physicists; that our material bodies are as helpless without life, as the motor-car, even with its petrol and oil, is without the driver and his mind and will.

Conscious then of this creative power within us, we are usually conscious of the contact between our own and other minds and thoughts and feelings; of the inheritance of many qualities of our minds from past generations. Life appears to be something apart from matter, continuous in time and space; an limitless matrix, which touches matter at certain points and makes those points live; is not tied down to the perishable matter of the body, but lives on, with the impress of its experience in that body to life eternal. Such is the hope of our religion, now suggested by modern thought.

But, more — as we can only contemplate things greater than ourselves in terms of our own experience, and can only describe them in terms of our five senses, so we can only imagine the Creator, the Great Governing Power of the Universe, in terms of manhood. We know that we have living power over our surroundings. We rightly assume the same life throughout the

universe, with the same attributes as those of man, those not merely of power, of creation, of governance, but those also of loving kindness and beauty, which are of the essence of our life. And so we imagine the Power as a person, of which our own souls at their best are an infinitely small part—we believe in Him with our whole minds as well as with our souls and all our strength. Our Lord has taught us accordingly to look on God as His Father and ours, and on ourselves, if we do not forfeit the privilege, as His children, sons of God.

So, after all the doubtings or indifference of ourselves or our patients we come back to the simple faith of the little child, who puts his hand trustingly in that of his father and prays 'Our Father' in the simple terms of our Lord's prayer.

We come back to the little child with its demand for love that appeals to us all. Our patients to us are all little children; we pity them; we try to understand their peculiarities, their difficulties, their feelings, often very different from our own. They call for our sympathy and self-sacrifice—which to a true Christian is its own reward. Let us beware lest our human nature be petrified by science or by the necessary but often over-worked machinery of committees and rules of organization. We must be human—aye, and humorous—in our dealings with men. Let us avoid offence, as we condemn offence to little children; cruelty to the mind and soul and feelings of others, as far worse than injury to their bodies. Let us look far afield and seek to prevent causes of trouble and suffering as well as to cure it when it has occurred. Let us stand for peace to all men of good will. Let us stand for our Master who gave Himself for the whole world, in past, in this and in future ages, that they, that we, that our neighbours, whom we serve, should have Life and have it abundantly.

'Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.'

BOOK REVIEWS

SIR WILLIAM ASHLEY *

Many of the older members of the Modern Churchmen's Union cherish pleasant memories of their fellow-member, Sir William Ashley, and will accordingly value his biography, written by his daughter, to which is prefixed an appreciative Foreword by Mr. Stanley Baldwin. Born in 1860 at Armondsey of artisan parentage, William Ashley, by sheer ability, unflagging industry and social sympathy, rose to positions of considerable academic distinction, and achieved a world-wide reputation as a writer of economic history and an exponent of historical economics. He was educated mainly at St. Olave's School and at Balliol College, Oxford. His student days, though full of happiness and interest, were circumscribed by narrow means both before and after graduation in the Honours School of Modern History. Release from sordid cares was attained on his election to Fellowship at Lincoln in 1885. He held successively professorships of Economic and Social History at Toronto University, Harvard University and Birmingham University. In each of these Universities his work was an unqualified success. In each of them he was a pioneer and laid the foundations for the study of economics on sound lines which sought to combine historic truth with modern practical needs. The Department of Commerce in Birmingham University owes its existence to him. It was not a dry-as-dust professor that he entered on his work in the great capital of the Midlands but as a patriot who desired, as the result of his labours here, to produce intelligent and public-spirited 'captains of industry' who should add to the prosperity of their country.

He produced a number of books, the most remarkable of them being *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory*. The latest of them, *The Bread of our Forefathers*, was published posthumously. Ashley combined erudition and meticulous accuracy with a style remarkable for its purity and attractiveness. He held strong views on style, which the general reader could wish were more widely held and put into practice by the teachers of technical subjects. This appears in a letter of congratulation addressed to him by that delightful and accomplished scholar, Warde Fowler, after reading his *Surveys, Historic and Economic*:

'I find much real consolation in reading and in re-reading your work, which is always to my mind exactly what such work should be, not only scientific, but capable of being understood and enjoyed by the laity. I am convinced that it is a matter of real importance that while we fully allow that the great object of history in all its forms is to arrive at truth, and that, as Bury says in his inaugural Cambridge lecture, it has nothing to do with literature as such, we should stick to the good old French and English habit of trying to say what we have to say as clearly as possible. In that way we should escape the danger of consciously writing only for a professorial caste, as in Germany: we should tend to think out our conclusions more thoroughly, as Darwin did when writing on this principle, and we should probably not commit to print a good deal which we might otherwise shovel out of our notebooks into print, under the impression that all our work

* *William James Ashley*. A Life by Anne Ashley (with a Foreword by the Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin, M.P.) (P. S. King and Son. 1932. 8/6.)

must be permanently valuable — an impression only too easily arrived at by men who work exclusively at one subject. Your writing always seems to me to hit the mean almost to perfection' (p. 66 f).

Ashley's life was full of activities. He recognized that his professorial duties included warm personal relationships with his students and an active interest in the social and economic life of his community. He could not have achieved all he did without the devoted and highly intelligent partnership of his wife, a daughter of Dr. Birkbeck Hill, to whom all lovers of Dr. Johnson owe so much. Lady Ashley, a highly accomplished woman, was an embodiment of kindness and calm. Although a member of the Church of England, she was married by Dr. Fairbairn in the Congregational Church at Oxford, as she believed in the equality of the sexes and felt that the Church of England Marriage Service failed to recognize this equality by exacting a promise of obedience. Her husband, who had been brought up a Baptist and was a constant auditor of Spurgeon's sermons in his youth, felt compelled to relinquish his evangelical convictions. He eventually became a member of the Church of England and was confirmed, but in the case of his two elder children he had them baptized by a Congregationalist Minister, as both he and his wife were unable to take part conscientiously in our English Baptismal Service.

Ashley became a devout communicant, although not in the strict sense a believer in sacramental grace. His daughter cites a very beautiful passage in which he expresses his ideal of the Holy Communion:

'And nowhere is our Master more clearly shown to us than at His Table . . . We see Jesus gathering His disciples around Him before His death, we are present in thought at the foundation of that Sacred Society which was to bring the world to righteousness: our Master speaks to us once more of hope and love and sends us again to the battle . . . When we think of those in all times since His appearing who have felt on their brows the hand of Christ, we cannot refrain from thanking. "Lift up your hearts." Yes, Blessed Master, we will lift them up' (p. 38).

Deeply Christian in his life and spirit, like many another English layman, he possessed the minimum of dogmatic conviction. His biographer writes:

'His whole tendency of thought prevented him from regarding the Person or the work of the historic Christ as unique except perhaps in degree' (p. 39).

Ashley said that he had descended to the bottom of the hill and had only succeeded in climbing half-way up again. His belief in the uniformity of nature and the evolutionary character of the creative process precluded his being able to believe in miraculous divine eruptions. He recognized intensely the need for the Christian religion in personal and in social life, but it was a form of that religion more closely akin to the teaching of the Master in the Synoptic Gospels than to the theological pronouncements of the General Councils.

Besides being a regular worshipper in the Christian Church he also took a public part in its services. He composed and delivered a number of admirable sermons, some of which were published in the *Guardian* and afterwards republished in a volume entitled *The Christian Outlook*. Two of the most notable of these sermons were delivered in Birmingham Cathedral and in St. James' Cathedral, Toronto. He was licensed as a lay reader by the Archbishop of Canterbury. He was an active member of the Modern

Churchmen's Union, attended its annual conferences regularly and became Vice-President and member of its Council. The reason he gave for joining the Union was characteristic. In Bishop Gore's day a public meeting was held in Birmingham to promote the aims of the Union. Ashley acted as chairman and at its conclusion said: 'Now I am going to join you because you have come out into the open.'

This biography is a model of what such a biography should be. It is a brief history of the development of economic teaching in our modern universities and contains interesting sidelights on social life at home and abroad. But it is of even greater interest as portraying, in simple, unsentimental language, the story of a noble life dedicated to ideal ends but without any trace of priggishness, cant or fanaticism.

H.D.A.M.

AN AUGUST AND FASCINATING SUPERSTITION*

Dr. Walter McDonald, a learned Roman Catholic divine and professor at Maynooth, stated in his Memoirs, which were published in 1920, the year of his death, that Dr. Salmon's *Infallibility of the Church*, which was first published in 1888, had never received a sufficient answer. It still, after the lapse of another fourteen years, remains unanswered. Nor have Roman controversialists been more successful in controverting more recent criticism, such as that contained in Dr. Cadoux's massive *Catholicism and Christianity*; while against Dr. Coulton's rapier thrusts they have shown themselves well-nigh defenceless. Yet Dr. Major in his book on the Roman and Papal claims tells us that it is estimated that in Great Britain something like fifteen thousand converts enter the Roman Church annually. We are very unwise if we blink the fact that there is going on unceasingly a very intensive propaganda to win, for Rome, converts from the Church of England, and that it is meeting with a not inconsiderable success. The trouble is that potential converts to Rome are quite unlikely to have read the works of Dr. Salmon or Dr. Cadoux or Dr. Coulton, and, if they did, they might be in danger of losing their way altogether in the controversial ticket. To such great scholars we owe a great debt. The work they have done is invaluable. But it is clear that the simple and rather muddled-headed people who form a large proportion of those who feel the lure of Rome need something of a rather different type. Dr. Major has provided just what is needed by the man who is attracted by the fascination of Rome, and yet is unable or disinclined to follow the elaborate discussions of a complex controversy. Dr. Major is familiar with the writings of the controversialists and makes admirable use of his knowledge, but his method of approach is his own.

He holds that the highest religion makes its appeal to man through, and only through, the rational, moral, and spiritual consciousness, and with Whichcote he says: 'I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational.' The corollary is that the highest religion not only allows but demands a large measure of individual freedom. In theology and worship alike there is a primal simplicity which ought to be safeguarded. The modern man is right when he says, 'I do not think that we Christians to-day ought to be required, if we are to be Christians, to accept as true more than Christ Himself taught in the Gospels.' At the same time Dr. Major sets high value on the continuity of Christian thought, 'the great Catholic heritage.' This provides the static element in Christianity. But it

* *The Roman Church and the Modern Man*. By H. D. A. Major, D.D., F.S.A. Published by Messrs. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1934. Price 5/-.)

is in the other, the dynamic element, that there resides 'the creative factor of the Christian religion and its power to mould the civilization of the future.' As environment changes religion evolves. A superstition is a detrimental survival from an earlier stage.

'What is now a superstition was, in an earlier stage of the evolution of religion, not a superstition at all, but a vigorous expression of religion, living in harmony with its environment. But having, owing to the general evolution of religion, become a superstition in a later evolutionary stage, it is now out of harmony with its environment, and serves a no more useful purpose in that environment than does the appendix vermiformis in the human body.'

It is from this general position that Dr. Major approaches his examination of Roman claims.

Dr. Major possesses the sympathetic imagination which enables him to put himself in the position of the man who comes under the spell of the lure of Rome. This psychological insight adds greatly to the practical value of his book. He understands how men are drawn to Rome by the fascination of the numinous, but he holds that the *mysterium tremendum fascinans* does not belong to the highest form of Christianity. 'There is no fear in love, but perfect love casteth out fear.'

'So wrote the Apostle of Love. But in the primitive religions, terror and mystery, and the fascination which they possess for the weak and ignorant, are prime factors in religious power. The Church of Rome possesses them in a high degree, and exercises them with a subtle wisdom acquired by a long and varied experience.'

The 'strident tones' and authoritative manner of Rome, especially when backed by millions of adherents, impress the simple and ignorant. Her tremendous claims, embracing this world and the next, combined with the precision of her teaching and system, intimidate the weak and uncertain. Dr. Major subjects the basis of these claims to an acid criticism, historical, rational and moral, and, after reading the pages in which he deals with this aspect of his subject, even the uninstructed reader will understand why it was that Dr. McDonald had sadly to admit that the kind of criticism embodied in Dr. Salmon's book had not been adequately answered. It has not been answered because it is unanswerable.

But Dr. Major realises that there are many who, so far from being influenced by reason, are positively attracted by the irrational and the superstitious, by materialistic sacramentalism and crude supernaturalism. Rome gains numerically by attracting such people to her fold, but it is at a tragic price.

'It is one of the sinister results of Romanist superstition that there is bred in every Roman Catholic country, except where Romanism is strong enough to extirpate it by force, a bitter and detrimental secularism. As a consequence, in Roman Catholic countries, we have the unhappy spectacle of superstition in conflict with secularism, and no place at all for that form of Christian religion which is as enlightened as it is reverent, and is as opposed to superstition as it is opposed to secularism.'

Then there are others who are attracted to Rome on political grounds, seeing in the Black International the only effective alternative to the Red International. Dr. Major holds that they are mistaken in regarding the Roman Church as international. It is not international; it is imperialist.

constant interest and endeavour is, not to forward the well-being of the nations and to improve international relationships, but to play the high political game to forward its own prestige and advantage.

'It is as a danger not as a buttress to political and social stability that the acute observer of political institutions in Western Europe will view the Church of Rome. And we would venture to add that every important political cause which the Church of Rome has espoused in the last four hundred years has, in the end, been defeated.'

Dr. Major discusses the relationship of the Roman Church to moral questions with a special reference to the moral challenge raised by the developments of eugenic science, and rejects as absurd any claim of the Roman Church to moral pre-eminence over the Reformed churches.

His criticism of unjustifiable claims made by the Roman Church is acid. His tone, however, is never acrid. He understands the other point of view as well to be bitter, and it is this understanding which gives much of its value to a valuable book. Behind all that he says lies the clear vision of an ideally Catholic Church, a Church such as he would have the Church of England to be.

'We make no claim here for the perfection of the infallibility of the Church of England. She knows nothing of such claims on her behalf . . . She believes in the continuity of Christian thought; she maintains the continuity of Catholic institutions adapted to modern needs; but whilst she reverences the past, she no less reverences the present, which has its inspirations and revelations to which she feels bound to give heed. Believing in the unity of the Christian faith, she feels no compulsion to believe in the uniformity of Christian dogma. Believing in a comprehensiveness in which the apprehension of Christian truth and its exposition are varied, she feels only concerned to promote a spirit of freedom, truth and love within the fellowship. This is the ideal of that reformed and free Catholicism to which the Church of England seeks to attain.'

G. L. H. HARVEY.

JESUS FOR THE MODERN CHILD *

Mr. Griffith, whose qualifications for the task are well known, has made a gallant and needful attempt to do something which is perhaps impossible, and is at all events exceedingly difficult. Many writers have tried to vindicate Jesus' real humanity without reducing His stature. It is fairly easy to show that Jesus was not a magician, and that He was at least as wise and good as Socrates. But it is not easy to convey, in a 'rationalised' presentation, that tremendous spiritual force which made Paul and the Christian Church, and of which the Gospel writers leave us in little doubt, though their technique is artistic rather than historical. The task is still more difficult when the presentation is designed for children.

The rightness of Mr. Griffith's aim is beyond dispute; the child must learn things which he will have to unlearn (as Mr. Claud Mullins says in his Foreword: 'We want Jesus to survive Cinderella'); the right method is to begin with the human Jesus, and to find in Him, as Man, the image of the invisible God.

'The appeal of our Lord is not through alleged disturbances of the natural sequence of cause and effect . . . but through the perfection of His life and teaching' (p. 14).

Jesus for Everychild. By R. Gladstone Griffith. With a Foreword by Claud Mullins. (London, 1934. 2/6.)

After a preliminary description of the Jews and their religion, the story of Jesus is traced from the Baptism to the Resurrection. Incidents peculiar to the Fourth Gospel are omitted, as are the miracles except for some of the miracles of healing (which are not presented *as* miracles). As an example of the style in which the story is told, the following brief extract must serve :

'We have to keep in mind the fact that Jesus was born in a different country from ours, where people talk in a different way. When, for example, He says that we are to turn the other cheek to someone who hits us, He means, as we should say, "Don't hit back!" The people who live in Asia to-day speak in the same sort of way and say rather more than they really mean. It is not lying; it is just their way of speaking, and it is quite easy to understand when you think of what Jesus said about faith. He told us that, if we had as much faith as a grain of mustard seed, we could move mountains (Mark xi, 23; Luke xvii, 6), or trees, by which He meant, of course, that we could do very difficult things.'

Perhaps the best chapter in the book is the last: 'Why some things have been left out.' Mr. Griffith's contention is that the 'plain story' should be presented first, without legendary additions, and that the child should learn afterwards how the additions came to be made—a process which Mr. Griffith describes in such a way as to make it appear quite natural. Moreover, the rejection of inaccurate or fanciful passages is, where possible, made to depend on internal evidence; thus the stories of the Adoration at the Nativity are set against the hostile attitude of Jesus' own family in Mark iii, 21, 31-35. Throughout the book parents and teachers will find much to help them in awakening the child's understanding. And the selection of material represents what is probably the first serious attempt to put together an account of Jesus which will meet the needs of the child and at the same time satisfy the scholar. The book is so good and so valuable as pioneer work that criticism seems ungracious. The following suggestions, however, concern practicable modifications.

In the first, place, the book seems to reveal a conflict of purposes. The main object is, of course, to present a living picture of the historic Jesus. That would be best done by direct and positive statement of the carefully selected material. But this direct and positive effect is sometimes subordinated to the secondary aim of forestalling and counteracting undesirable impressions. Very likely the author was thinking of children who have already been mistaught; he seems to be trying to unteach as well as to teach, and to be uneasy lest the child should be insufficiently Modernist. For example, there need not be so much discussion about the Voice at the Baptism; nor need the Temptation (though it certainly should be rationalised) be subjectivised to such an extent that no dramatic setting is left. Much of the running commentary would be valuable to the parent or teacher, and might well be transferred to the sections intended for adults, so that it would not hinder the narrative. It is impossible to tell a story and discuss it at the same time.

An important consequence of the rather laboured insistence upon Jesus' human limitations is that the earlier chapters will scarcely support the Christology of Ch. xvi. Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi strikes one as something more like an intelligent guess than a response to overwhelming spiritual power. And it is with some perplexity that one comes across the sentence: 'There is no difference between God the Father in heaven and Jesus Christ on earth, except that Jesus, being born a humble

asant in Nazareth had to live as the rest of us do.' There is value in pointing out that Peter 'found out for himself'; but we remain unconvinced as to why he should have found out at all. It is the impression of Jesus' spiritual power which is inadequate. The problem may be insoluble. It might have been better to make more of His tone of 'authority,' and the effect of His personality upon His hearers, with more emphasis on His disciplined life and constant communion with His Father, whence His 'authority' derived. In short, we are given a good deal of Jesus' sayings, but not enough of His own religious life. Furthermore, incidents might have been selected which better illustrate Jesus' power of mind—His readiness in emergency and His rapier-thrusts. The Sadducees' question about the seven husbands might have been left out, and the question about the Baptism of John put in; it is difficult perhaps, but a child of eleven could appreciate how Jesus' question, at first sight an evasion, was really one which, if the Scribes dared to answer it, would make them answer their own question.

The narrative loses force for another reason; there is too much moralising. The 'moral' of Peter's boast of fidelity needs no pointing (let alone pointing twice); the story says everything. Nor was it necessary to moralise twice in the narrative of the Crucifixion, once to drag in an observation about gambling, and again to remark that the two crucified thieves deserved their fate' (which in any case is a disputable statement). The plain story' might well have been kept plainer.

The whole story would have gained dramatic value had more *milieu* been supplied. To say that the action takes place in a vacuum would be a gross exaggeration, for there are many touches which suggest the 'setting.' At there might be a good deal more, instead of some of the moralising. The tone throughout is almost entirely ethical: there might be more about flowers, animals, and children. In a book for children it is odd to find only four lines about Jesus' relations with children.

No indication is given as to the age at which children are intended to read this book. Most of it could probably be read to children as young as nine, or even eight, but would be too difficult for those younger still. It is harder to assign an upper age-limit; boys and girls of fourteen and upwards would probably prefer a book which contained more critical discussion of the sources of our knowledge.

M. V. C. JEFFREYS.

TOWARDS PRAYER BOOK REVISION*

The Rector of Haughton has made an interesting experiment. He asked himself the question, 'Should not the common speech of the first century be translated into the common speech of our own day?' And he has tried to show how this may best be done in the passages of the New Testament which are appointed as Epistles and Gospels. Mr. Royds recognises fully that 'the use of the vulgar tongue does not condone vulgarity,' and seeks to use good colloquial speech to replace somewhat archaic writing. For this reason he drops the second person singular except in quoted words, and abandons 'whence' and 'whither' (to the impoverishment of the language), although they are still used by many good speakers. On the other hand, he often replaces the simple tense by the participial compound (where continuous action is meant) with good effect, e.g. 'was speaking' instead of 'spoke' or 'spake.' Starting from the Jacobean and Victorian Versions,

* *The Epistles and Gospels*. A new translation with some collects and prayers. By F. Royds, B.D. (Blackwell. 1934. 2/6 net.)

he has made his own revision, and then compared it with several modern translations before final adoption. To the Victorian Version he does justice, both on account of its superiority over the Jacobean in fidelity and accuracy and also in defending it against the allegations of defective rhythm so groundlessly made against it by many whose ears are unable to distinguish between what is merely unfamiliar and what is bad. 'Ignorance is the handmaid of much criticism of the Revised Version,' he says. It is sometimes inferior in rhythm, where the rhythm of the Greek is inferior, but in not a few instances the rhythm is improved, and that considerably in the Old Testament, especially in the (Biblical) Psalms. No translation will satisfy everyone, and in Mr. Royd's there are cases for regret; but as a whole his renderings are simple and dignified, while helping to make the meaning plain.

Perhaps the best course is to take a concrete example: let us take the second Sunday in Lent. The Epistle begins in the Jacobean 'We beseech you, brethren, and exhort you . . . that as ye have received of us how ye ought to walk . . . so ye would abound more and more.' This becomes 'Brothers, I beseech and exhort you . . . go on living . . . in the way you learned of me, and increase in that way more and more.' St. Paul wrote in the first person plural, and perhaps intended it to cover Silvanus and Timothy, though primarily himself; is this made plainer or more exact by substituting 'I' for 'we'? It continues, 'For this is the will of God, even your sanctification,' and Royds retains this, except that he omits 'even,' which merely marks the apposition, and gives a marginal alternative 'holiness.' But *ἁγιασμός* does not mean either 'sanctification' or 'holiness,' it means 'consecration.' That is a word more in current use than 'sanctification'; why not use it here, and so be at once more exact and more intelligible? The next phrase, 'how to possess his vessel,' is certainly obscure, as is the original *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος κτᾶσθαι*; Royds renders it 'keep his own body,' giving a marginal alternative 'take a wife of his own' with a footnote which is informative and fair. 'That no man go beyond and defraud his brother,' which the Victorian Version renders 'transgress and wrong,' becomes 'go beyond his rights and rob,' for *ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν*. The Victorian is here the simplest and perhaps the most exact, for it is quite questionable whether *ὑπερβαίνειν* means go beyond *his* rights, or beyond his brother's rights. For the rest, the Victorian Version is followed in a few lesser points where it is more correct than the Jacobean, without making marked difference in either sense or rhythm.

The Gospel for this day gives the appeal of the Canaanite woman, 'Have mercy on me, O Lord . . . my daughter is grievously vexed by a devil,' and the Victorian Version is the same. It becomes 'Pity me, Master . . . is tormented by a demon.' The first clause might well be admitted but for the fact that 'Master' is usually in the Gospels the rendering of *διδάσκαλος* while here the word is *κύριος*, and this is rather confusing. 'Demon' means probably less than 'devil' to most modern hearers; and in either case the translation of *κακῶς δαιμονίζεται* might be improved. Is there any gain in saying the woman 'began crying out' these words rather than 'cried' (*ἔκραζεν*)? It is, however, an advantage to make the disciples say 'she keeps crying out after us,' instead of 'crieth' (*κράζει*). So is it to read she 'bowed down before him' instead of 'worshipped.' His answer, 'It is not fair to take the children's bread,' is attractive, and much better than 'meet,' though neither quite gives *οὐκ ἔστιν καλὸν*. But an opportunity is missed in her rejoinder *Ναί, Κύριε, καὶ γὰρ τὰ κυνάραι* . . . The

Jobean Version renders this 'Truth, Lord; yet the dogs . . .'; the Victorian Version 'Yea, Lord: for even the dogs . . .'; Royds has 'True, Master, for even the dogs . . .' But the woman was not acquiescing in his word, but contradicting Him. The rendering should be 'It is not . . . Yes it is, Sir, for even the doggies . . .' though perhaps this last is almost too colloquial. It was just this intrepid rebuttal, with the ready insight of the woman which pierced His own metaphor, which moved his admiration of her great faith.

It remains to make mention of more than two dozen collects and prayers which follow, and of the short essay on translating the Bible which forms an appendix. The last is well balanced and thoughtful, and it makes a plea which is amply justified for less prejudiced consideration of the Victorian version, which however it is not afraid to criticize. The collects are not intended to displace those in the Prayer Book, even when they are linked with particular Sundays. More than half the prayers are not so linked, and they broach various needs and occasions. Those who have known Mr. Royds' services as Chaplain to several of the M.C.U. Conferences will both expect and find in these prayers a dignity and sobriety which are clothed in simple language that encourages worship that is neither over-strained nor stale. Such as share the apostles' resolve, 'I will pray with the spirit, I will pray with the understanding also,' will welcome many of these prayers, and find that they deepen in use rather than stale.

E. P. BOYS-SMITH.

CONGREGATIONAL MODERNISM*

We have been deeply interested in this book. It is exposing no secrets, but we remark that it comes from the bosom of 'The Blackheath Group,' a group of liberal Congregational theologians, who are engaged upon the important and yet ambitious task of working out a restatement of Christianity in current terms. The work of their founder, the late Frank Lenwood, has evoked a wide interest and no little controversy. His mantle would seem to have fallen upon Mr. Wigley, who preaches his new highway with a confidence and a sincerity which he does not fail to transfer to his reader. At times a note jars. A deep respect for older theological conceptions is a little hurt at seeing them ruthlessly set aside, but one recalls that the author is a working minister anxious to pass on to the freer faith which he has made his own, and one can forgive the impetuous statement. Again, there is a tendency to rebuke an idea because it is old. The classical Christology is taken severely to task. A modern Christological position is stated: 'The modern mind can no longer be content with Hebrew Messianic phrases, nor can it run in Hebrew-Hellenistic grooves; it must find terms for its own thought, or condemn itself to stultification,' a statement with which we are in complete agreement. 'In Jesus,' writes Mr. Wigley, 'we find what God is, and what man may be.' Surely here is not an altogether fair treatment of the Fathers? The position to which we are brought is the content of the Patristic view of Christ. We are reminded strongly of the Englishmen's appeal for discipleship of Christ 'that we may become Divine.' It was the great work of Dr. Rashdall to show the stress which true orthodoxy laid upon the Humanity of Christ, and it would be no mean loss if a restatement is to be made of classical orthodoxy to obscurantism. There is a tendency in some circles to do this and to look upon the strain of broad Christianity which one can find throughout church history as essentially

* *A New Highway*. By T. Wigley, M.A. (Allen and Unwin. 1934. 7/6.)

new, or else to champion new views for the sake of their newness. Either course will end by being a direct blow at a truly enlightened Christianity for they are paths which lead to either credulity or scepticism. We do not accuse Mr. Wigley of these faults, but they are real dangers to which any 'New Theology Movement' is prone. The fate of one such movement of some years since is a warning of what may happen.

The modern mind is subjected to a careful analysis. There is a drift from orthodox conceptions which have become intellectually outworn. The churches are to blame for not revising their statements of faith. There is theological disintegration. With much of this, we agree. But questions arise. Are statements of faith more than symbols, and is it not true to say that there are essential values which must be safeguarded? For example, it is very necessary to safeguard the acceptance of the historicity of Jesus Christ as well as some belief in His Divinity which allows the use of the traditional language about Him. Once again we are rendered uneasy by a tendency to throw away both kernel and husk. The modern mind has a right to ask that the Christian tradition may be expressed in terms which it can understand, and it has a right to ask that the tradition may be restated with this end in view, but it has no right to assume an infallibility and then to demand surrender. It has, in short, the right to ask that the implications of a propositional revelation may be cast aside and a progressive revelation fully recognised, but this is not to place 'the modern mind' beyond all reasonable criticism. We feel, however, bound to agree with Mr. Wigley that the churches have made too weak an attempt to grapple with the contemporary intellectual situation. The flight from reason, which may be espied in the Group Movement or in the theology of crisis sponsored by Karl Barth, are but representative of much present-day apologetics. It is not specifically Christian and it is rather a refuge for distressed souls than a reasonable presentation of the Christian values as, at the least, a tenable alternative to neo-paganism. It is the duty of the churches to meet the situation and they are not doing it. It is to the credit of 'The Blackheath Group' that they have realised the need and are attempting to grapple with it.

A discussion of nature and of law leads on to the figure of Jesus. Mr. Wigley gives a good and useful account of the Christology of the early centuries, pointing out the development of belief in Christ within the New Testament period itself. His conclusion is: 'we would all admit that Jesus was the consummation of humanity and the manifestation of Deity.' But here the matter is to end. 'This admission gives us no warrant whatever for saying that we must worship Jesus as deity.' Yet it is upon this very conclusion that the Christian Church has based its Christ worship. Allowing that Christ is the supreme Revealer of God, it follows logically that we should worship Him as such. So long as Apollinarianism is avoided, Christ-worship takes its place as a central postulate of the Christian position. If any weight is to be allowed to the theory of the development of doctrine, it is beside the point to cite the Synoptic writers against Christ-worship; whilst the fact remains that it occurs within the pages of the New Testament, a witness to its early character. Mr. Wigley seems to us to go either too far or not far enough in his regard for the figure of Christ. He is upon an inclined plane which can lead either to a Christocentric position or to its exact opposite. But he cannot stop at a halfway house in this manner. He must make up his mind as to whether all doctrine is a retrogression from an original simple Gospel or a development. He is explicit in his claim of the right of each generation to restate Christology.

here several questions are involved. There is the obvious right of a statement of terminology. That is an essential. There is the right of stating the figure of Christ and the things for which It stands to the specific age in question. That is the only method of making His Gospel a living reality. But this leaves unsolved the question as to whether the statement is to lie within or without the general stream of Christian tradition. We have given our reason for remaining within that stream. Christ, we believe with Canon Raven and the late Dr. Rashdall, is the Supreme Revealer of God and therefore the fit object of our worship. If his position be departed from, Christology has not been remodelled but completely reformulated, and this should be made clear. It is a new Christology and the question in debate must be whether it will stand criticism and whether it solves the question of revelation. The old Christology does when by that is understood the conception underlying its terminology. Mr. Wigley should also have paid more attention to Form-Criticism. He may find that it affects his theory in a rather drastic measure. He is at one with the majority of modern apologists in refusing to admit miracles to his scheme of apologetics.

The philosophy of sin and salvation espoused by Mr. Wigley is, in essence, Abelardian. Salvation consists in the overcoming of all that hinders the individual from approaching to the Perfection of Deity. It is little short of a tragedy that this doctrine, which links together Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Abelard, should have been hidden away behind such views as those of St. Bernard. Its adoption in recent years by J. M. Wilson and by Dr. Rashdall has done not a little towards both the freeing of doctrine and the advent of a more human form of Christianity in which the life of Christ is stressed and the Cross is but the summing-up of the life. It has quashed the travesties of Christian doctrine which were once so common in this connection, and which received an unfortunate impetus from the Evangelical revival. The popular statement which Mr. Wigley gives will do no little good in calling attention to the meaning of the Atonement for modern men. He goes on to affirm personal survival.

The essence of Christianity to Mr. Wigley is the revelation of God in Jesus as holy love, a point of view which links up with the modern view that the Deity of Christ lies, not in any *communicatio idiomatum* but in His essential holiness. Old methods of apologetic are set aside and the truth of Christianity is based upon this datum. The background of the whole is a philosophy of immanence. We were especially pleased to notice the manner in which Mr. Wigley set aside any idea of 'anti-social individualism.' The recognition of the fallacy of this point of view is the basis of any specifically Christian sociology. But it is also the basis of something more. There is in this book no statement of what is meant by the church which can be taken as an adequate discussion of the problem. Christianity has never been organised upon a corporate basis, and unless the author recognises this fact and decides what place an authoritative church plays in his scheme, his new highway will end in a riot of individualism. Again, he must ask himself whether his view of immanence does not lead to a demand for the thinking-out of a definite sacramental philosophy. We feel that so many of his postulates call for a restated Catholicism, in the sense in which Fr. Tyrrell or the Baron von Hügel would have understood that term, that unless he works out a very definite meaning for these factors he will turn some from the highway into mysterious bypaths where they will know no end to their quest until they find themselves side by side with St. Orchard.

We have found much to criticise in this book, and space has precluded discussion of all but a few of the many points which it raises. Yet, we should like to commend it as a book to be read. It is an analysis of the present-day situation in religion and philosophy by an able and well-read man of modern views. To say that it is suggestive is to express but a shadow of our commendation. We trust that it will find a place upon the bookshelves of all who wish to grapple with the modern situation. The contemporary quest for freedom of thought has found in the same author an able exponent and a penetrating critic.

F. H. AMPHLETT MICKLEWRIGHT.

MORALITY ON TRIAL*

The editor of the S.C.M. Press has produced a bright and lively little book, which he entitles *Morality on Trial*. It is throughout typical of the more intelligent and aspiring of the present generation. With its stimulating discussions of present-day issues, its numerous apt quotations and allusions, its fresh and intelligent references to the New Testament, the volume is capable of furnishing material for many sermons and addresses on quasi-religious topics. Especially admirable is what the author says of 'the mind of Christ.' He gives us a very useful chapter on 'The Christian Use of Sunday,' an enlightened and sensible one on 'the Relations of Men and Women,' and a suggestive, though slight, one on 'the Necessity of the Church.' Altogether the book is both stimulating and informative.

I suppose we should not expect much light on the deeper problems of ethics in so short a compass. The author skims over some of the usual answers to the question, 'Why be good?', rejecting both intuitionism and utilitarianism, and endorsing the explanation suggested by Carol Peter Green in *The Problem of Right Conduct*, that moral conduct is natural to the real, or true man. But unless the real or true nature of man is intrinsically good, the behaviour natural to him is not necessarily good.

Mr. Martin quotes a spirited protest by Huxley against St. Paul's: 'the dead rise not, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' (I wish he would give references to his quotations.) This is to illustrate the relation of belief in immortality to the sense of moral obligation. He thinks, *pace* Huxley, that social reform virtually implies or requires belief in immortality. But if this world be a mere ante-chamber to Heaven or Hell, why trouble to reform it? However, the Christian doctrine of immortality is not merely that of individual transference to Paradise or Hades at death but also of a collective resurrection in which the values of this world and the other world are synthesised. Obviously this makes a better basis for social idealism.

And then, thirdly, Mr. Martin alludes to the fundamental claim of Christianity that it 'brings to morality not only a standard and an intellectual justification; it reveals the dawn of power for the living of the good life.' But, as he perceives, the dependence of morality on religion is obscured by the disconcerting fact that many professed sceptics are more moved and more ardent for social amelioration than many apparently staunch and devout Christians, and that reformers, such as Lord Shaftesbury, have sometimes found more support among men of the world than among ministers of religion. He remarks, in reference to this, that Christian morality may survive for a time after the decay of Christian belief, but that eventually, like cut flowers, it will wither when it has lost its root.

* *Morality on Trial*. By Hugh Martin. (S.C.M. Press. 1933. 3/6.)

But why, let us ask, does the apparent experience of salvation, called 'conversion,' which occurs especially in movements of religious revival, not immediately sweep the world towards utopia? Why, again, has there been such oscillation between this and the Christianity which preaches the Kingdom of Heaven on earth? Can it be that St. Paul overstated his antithesis of justification by works and justification by faith, of the Law of Moses and the Grace of God through Jesus Christ? All this constitutes one of the major problems of Christian ethics, and of Christian soteriology as well, of immense practical urgency in the present parlous state of both civilization and religion. Perhaps Mr. Hugh Martin will consider it more deeply before he brings out his next book.

F. A. M. SPENCER.

A ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTOLOGY*

The author begins by quoting Dostoievsky as believing that 'the problem of faith is essentially the problem of the Godhead of Christ.' This debatable statement is made the text for his book, whose first three chapters are devoted to 'clearing the ground.' In the first chapter, 'Christ and the Man To-day,' the Catholic Christology is stated, after an attack on some other views. If the statements on pages six and seven are to be taken to apply to the liberal theology of this country, then this first chapter suffers from a complete misunderstanding of the liberal view of Christ's divinity. According to Adam this view

'has for its explicit aim to snatch from the shoulders of the simple Teacher of Nazareth the "heavy mantle of gold brocade" which the veneration of his disciples has woven for him; that is to say, the glory and splendour of his Divinity.'

This is hardly fair. Whatever Adam thinks of the result, the explicit aim of liberal theology is to take away the heavy mantle in order that the divinity may be revealed. A little later we read with some surprise that:

'We must either give our consent to the historical existence of the whole Christ, the Christ of the miracles, or openly in the face of all the historical evidence venture the assertion that the Christ of the Gospels never existed' (p. 16).

And on the next page the historical Christ is clandestinely identified with the dogmatic Christ.

In the second chapter, 'The Way of Faith,' which we have been warned will be a discussion of the way to accept the divinity (or, for Adam, the humanity) of Christ according to the teaching of the Roman Church, Adam truly remarks:

'Anyone who is blind to the nature of the religious and the divine is in advance incapable of estimating the full significance of religious documentary sources such as the Gospels' (p. 26).

But he proceeds to argue that because Jesus may be divine, in approaching the Gospels we must expect anything, and it soon becomes clear that this means we must be ready to swallow anything. He argues:

'If Christ is of divine nature, his being and work must, at decisive points, transcend the human and the created and burst apart all norms of experience' (p. 28).

The argument should surely be the other way round: if Christ's being and work transcend the human and the created and burst apart all norms of

* *The Son of God*. By Karl Adam. (Sheed and Ward. 1934. 7/6.)

experience, He is of divine nature. Adam appears to argue from the possibility of Christ's divinity to the credibility of the Gospels taken at their face value, which in turn guarantees Christ's divinity.

There follow, first a rather old-fashioned analysis of the 'act of faith' (wherein Adam's belief in the inadequacy of the intellect and in the existence of a 'religious emotion' becomes apparent), and then a powerful attack on the Dialectic Theology fashionable on the Continent :

'The road to the *mysterium Christi* leads not across the uncontrollable secret places of the transcendental, past the precipices of the paradoxical and incredible, but over the bright open plain of the historical life of Jesus' (pp. 44-45).

Many will see in this statement an indictment not only of the Barthian theology but also of the Roman Catholic orthodoxy.

The third chapter, 'The Sources for the Life of Jesus,' restates this truth. 'The road to the divine Christ leads across the historical appearance of Jesus' (p. 49). Although this chapter makes full use of all the recently evolved methods of criticism it refuses to admit the fundamental point made by the creators of these methods that this historical appearance is given us not in a clear picture, but refracted through many minds alien to our own. The Gospels are not modern history. Indeed, considered from the strict modern point of view they are hardly history at all, though it must never be forgotten that they were written as such. With this caution, this chapter can be recommended as a very useful summary of the sources for the life of Jesus, the pagan sources being very fairly discussed. In this third chapter Adam thus uses critical apparatus but refuses to take the critical point of view. Claiming that in the Gospels we have the unadulterated Apostolic tradition (but failing to remark that the Apostles had different methods of interpretation, report, and even observation from our own), he proceeds to a chapter on 'The Mental Structure of Jesus,' a chapter in most respects admirable but suffering here and there from the fact that the author's views allow his selection of evidence to be arbitrary. It is, for example, somewhat of a shock to read that Jesus 'did not hesitate to work his first miracle to please the guests at a marriage feast' (p. 131).

The other chapters of the book march on to establish the Catholic view of the Person of our Lord. Herein is much fine writing : wherever Adam is describing the relation of Jesus as man to His Father in Heaven, he says little with which any reader would wish to quarrel ; but in Chapter 6, 'The Self-revelation of Jesus,' he is very seriously embarrassed by the necessity for holding to the traditional belief in a future day of judgment. When he has expressed brilliantly the Johannine interpretation of the eschatological element in the teaching of the Synoptics, and has said that Jesus' earthly life is 'the spacetime transparency' of 'the ultimate eternal reality,' it is a pity he has to add 'of the judgment to come.'

Adam's final *coup d'état* in establishing his view of the Deity of Christ is startling : because Jesus as a Jew must have been a strict monotheist and felt so unquestionably His oneness with God, He must have identified Himself, His very ego, with Jahwe. After this appalling lapse from philosophy to mythology—wherein Jesus, part of creation, is identified with the Creator—the argument takes the familiar form : it is incredible that Jesus was God, but He must have been, because God vindicated His claim by raising Him from the dead.

If the argument of the book could be saved after this, it might be saved by the chapter on 'The Resurrection of Christ,' which is very ably written ; puts clearly the various conflicting views ; and argues strongly that nothing

the appearance of an actual body could have convinced the disciples, with their Jewish idea of the necessity of a body for life, that Jesus had risen. But this gives no help to the man for whom the bodily resurrection is *a priori* incredible, unnecessary, and even a stumbling-block. Its method accepts the evidence of the Gospels as unconflicting or at least capable of harmonization. It is strange that the eternal life of Christ apparently has no meaning for Catholic orthodoxy unless guaranteed by a bodily resurrection. One is tempted to ask, 'Where is Christ's body now?'

The last chapter, on the Atonement, has nothing new to offer, vitiated as the argument is by its archaic view of the origin of mankind and its marckian interpretation of the consequence of Adam's sin.

A. R. C. LEANEY.

A MAKER OF MODERN SPAIN*

In the list of tendencies indicated by Friedrich Loofs (*Leitfaden z. Studium d. Dogmengeschichte*, pp. 334-335), which accounted for the decisions reached at the Council of Trent, the reorganization of the Spanish Church under the crown in a strictly medieval spirit has a high position. Professor Loofs would, however, have been the last to assert that this important tendency in the production of modern Romanism, as distinct from medieval Catholicism, was a product of the simple logical reaction against the Protestant Reformation movement. The reorganization of the Spanish Church began several years before the advent of Luther, or the opening session of the Council of Trent, and probably its greatest name is that of Gonzalo Jiménez de Cisneros—or, as Mr. Merton calls him with a fancy for the archaic Spanish form, Ximenes.

A much greater interest in the history of the Spanish Church has been exhibited by fellow-countrymen of Loofs than by English historians. The monumental *Kirchengeschichte v. Spanien*, by the German Benedictine, B. Gams, of seventy years ago, has found neither emulator nor translator in England, and it covers even more ground than that taken in by the best native Spanish writers like the industrious Menéndez y Pelayo. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the great German scholar, Hefele, produced (1844) the monograph on Ximenes which, translated in 1860 by Dalton, remained for over fifty years the sole serious contribution in English.

For this reason, it is clear that Mr. Merton has had a great opportunity in presenting his study to English readers. He exhibits, both in his Bibliography and by numerous references in the body of his work, an acquaintance with all but two of the more serious works dealing with the great Cardinal: he also knows that a man on whose behalf Philip IV, in 1650 and 1655, sought to initiate proceedings for canonization is one who can be the recipient of much uncritical appreciation and purely legendary glory. Mr. Merton, be it said, sifts the wheat from all such chaff with a very firm hand. This 'wheat' is presented to us in fifteen chapters, throughout the whole of which interest never flags.

There is always romance and stirring incident in the rise of a man, significant as to birth and fortune, to the position of ruler in a nation rapidly approaching the zenith of its glory. We are told in the Foreword to this book that:

'It has seemed to the writer that Ximenes' interest for us is human and psychological, not sectarian, or even primarily religious. . . . The

* *Cardinal Ximenes and the Making of Modern Spain*. By Reginald Merton. (Kegan Paul, 1934. 12/6.)

aim has been to describe the life of Ximenes not in isolation, but as an integral part of the period in which he lived.'

We are early made to realise the great assets possessed by this Spaniard in the shape of determination and singleness of purpose. He had gone, in 1460, to Rome, and had practised in the consistorial courts. For services rendered he returned to Spain with the *letra expectiva* entitling him to claim the next benefice falling vacant. This brought him into collision with the nominee of the Archbishop of Toledo, Carillo—the occupant of the wealthiest See in Europe apart from Rome. In its consequence, imprisonment for six years, Ximenes' resolution remained unbroken, although his removal to another diocese—that of Sigüenza—was thus made imperative on his release. The Bishop of Sigüenza was the aristocratic Mendoza. He was a man of remarkable moderation in a fanatical land, and rapidly recognised the ability of Ximenes, whom, at his own death as Archbishop of Toledo, he recommended to Queen Isabella as his successor in that Archbishopric. Ximenes was made of sterner stuff than this mild and humane Mendoza, and to a knowledge of Hebrew and Aramaic, which he learnt from a Jew, he added a remarkably austere practice of the religious life. This latter impelled him to a reforming zeal which made him, a Franciscan Observant, a most energetic reformer of the Franciscan Order, of which he became eventually Provincial in Castile. But, with the knowledge of what he wanted, was that of what he did not want. Although such as Prescott have doubted Ximenes' honesty, it seems definitely to have been established that Ximenes did not want to be the Provincial of his Order, nor to vary his ascetic life on becoming so, nor to become Archbishop of Toledo. Yet there is no doubt that when called to high office, and especially when appointed Archbishop, he attacked the relevant problems on almost every occasion with remarkable ability and success. On only very rare official occasions, such as the forcible conversion of Moors after the famous capture of Granada in 1492, does he stand in an unfavourable light when compared with other Spanish ecclesiastics and statesmen. Mr. Merton says that this event is 'the one and only episode in his life that stains his record' (p. 44). This, as the author makes abundantly clear, is a remarkable thing in the life of a man who lived for eighty-one years, the last twenty-two of which were spent as Archbishop of Toledo. His versatility was amazing: in the University of Alcalá de Henares—which Erasmus rightly praised for its remarkable 'Complutensian Polyglot' Bible—he excelled Oxford's Wykeham as a founder and benefactor. He saw the possibility of the education of women apart from the vocation of the cloister—although this may be partially explained when one remembers that the one figure of his time in Spain, not completely overshadowed by him, was the woman, Isabella 'the Catholic.' Her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon, Mr. Merton does not like. Indeed, in Europe as a whole nobody excelled Ximenes as either diplomat, ascetic, or ecclesiastic.

The author has produced a work written in an excellent temper. In just those parts of the work where a writer on Spanish history is often found wanting—e.g. on the purpose of the Spanish Inquisition—Mr. Merton has shown that he can judge objectively and impartially. Although the book, as a biography, might have been more detailed, he has succeeded admirably, within the limits he prescribes, in setting forth a maker of modern Spain against the background of his land and age.

Certain minor mistakes in the spelling of Spanish names one would like to see corrected: these would seem to be slips in the printing. Malaga (p. 6) should be Málaga, and there should be no accent on Juan (pp. 7, 63).

G. K. BROWN.

THEISM AND THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT *

A recent book by Professor Horton, *Realistic Theology*, disavows liberalism because as been so empty of meaning in this country. He prefers to be known as a 'religiousist,' one who is interested in the relation of religion to social action more than to science as an intellectual pursuit. This position preserves the passion concerning truth and freedom which is the centre of liberalism, but swings religiously to the right and politically he left . . . Other books by Professor Horton are *Theism and the Modern Mood* and *Psychological Approach to Theology* (Harpers), and *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain* (New York University Press).

How have men dealt with the problem of science versus religion since the rise of modern science? This is the question that Professor Horton answers so interestingly in his new published lectures. He presents the positions of various men, from the time of Spinoza until to-day, who have felt the pressure of the scientific spirit and have attempted to deal with it—each in his own way. Some of these men

'adjust their religion to their science; others adjust their science to their religion. Still others keep the two in separate compartments, or give them distinctive places in some larger synthesis' (p. 16).

He begins his parade of thinkers with the reaction of Pascal and Spinoza to the science of Copernicus, Bruno, and Galileo. Pascal finds the God of religion not in the gods of the philosophers but in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Having failed to find God in nature,

'and having found God in Christ, through direct mystical experience, following upon an act of moral surrender, Pascal was inevitably led to minimize the role of reason and to exalt the role of faith in the religious life' (p. 19).

Spinoza's God was that of reason. He was 'the geometrical structure by which all things are determined to be precisely what they are, or the underlying essence through comprehending which all things can be comprehended' (p. 31).

While Pascal is strong religiously, Spinoza is strong philosophically. Spinoza reverted to the fatalism of the East. We are to

'bow before Nature as helpless slaves! Such is always the outcome of strict scientific determinism. . . . In a fixed and rigid universe it is hard to be strenuous or to care!' (p. 39).

Where Pascal fails is that his religion fails to be at all consistent with his science. Both methods are doomed to failure.

With the coming of Newtonian science, there was a change which drew away from the geometric thinking of Spinoza. We get a God who is like a great 'watch-maker.' Paine's deism gives us a 'Great Mechanic,' who created everything and now sits back and observes his handiwork. His God is too remote for religious purposes. For the counter-pole in Newtonian science, Dr. Horton presents an interesting picture of Swedenborg, whose picture is inadequate in the same manner as Pascal's fatalism.

In Kant, we find science as dialectic. His theory of knowledge revolutionized philosophic and religious thought for all time. Fichte, following the Kantian line of thought, gets free from his Spinozistic determinism, and in *The Vocation of Man* he develops the idea of God as the 'Living I,' or 'Absolute Self,' from which all individual wills and selves are

Theism and the Scientific Spirit. By Walter Marshall Horton. (Harper Bros. \$2.50.)

derived. 'For Fichte, God is on the side of man, Nature is a mere phenomenon, and the highest good is found in an aggressive activity' (p. 118). But idealism is, in the light of careful analysis,

'like a soap-bubble; it grows more and more iridescent and alluring as it expands and inflates, but when you try to hitch your basket to it for a balloon ascension to fairyland, it bursts and lets you down' (p. 121). 'Both idealism and mysticism are attempts to out-manoeuvre science in the supposed interest of religion. Their failure makes it evident that the real interests of religion cannot be conserved unless more substantial justice is done to the claims of science' (p. 122).

One of Professor Horton's most beautiful sketches is his section on Romanes, who doubted even until the end of his life. He wanted to believe but could find no ground. On the other hand, we find that Henry Drummond was able to blend Darwinian science with religion in such a way that neither suffered. Drummond's optimism was too great, but his vision has been of great value to modern theologians.

The most valuable chapter in the book deals with Edouard LeRoy. Dr. Horton chooses him in preference to the Americans, Douglas C. Macintosh and Henry N. Wieman, because LeRoy's greatest work has not yet been translated from the French. One regrets that such writers as William James and Dean Inge had to be omitted. In the last chapter, there is an excellent statement of the newest developments in science, especially physics, and then a resumé of how LeRoy deals with the problem. LeRoy comments Dr. Horton, 'does not take the results of science seriously enough, and is too ready to exchange the pure gold of verified fact for the questionable scrip of private intuition.' This, however, does not impair the brilliant suggestions of his point of view, because

'the segment of truth revealed by the natural sciences is very remote from the region where the problem of God arises, and where the principle data for its solution are to be found—the region of moral and religious aspiration' (pp. 194-195; italics the author's).

'God must be sought with the whole heart and the whole personality and it must be evident from such a history as this that he has been sought and found by many who were pitifully frustrated in their endeavour to conceive and define what it was that they had found' (pp. 198-199; italics the author's).

Horton's concluding section is entitled 'An Epilogue,' in which he turns to the future. What does it hold for us? God must not be impotent! He may be cosmic; He may be humanistic; but come what may,

'let one lay hold upon the worthiest and mightiest deity he may be capable of embracing. . . . The event is in the hand of God—not my God nor your God, but the One True God, half-veiled and half-revealed, who draws us all on in the quest for self-fulfilment, of which he is the Goal.'

On this note the book ends.

This book affords delightful reading; the summaries of the men are concise and accurate; the choice of material is well made; the criticisms are sound, and the conclusion is positive. It lacks that distressing timidity of most American liberalism. It is liberal in that it is full of hope and faith, yet withal critical.

RANDOLPH C. MILLER.

Yale University.

IMPULSE FROM A VERNAL WOOD*

Some two years ago the present writer had the privilege of reviewing the *Modern Churchman* a book by Mr. A. F. Webling which has brought many who have read it a sense of satisfaction and beauty—the autobiographical study entitled *Something Beyond*, now published in the *Cambridge Miscellany* series for 3/6. Those who recall their pleasure in reading that book have waited with interest for something further from the same writer, and the novel he has now completed will not disappoint them, though it has not the same compelling vitality of the earlier book. In some ways it seems a little formal and stilted, but that may be deliberately meant to fit in with the general late Victorian atmosphere which it intends to convey. But there is the same quiet, serene and unhurried prose which charmed us in *Something Beyond*. There is the same capacity to express thoughts with a real poetic feeling, the sights, sounds, and life of a remote and tranquil countryside. There is the same half-humorous self-appraisal which leads the author to stand as it were outside himself and contemplate what he is doing with a kind of childlike surprise that such things could be possible. Much of the earlier part of the book is descriptive, a sure contemplation of the life and the atmosphere of the village. Here, for example, is the description of the effigy in the ancient church of an Elizabethan Earl:

‘For four hundred years that effigy has rested there undisturbed by time’s changes, with gauntleted hands folded in prayer, with thin, quiet face and peaked beard in little ripples, and closed, unheeding eyes . . . There he has lain while four hundred times April has burst the bonds of winter, bringing sunshine and the sparkle of rain. Summer has clothed the world once more with colour and things of great glory, autumn has passed, rich in solemn splendour, and winter has come again. And still he lies in icy mail, patiently waiting those sonorous trumpet-tones that are to summon him from the vault below. These words are engraved upon the entablature of his tomb: “O that we were lovers of the life that endures as we are of that which passes away. The world is like a sea; he who loves God walks upon the waters.”’

The novel tells the story of a village schoolmaster in Suffolk in the late sixteenth century.

The second chapter will appeal to all whose books are loved and thought of as friends. The schoolmaster tells how he built up his library and of the hours and writings he cherished most. The story itself is simple. After many years of quiet bachelor existence his old housekeeper goes to London and the schoolmaster marries the daughter, who is much older than he, so that she may still look after him. But it is no marriage of minds or deep interests, although his wife is a kind, loving soul who tries her best. Later there comes to the village Mary, a young and attractively-drawn girl who is to help teach in the school. For a year there grows between the two a deep and enlarging friendship. The two are bound together by the same love of pure and beauty, and the same joy in literature. But Victorian morality, through the person of the Lady of the Manor, thinks it wise for the girl to depart and forbids all communication between them. The rest of the tale is the tragedy of the two loves in the heart of the schoolmaster. There is no easy selfish solution, but pain and sadness and yet never gloom or defeat. It is the working out of the conflict of a sensitive love of beauty and goodness

* *Deep in the Forest*. By A. F. Webling. (Faber and Faber. 1934. 7/6.)

with unquestioned acceptance of rigid principles and devotion to what was felt to be duty. The tragedy at the end is redeemed for the schoolmaster by his belief in communication with the dead, whereby he finds hope. His spiritualism is tentative, undogmatic, questing—but it brings him peace at the last.

There is not much plot in the book, but the three chief characters are living and real. Some will dislike the references to spiritualism, and feel that the book would be as effective without them. But the beauty of the prose, the feeling for the world of Nature, the sympathetic understanding of sensitive religious souls, and the sense of eternal things shining through the pains and the joys of this transitory life will lead many of those who liked the earlier book to be grateful to Mr. Webling once again.

MARCUS KNIGHT.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NAZARETH*

Character can, for most men, be considered to be formed by the age of thirty. Many people, most of those in the teaching profession—would put the age considerably younger. According to the psychologist, the first seven years are the most formative of all. How much light would a detailed history of Jesus' early life throw upon His Ministry? Yet the incident with the doctors in the Temple (*Luke ii, 46*) is the only one reported by any evangelist from these years.

This is a book which sets out to examine the influence of the home life of Nazareth upon the future course of events. It might seem at first sight a paradox that St. Luke's story is scarcely mentioned. Yet, barring that, what do we know of Jesus' early years? All we can do is to argue backwards from the finished character.

The argument then, is briefly this. Here is an account, or four interdependent accounts, of a three years' Ministry, with many recorded sayings and much teaching. This teaching can only be the fruit of experience: in particular the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount must represent the ripe conclusions of thirty years: they must be autobiographical. Granted this, we can work backwards, by empirical and commonsense methods rather than those of the trained psychologist, and discuss the influence of Jesus' home life and environment. This line of argument has its dangers and could certainly not be attempted by any and every person. But Mr. Hoste is clearly the right person to attempt it. He may sometimes press the argument too far. A passage like the following suggests that he (like many others who have theorised before him) has been somewhat carried away by his own theories. He is writing on the text 'Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake.'

'The fact is, He had never been allowed to be at home at Nazareth. The neighbours had seen to that. With many a man so brought up the result would be that for the rest of his life he would be at home nowhere; hard, cynical, disillusioned. In the case of our Lord Jesus Christ it was otherwise. He was at home everywhere' (p. 71).

That is an extreme, and perhaps unfair, example of the argument in the first part of the book. The second part develops the same line of thought. Pentecost, as an extension of the Incarnation, repeats the 'achievement of Nazareth' on a world-wide scale.

'He did not, as on the first occasion, take possession of a human

* *The Achievement of Nazareth*. By the Rev. C. D. Hoste. (Longman, Green and Co., Ltd. 1933. 6/-.)

body and a human nature, nor yet of a number of human bodies and human natures. He took hold, instead, of human *persons* . . .' (p. 188).

The book is of great value. It makes no pretensions to scholarship, but it is not an unscholarly production. It is obviously the fruit of a ripe experience and of a sound judgment. It is as if the writer had put together the results of life and prayer and meditation upon the greatest of all lives, and offered them to us for what they are worth, as a devotional meditation rather than as a theological treatise. The precision of some of his language, indeed, in his suggestion of an extreme kenotic theory of Incarnation, would be hard to justify. But to cavil at the use of certain phrases would be to miss the point of the book.

The book abounds in neat similes and illustrations. The effect of Christian civilisation upon the majority of those born in Christian countries compared to

'that of vaccination, which gives the patient a disorder like the real thing, and in doing so renders him immune from the real thing for the rest of his life';

which may not, medically speaking, be quite accurate, but is a sufficiently vivid description of the true state of affairs. Again the author asks, why is there often no difference between a baptised and an unbaptised person? Baptism is like giving a child a violin. He must learn to use it, and the learning costs considerable time and trouble, before the gift can benefit him.

There are many experienced parish priests who could write a book like this. More should do so. It would help those who come after.

W. H. OLDAKER.

RIGHT MARRIAGE*

Though small in size, a book of really great value on marriage has been written by Canon Barry of Westminster, Mr. Claud Mullins, Metropolitan Magistrate, and Dr. Douglas White.

The co-operation of three such competent authorities will guarantee the value of the production. The scope and aim of the book is best expressed in its preface, and from this we quote at length:

'The Encyclical Letter of the Lambeth Conference of 1930, signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, included this statement: "It is for us in the Church . . . to humanize religion if we would commend it to our generation. To them [youth] we appear to be largely preoccupied with dogmatic and ecclesiastical questions remote from common concerns. And so religion often seems to remain in a backwater, while the main streams of life flow past it, untouched and unaffected."

'The Life and Witness Committee of the Conference said: "We also think that there should be special preparation for marriage for persons between their engagement and the wedding. This need not be official or elaborate. It may be done, in part at least, through suitable literature. But the need for it is evident. We acknowledge that though the Church has set before her members the highest ideal of marriage, she has done but little to train them for it."

'Resolution 12 of the Conference urged "the need of some further preparation for those members of the Church who are about to marry."

* By F. R. Barry, Claud Mullins, Douglas White. (Published by S.C.M. 1934. Price 6d.)

'Since 1930 there has been much discussion of these statements, but very little action. It has seemed to us that there is room for a booklet describing marriage, on both its spiritual and physical sides, with information about right marital conduct, which the clergy can hand to those who are about to marry.'

We commend this book heartily to our readers and especially to the clergy for the purpose for which it is intended. The only sound preventive of Divorce is happy marriage.

H.D.A.M.

CARDINAL MERCIER *

Désiré Félicien François Joseph, Cardinal Mercier, was born in the little town of Braine l'Allend, overlooking the plain of Waterloo, in November, 1851. Like many other princes of the modern Roman Church he had as forbears a long line of hard-working, religion-loving members of the *petite bourgeoisie*. The genuine piety of his widowed mother, the encouragement of the parish curé, and his own native intelligence, led him at the age of twelve years to the College of St. Rombant, Malines. This was the first rung in a long academic ladder, which the young Désiré had little difficulty in scaling, and we follow with interest his progress through the Petit Séminaire, Grand Séminaire, the minor orders and an early lectureship at Louvain. In April, 1874, he was ordained priest and dedicated his life *Ad Deum, qui letificat juventutem*, and his studies to St. Thomas Aquinas. It is this dedication which gives the key-note to the whole of his later activities. His zeal for the revival of Thomist studies on the one hand, and his intense devotion to the Catholic Church on the other, are a little too little known, even by those who most reverence the heroic Archbishop of war-time Belgium, or the central figure of the Malines Conversations.

In August, 1879, the encyclical 'Æterni Patris,' promulgated by the septuagenarian Leo XIII, 'urged the renaissance of Thomism on the Catholic world as a measure of common sense and scientific procedure contrasting the philosophy of St. Thomas as fine gold with the tawdry tinsel of the modern philosophers, urging the return to his sound principles as a cure for the ills of modern thought.'

Despite wide-spread opposition, most of all from the University of Louvain, which Leo wished to become the centre of his scheme for the revival of the study of Aquinas, a Chair of Thomistic Philosophy was established there in 1882 with the young Abbé Mercier as Professor. For some time classes were small. The seminarists had no time for extra philosophic studies. The members of other faculties had little inclination to pursue a subject which they had always associated with dry-as-dust systems of metaphysics. But this state of indifference did not last long. Mercier, already well-trained in theology and philosophy, perfected his studies in the lecture rooms and laboratories of his brother professors. There was none of the new natural sciences which he did not take up and pursue with vigour, for to him all knowledge could be correlated with and enunciated by the Thomist system. His lectures were the reverse of formal, given in the vernacular and not the customary Latin, and came straight from the heart and experience of the man. Students, clerical and lay, came flocking in ever increasing numbers, academic opposition to the new studies gave way, and the star of St. Thomas Aquinas shone bright

* *The Life of Cardinal Mercier*. By John A. Gade, Citoyen du Hainaut. (Charles Scribner's Sons. Price 10/6.)

Louvain. In 1889 Mercier's long cherished Institut was founded, and years later it became an integral part of the University.

Late in life he wrote :

'I am convinced that he who has the courage to pursue his philosophy to the end and to its logical conclusions, will agree with me that in the analysis of the very foundations of speculative science and ethical philosophy, no other man has ever thought or written with the powers of St. Thomas.'

The extension and popularizing of the favourite studies of his youth was pursuit which gave Mercier the greatest happiness, and he would have been content to make it his life's work. This, however, was not to be. While still comparatively young he was appointed to the Archepiscopal See of Malines; with this came his elevation to the College of Cardinals and the care and responsibility for the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Belgium. He lived the life of an ascetic, yet his days and nights were crowded with practical duties. Whenever he could snatch a few minutes to himself, he devoted them to his beloved St. Thomas or disappeared for long rambles round the fields of his native Braine l'Alleud. Often he was to be seen stealing out at dusk to the bedside of some sick person, beneath the shadow of his cathedral, and nothing delighted him more than an informal visit to the youthful seminarists of St. Rombaut.

The War showed him at his most heroic, the Malines Conversations at his most magnanimous. These phases are dealt with fully in the later pages of Mr. Gade's book, and will be still fresh in the memory of many of his readers. For to the world at large they stand for the essential Mercier; to Catholic and intellectual Belgium he will be equally well remembered as a pioneer in education, and as one who brought new light and vitality to the national Church. Strongly national himself, and devoted son of the Church as he was, he was yet willing to learn from other nations and communions. If his chance encounter with a little Protestant minister, and his death-bed farewell to the late Viscount Halifax, are the most thoughtful and the most touching incidents in the book, the following passage will give some idea of the same breadth of vision which he sought to employ for his country's good.

'Mercier took over the leadership of the Belgian clergy as a spiritual fatherhood, with high ideals, a strong sense of responsibility, and an eager feeling of opportunity. He had the vision to see what not all of his colleagues saw, that the country is what its people make it, the people are what their clergy makes them, and that the clergy might be shaped to his ideal. He could read the example of English history, and did not need Emerson to tell him that for a thousand years the English clergy have been the scholars of the nation, and that no church has had more learned and industrious men. He thought of their names in shining procession, Cardinal Wolsey, Sir Thomas More, John Colet, Robert Burton, Archbishop Usher, Bishop Lightfoot, Palgrave, Newman, Channing, and all the rest. What these did for England, an enlightened and devoted clergy could do for Belgium. Perhaps the Belgian clergy might have done as much had their history been different, if they had worked in a "tight little island" instead of in the "cockpit of Europe."'

English readers will be grateful for this full length biography of one of the most fascinating figures of modern times. The style is invigorating, refreshingly free from those subtle phrasings or half-turned questions

which betray cynicism or bias in many works of a similar kind. Whether Mercier's conversations with Anglican clergy at Malines bore, or will bear fruit, is open to question. Whether from the practical point of view he was greater than many other ecclesiastical statesmen may be doubted. But he will go down to history as Belgium's first national hero, and as a versatile cleric who let not a little fresh air into the Roman Church, at a period when she was closing many of her windows. The very full bibliography with which this volume closes testifies to the great attraction which its subject held, and still maintains for the French and German speaking races. And now, thanks to Mr. Gade's careful and sympathetic study, a people which has always revered great souls, not least when they have been great churchmen as well, may become better acquainted with, and learn much from, one whose constant prayer throughout his life was 'that they all may be one.'

J. R. BATEMAN.

MODERN ARGUMENT FOR PERSONAL IMMORTALITY*

These two volumes, as their titles indicate, discuss the question whether human personality survives physical death and, if so, the probable nature of this survival. The work of Dr. Baillie, which is the larger, contends that in the history of the discussion there has been a regrettable confusion between specifically Christian beliefs in Eternal Life and earlier beliefs in merely animistic survival. Heaven is not the Christian name for Sheol. Eternal Life, in the Christian sense, is not a living death but a consummation of our present communion with God. The smaller work is a symposium of views upon the future life by a number of representative modern thinkers delivered as a series of broadcast talks in 1933. Both volumes provide an outline of the history of the belief in a future life, and both realise that a much modern thinking the question of personal immortality is no longer explicitly central. This is traced not to an accidental decline of interest but to a moral reaction from an unwholesome pursuit of immortality to the exclusion of all other human interests.

Dr. Baillie analyses very fairly the justifiable and unjustifiable elements in this revolt. As a morally grounded revulsion, the movement has been towards the discovery of moral alternatives. Only the few who accept metaphysical materialism naturally find no place for personal immortality. We cannot survive our bodies if either we are our bodies, or if our mental life is in the last resort entirely conditioned by our bodies. This philosophy is, however, widely rejected, not because it will endanger religion, but because it is not the most adequate to the world of our experience. Of the several moral alternatives to personal immortality, the one which appears to be the most prevalent is some form of social service. In the smaller book, Professor Julian Huxley gives a typical expression of this ideal:

'Facing ignorance and overcoming fear, men and women can still find enjoyment and interest for themselves in this world, and can attempt to transform it in the direction of something better, for the benefit of others now and in time to come' (p. 123).

There is considerable discussion of the validity of this alternative in both volumes. The issue of the discussion is a claim that to deny the ultimate value of personality is to deny the value of the ideals which persons are called to serve. Professor N. Kemp Smith concludes:

* *And the Life Everlasting*. John Baillie. (Oxford University Press. 1934. 10/6.)
The Future Life. (Martin Hopkinson. 1933. 3/6.)

'If we eliminate all personality, Divine and creaturely, these goods are no longer even barely conceivable. Dispute can only arise as to whether personalities, so enriched, are or are not mortal beings' (p. 149). In other words, the consideration of moral alternatives may suit the modern world, but it may also obscure the initial question whether personal immortality is a fact or not. In one way or another in these essays, it appears that those who retain some belief in the future life affirm in the first place that the spiritual world is basic, and in the second place that personality is the natural form of the spiritual world. Mr. Christopher Dawson sees the vital initial choice as the decision, 'to accept the reality and transcendence of the spiritual world' (p. 128). Professor Kemp Smith states quite fully:

'The belief in immortality cannot stand alone . . . it follows upon belief in Divine Existence, and save as a corollary or consequence of such belief we have no right to it' (p. 142).

Dr. Baillie's argument is an expansion of his enquiry, 'In the discovery of the love of God is not the assurance of immortality enclosed?' (p. 57). Dr. Claude Royden is explicit, 'My belief in a future life is based in the single truth that God is Love' (p. 81).

On the nature of the future life, those who do not accept, or are uninterested in psychic evidence, content themselves with a wise agnosticism. They affirm only what appears to them to follow from the Love of God. A study of these volumes provides a good stimulating summary of modern thinking on this question, both in its more and less satisfying manifestations. To base their faith in immortality upon a belief in God is sound, but tends to remove the foundations of the argument beyond the scope of the volumes. The argument would have been more complete with a pre-liminary series on the Love of God.

G. F. WOODS.

THE NATURE OF FAITH*

These two small volumes on Faith present two approaches to the subject, both of which must come under the consideration of every thoughtful Christian. In *Faith in Action* the word is used:

'not in the ecclesiastical sense, as being what the Church holds as true, or what by long usage has come to be regarded as orthodox. It is not even used in the sense of assent to certain doctrines regarding God and man. It is rather an attitude and a personal response to what is given in Jesus Christ. It is trust in Him as Saviour and Lord . . . The basis of our faith is a personal relation to God, made possible by the present activity of Christ through His Spirit, which brings power to live and illumination to the mind' (pp. 8 and 22).

Another approach to the question is found in *Scientific Faith and Religious Truth*, where we read:

' . . . a Christian must have a personal confession of faith or a creed of some sort, for experience needs the direction of religious hypotheses, which are themselves framed from the data of experience. A creed, however philosophical or theological its language, is in its main essentials a starting point for a tremendous faith in God, and consists of a number of signposts towards first-hand knowledge of God' (p. 77). That these approaches converge, or in other words that while faith is

* *Faith in Action*. By A. J. Nixon. (The Kingsgate Press. 2/-.)

Scientific Faith and Religious Truth. By J. P. Oakden. (S.C.M. 2/-.)

something far greater than creeds, yet, in general, human nature requires that its hypotheses should be formulated, is confirmed by a Roman Catholic's opinions of the Creeds quoted by Dr. Oakden :

"A creed is simply a statement of certain chief points of the Faith, drawn up by some council, bishop, or even private person . . . No creed contains the whole faith, from any point of view. No creed pretends to be inspired ; none is a final standard in itself " (p. 101).

Dr. Nixon justly describes his book as : 'a manual for those who, while they are not much interested in the discussion of doctrine, are very much concerned to make use of their faith in everyday matters which touch their lives at many points,' and as such it cannot fail to commend itself to those who are aware of a need for refreshing reading in the preparation of sermons. His addresses are characterised by a strong personal appeal, and contain a fund of illuminating anecdotes and quotations ; they would be admirable placed into the hands of any who feel the burden of the cares of the world.

On the other hand, Dr. Oakden, feeling acutely the conflict between Theology and Personal Religion, is convinced that 'nothing less than the reunion of Christendom can bring Theology and Religion together once more,' and to this cause dedicates his book. However, may it not be that the reverse is the case, and that when a rapprochement between Theology and Religion is attained, such a degree of reunion as is possible or desirable will automatically follow? Dr. Oakden concludes with some trenchant remarks on the relation of Religion and Science :

'Science frequently stands in glaring contrast to Religion. On the one hand Science is almost entirely in the hands of experts, and amateurs are not encouraged, whereas in the case of Religion, being the concern of all men, its adherents include people at all stages of belief. Christianity can no more be *proved* than can scientific truths but its assumptions are not greater than those of science. The failure of religion is in a real sense its failure to be scientific, that is to say, its customary inability to be as logical and definite in its own sphere as science is in the scientific realm. Religion cannot afford to be inconsistent with itself. With Jesus Christ the methods of discovering knowledge of God are made as scientific as possible, for He pays due regard to the witness of the past, frames new hypotheses about God and tests them with an absolutely consistent faith or confidence in God' (pp. 110-12).

The book ends on an optimistic note ; the author admits that though to-day faith is weak and the conception of God shadowy, yet ' . . . Man is becoming tired of his own reign, and is already beginning to turn his eyes in the direction of the Kingdom of God, which Jesus came to proclaim.'

G. F. COPE.

THE STATE AS RELIGIOUS EDUCATOR *

In this timely and useful book, the Principal and the Chaplain of Bede College, Durham, have gathered a quantity of information, not otherwise conveniently accessible, upon the present state of religious instruction in the schools, and the relations in which the various official agencies stand in regard to it. The crux of the situation is seen to be in the secondary

* *The State and Religious Education*. Being an examination of the present position with some suggestions for its improvement. By E. F. Braley, M.A., LL.D., and M. C. Petitpierre, M.A. With a Foreword by Basil A. Yeaxlee, Ph.D. (S.P.C.K. 1934. 3/6.)

schools and the universities; young men and women, having learnt little or nothing of religion at their secondary schools, proceed to secular universities, and thence issue as teachers (there is an interesting analysis of replies by college students to a Questionnaire on the instruction received at their secondary schools).

The authors note that the Local Education Authorities and the National Union of Teachers are favourably disposed to religious instruction; yet in teaching that results is too often perfunctory or worse. In accounting for this sorry state of things the authors are too ready to make a scapegoat of the Board of Education. Admittedly the Board's attitude is cautious, but it is true that the language of its pronouncements is Greek rather than Christian in derivation and flavour. But, even when portions of the *Handbook of Suggestions* have been examined and fathered upon Plato, there is still no ground for suggesting that the 'State' is putting forward a non-Christian view of education—the 'State' is not doing anything so positive as that, in either direction! Dr. Yeaxlee, in his foreword, puts a truer view when he attributes the neutrality of governments and the secularity of universities to memories of the denominating facetiousness of earlier days, rather than to a 'conscious and deliberate' assertion of non-Christianities; and he concludes that 'only a Christian community can give us a Christian educational system.' Apart, however, from questions of the authors' historical perspective, there is value in their analysis of the *Handbook*; it is always salutary for us to realise how small are the traces of a Christian impress upon the commonly accepted language of 'Education.' The trouble, however, lies deeper than 'policies'; it lies in the religious and moral disintegration of the present age, which Dr. Braley and Mr. Guitierrez describe, with frequent reference to Walter Lippmann's *A Face to Morals*. It is for this age to undertake a work of reconstruction of religious thought on a scale and of a significance comparable with that proceeding in the sphere of physical science. Here is probably the reason why so many of us are so inarticulate about spiritual things, and why—when formulating, say, the aims of education—we are tempted to fall back on weak statements which, though poorer in every way than Christian statements, have the merit of raising fewer questions. The authors of the book urge us fully appreciate the importance of adequate equipment for the teacher, and there is a chapter in which valuable constructive proposals are made as to the training of the teacher. But the radical difficulties remain, and the task of the teacher of religion to-day would still be a very hard one, even if no time and labour were spared in preparing him.

The book is in two parts, of which the first is descriptive and diagnostic. Part II consists mainly of practical suggestions for improving the teaching of religion in provided schools, primary and secondary. These chapters contain many things of value, but they fall in a sense between two stools. There is more than enough to support the thesis that valuable teaching is possible within the limits of the Cowper Temple Clause, but not enough to serve as a handbook for the practising teacher. The second object was doubtless not in the author's intention. But having gone so far, they might as well have gone a little further, worked out their syllabuses in sufficient detail to show what the courses proposed would actually amount to, and added lists of books, collections of suitable hymns and prayers, etc.

There is an excellent chapter on worship in school, and there is humour as well as discernment in the criticism of prayers which (a) are 'sermons in disguise': i.e., an oblique means of exhorting the young worshipper, (b) 'issue elaborate instructions to God.'

In the chapter on class room instruction, emphasis is laid on the inestimable value of studying the Bible, even should that study be conducted by a teacher who is not himself religious.

‘Without some reasonable knowledge of what the Bible in fact contains, it is not possible to form any significant judgment as to the meaning and purpose of the Christian faith’ (p. 94).

Two final criticisms may be permitted. In the first place, the problem of how to present Miracle is touched only to be hastily dropped; on p. 127, when discussing a scheme for secondary pupils *up to sixteen*, the authors evade the issue with, ‘The miracles ought to be known, but the question of their authenticity can hardly yet be discussed.’ In the second place, with their very proper emphasis on the value of historical approach, the authors might have acknowledged more the interdependence of the ‘Scripture’ and ‘History’ syllabuses. It is of the utmost importance that sacred and secular history should not come to the child’s mind as two distinct kinds of history. And, if the integrity of history is to be secured, the teacher of ‘Scripture’ and the teacher of ‘History’ must put their heads together and work out a concerted scheme.

M. V. C. JEFFREYS.

CORRESPONDENCE

AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

SIR,

I do not remember ever having enjoyed an article in the *Modern Churchman* more thoroughly than that by Dr. Cadoux on ‘Authority in Religion.’ It appears to me, as an unlearned layman, to put the case for private judgment against the infallibility of Pope or Creed with clarity, and yet—or perhaps I should say ‘and therefore’—with convincing brilliance and finality.

It may be ungracious to add a complaint against the page and a half of postscript on ‘the personal authority of Jesus,’ with which Dr. Cadoux closes his article. But I find his argument here tantalisingly brief and inconclusive.

Allow me to express some of my hesitations and doubts.

Do we accept Jesus’ person and work as a ‘*divine*’ revelation? If so, do we not beg the question? For, as Dr. Cadoux postulates, ‘the ultimate authority is God.’ A *human* teacher may err and his pupil may differ from him (points 4 and 5 in Dr. Cadoux’s main thesis). If I accept the ‘divinity’ of Jesus, I do so exactly as the Catholic accepts the ‘infallibility’ of the Pope—on the strength of fallible private judgment. This Dr. Cadoux seems to admit—but then we must accept Jesus’ authority as ‘provisional’—*not* divine.

Do the Gospel records—or what criticism leaves of them—exhibit a ‘perfect’ life? Have we enough material to say? In any case, can we imperfect beings judge perfection? Admittedly Jesus was intellectually fallible. Is there no evidence of moral shortcoming too? Possibly incidents like the cursing of the barren fig tree may be explained away or expunged altogether as unhistorical. There remains indelible Jesus’ complete incapacity to appreciate any good in the Pharisee.

Am I right in imagining from Dr. Cadoux's last paragraph that he not only witnesses but also approves a shifting of the Christian fulcrum from reliance on 'the objective authority of historical characters' (even perhaps the very Founder Himself) to reliance on 'the inward manifestations safeguarded by God to the mind and conscience of man'? If so, I declare myself his humble pupil. But then must we not with such men as the late Frank Lenwood, give up applying to Jesus such a phrase as 'Our Lord,' and adopt that of 'Our Leader'?

ARTHUR DAVIES.

Wyke Gates, Berkhamsted, Herts.

THE REPLY OF DR. CADOUX.

I have read Mr. Davies's letter with great interest and appreciation. It is particularly interesting to learn the points at which the sympathetic reader feels difficulty: and I am accordingly grateful to Mr. Davies for expressing his criticisms, and to the Editor for allowing me to try to answer them.

In reply to his first point, I am afraid I cannot accept 'provisional' and 'divine' as two mutually exclusive kinds of authority. All tested and verified authority is in some sense divine; but until it is tested and verified, it is also provisional. In any case, I should certainly say that, strictly speaking, and using the term in the sense in which Mr. Davies seems to be using it, Jesus' authority is provisional. This seems to me only an alternative way of saying what many orthodox Anglican scholars have been saying for many years past, *viz.* that Jesus, in His incarnate life, was not intellectually infallible or omniscient. If that position be accepted—and I do not see how it can be evaded—it follows as the night the day that what Jesus said is true and authoritative, not simply because *He* said it, but because, and in so far as, it answers the tests of truth to which He invites His followers to subject it. I tried to bring this out in the last paragraph but one of my article, and have discussed it more fully in my book, *Catholicism and Christianity*, ch. xi. I need only add here that the limiting conditions within which Jesus' revelation of God was imparted to us do not make that revelation (when clearly sifted out) any the less divine.

On Mr. Davies's second question—the perfection of Jesus—I can only say that I do not share the feeling which some admit that there are moral shortcomings in the character discernible by historical criticism in the Gospels. The story of the blasted fig-tree is almost certainly a perversion of a genuine parable (Lk. xiii, 6-9). And I cannot admit that Jesus was incapable of perceiving any good in the Pharisees. Passages like Mt. xiii, 12-17 (see McNeile's note); Lk. xi, 37; xiv, 1; Mk. xii, 28-34, show that the relationship between them was not always one of tension: and extra emphasis must be placed on these passages if we wish to correct the unbalanced view which the bulk and prominence of the recorded denunciations is apt to create in our minds. In the denunciatory passages, certain objections are probably necessary on critical grounds: *e.g.* 'offspring of the serpent' (Matt. xiii, 38), who is addressed by Jesus to the Pharisees only by 'Matthew' (xii, 34, 35), who is probably simply ascribing to Jesus a phrase of John the Baptist's (Matt. iii, 7=Lk. iii, 7, Q). Matt. xxii, 7 (missing from the Latin version of the story) is almost certainly not a true saying of Jesus. When due allowance is made for these critical reductions, and for the

emphasis habitual with the enthusiastic Eastern prophet (though often seeming hyperbolic to Western ears), Jesus cannot be shown to have been unfair to the Pharisees. That their pettifogging view of religious obligation stood in need of sharp correction will be patent to anyone who will read a tractate or two of the Mishna. But I have long doubted whether the truest estimate of Jesus' moral character is obtained by detailed discussion of points in the story which some feel are morally doubtful. The broad fact remains that in moral grandeur—in sheer achieved goodness—Jesus easily out-tops the best we can see elsewhere. The precise question of how sinlessness is to be made consistent with that natural moral development through which we know Jesus went (Lk. ii, 40, 52; Mk. x, 18; Heb. v, 8), is a very difficult one to answer; and the discussion of it rarely leads to satisfactory results.

In regard to Mr. Davies's last point, may I refer once again to my discussion of this whole question of the nature and seat of authority in *Catholicism and Christianity*, Part II? Broadly speaking, my answer to the first of his two questions is 'Yes'; but the provisos that (1) God's authority, manifested inwardly in us, is truly objective, and (2) God's authority, in order to be clearly realized by us, needs not only inward attestation, but also outward embodiment in the lives and deeds of others, must never be lost sight of. I see no need to abandon the phrase 'Our Lord' with reference to Jesus: if Jesus be *truly* our Leader, *i.e.* the one in whom we see with supreme clearness the numinous embodiment of the Divine Will and Nature in a human life, that amply justifies the title 'Lord': and so far as I can see, no revelation of a metaphysically super-human life that was not essentially leadership in this sense would justify the title.

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THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION

COUNCIL ELECTION, 1935.

SIR,

I shall be obliged if you will kindly give publicity to the following official notice to members of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

By the Constitution the following elected members of the Council retire on the day of the Annual General Meeting in May, 1935, and are not eligible for re-election, *viz.*: — Miss E. M. Beaumont, Rev. J. S. Boys-Smith, Miss A. M. Ferguson, Rev. R. G. Griffith, Mr. R. B. Henderson, Rev. R. D. Richardson, Rev. C. F. Russell, Rev. A. E. N. Simms, and Rev. Professor N. Sykes.

The following co-opted members of the Council retire at the same time, but are eligible for re-election, *viz.*: — Rev. Canon Harold Anson, Miss A. M. Ashley, Mr. F. Victor Fisher, Mr. Claud Mullins, Dr. J. W. Walker, Dr. Douglas White, and Sir Arnold Wilson.

Ten members of the Council are to be elected this year, and the nominations of candidates must reach the Secretary not later than March 1st. The names must be proposed and seconded by members of the Union, and the consent of the nominees should first be obtained. If more than ten nominations are received, voting papers will be sent to all members of the Union.

T. J. WOOD.